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A  UTHOR : 


COURTNEY, 


TITLE: 

THE 


ETAPHYSICS  OF 


JOHN  STUART  MILL 


PLACE: 


LONDON 


DA  TE : 


1879 


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Courtney,  William  Leonard,  1850-1928. 

The  metaphysics  of  John  Stuart  Mill.   By  W  L  Court     ,' 
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1^1,  John  Stuart,  1806-1873.    2.  Metaphysics. 

Title  from  Univ.  of  Chicago  B1608.M6C8    Printed  by  L.  C 


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^*,    n«TJt?    TWT?nRY    OF    LOGIC  :    An  Essay. 

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PHYSIOLOGICAL  /ESTHETICS.     By  Geaht 
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1879. 


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THE    METAPHYSICS 


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JOHN     STUART    MILL. 


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This  book  is  an  attempt  to  deal  in  somewhat 
cursory  fashion   with    large    metaphysical  pro- 
blems.    Questions   of  Philosophy  almost  neces- 
sarily involve  an  abstruse  mode   of  treatment, 
intricate    details,   and   a  technical  phraseology, 
which  make  them  difficult  and  repellent  to  the 
majority  of  the  reading  public ;  while  the  attempt 
to  treat  them  in  a  simple   and  broad  manner, 
without   the   use   of    a  peculiar   nomenclature, 
seems  fore-doomed  to   ignore   their  complexity 
and  arduousness.     Whether  it  is  possible  to  steer 
clear  of  either  misfortune  is,  perhaps,  doubtful : 
all  that  I  have  tried  to  do  in  the  following  pages 
is  to  avoid  prolixity,  and  to  set  as  clearly  as  I 
could  before  the  reader  the  main  issue  between 
rival  systems.     Originality  I  cannot  and  do  not 
claim. 


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Yl 


PEEFACE. 


That  Mr.  Mill's  logical  and  psychological  spe- 
culations distinctly  raise  metaphysical  questions 
is  in  itself  a  proof  of  the  reality  of  Metaphysics. 
Every  system  must  of  necessity  rest  on  the  basis  of 
some  theory  of  "  Consciousness,"  and, "  Conscious- 
ness "  brings  inevitably  in  its  train  metaphysical 
problems.     Even  a  physiologist  like  Mr.  George 
Henry  Lewes  finds,  in  his  ''  Problems  of  Life 
and  Mind,"  that  the  Positive  Philosophy  must 
seek  to  lay,  as  best  it  can,  the  Metaphysical 
ghost,  which  is  ever  starting  up  with  awkward 
persistence  to  confront  experimental  psychology 
and  demonstrated  materialism. 

It  only  remains  for  me  to  acknowledge  assist- 
ance received  from  one  or  two  friends,  especially 
Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley,  Fellow  of  Merton  CoUeo-e, 
Oxford.  Most  of  aU,  however,  I  am  indebted  to 
Professor  Green's  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy 
of  Hume,---a  work  to  which  many  of  these  pages 
owe  any  value  they  may  contain. 

Oxfoi©,  Nomnher,  1878. 


? 


iff 
III  I 

I 


CONTENTS. 

f 

PACE 

CHAP.          I.— IXTEODUCTORY 1 

„             II.— THE  ANTECEDENTS   OF    MILL.      HUME           .           .      .  16 

,,           III. — THE  ANTECEDENTS  OF   MILL  {continued)          .           .  27 

,,            IV.— CONSCIOUSNESS 44 

^^             Y. — BODY  AND  MIND 63 

,,           VL— THE  PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER        .'          .      .  81 

„         VIL— CAUSATION,   AND   THE  UNIFORMITY  OF   NATURE    .  9S 

,,        VIIL  — MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS  AND  NECESSARY  TRUTHS    .  116 

,,            IX. — GENERAL  IDEAS 134 

,,             X — EPILOGUE 148 


1^ 
~4 


THE   METAPHYSICS 


OF 


JOHN    STUAET    MILL. 


CHAPTER    I. 


INTRODUCTOEY. 

The  future  of  metaphysical  speculation  is  tlie 
question  which  is  more  and  more  agitating  the 
modem  philosophic  mind.  Is  it  doomed  to  yield 
to  the  conquering  inroads  of  *'  Science,"  is  it,  in  Mr. 
Lewes'  language  "  to  be  crushed  into  dust  beneath 
the  chariot  wheels  of  modern  thought  ?  "  Or  is  there 
yet  a  region  into  which  Science  has  never  come,  into 
which  it  cannot  come,  because  Scientific  methods 
cannot  be  applied  to  the  source  and  fountain-head  of 
all  method  whatsoever  ?  Such  a  question  can  only  be 
approached  when  it  has  become  clear  with  what  sort 
of  problems  metaphysics  deals  :  it  cannot  be  sum- 
marily despatched  by  the  assertion  that  every  such 
problem,   when    "  rationally  stated,"    is    capable  of 

B 


2  THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 

solution  by    "the  inductions  and  deductions    from 
experience." 

The  c^^^-^ntion  of  ^^^  "f[  iii'iif-i  lif  rnrtfiphpin  is 
that  itjs  totally  unprogressive.  Here  again  the  whole 
question  turns  upon  the  nature  of  the  progress  to  be 
demanded,  the  character  of  those  hindmarks  by  which 
advance,  retrogression,  and  lateral  oscillation  are 
severally  to  be  estimated.  Especially  in  the  judgment 
to  be  passed  upon  a  particular  philosophical  writer, 
like  John  Stuart  Mill,  is  it  necessary  to  begin  with  a 
preliminary  view  of  intellectual  movements  in  the 
higher  questions  of  philosophy,  if  we  are  in  any  way 
to  determine  the  position  he  is  to  occupy,  and  the 
value  to  be  attributed  to  his  labours.  And  it  is  only 
possible  adequately  to  do  this,  after  a  general  survey 
of  the  lines  on  which  Modern  Philosophy  has  moved 
for  two  centuries  from  Descartes  to  Hegel. 

The  period,  commencing  in  the  sixteenth  century 
and  ending  in  the  eighteenth,  exhibits  three  great 
movements.  At  the  outset  there  is  the  vast  do^miatic 
system  of  Scholasticism.  At  the  close  there  is  another 
dogmatic  system,  rising  into  prominence,  a  dogmatism 
which  attempts  to  construct  an  ontology  out  of 
thought,  tlie  system  of  Hegel.  And  midway  be- 
tween the  two,— in  the  interspace  between  the  two 
dogmatisms,— there  is  a  period  wherein  thought  in  its 
newly-found  emancipation  is  running  riot  in  different 
lines,  touching  the  problems  on  every  side,  enquiring 


'  h 


1 


INTEODUCTOEY.  3 

critical,  tentative,  everything  but  dogmatic,  going  a 
few  steps  in  one  direction,  and  then,  dissatisfied,  turn- 
ing back  on  its  footsteps  and  essaying  another  path, 
building  up  only  to  destroy— a  great  transitional 
period,  paving  the  way  for  a  great  constructive  epoch 
in  the  future. 

Is  there  any  one  description  which  will  suit  this 
period?  is  there  any  one  aspect  which  will  embrace 
its  various  movements?  Perhaps  only  this:  a  de- 
termined assertion  of  the  rights  of  the  individual  as 
against  all  authority.  Authoritative  assertion  it  will 
have  none  of:  whether  it  be  the  authority  of  the  Church, 
or  the  authority  of  Thought  in  its  universal  relations, 
or  the  authority  of  a  great  Matter  outside  which  forces 
knowledge  into  conformity  with  itself.  If  ever  any  of 
these  assertions  of  Authority  are  made,  in  however  tenter 
live  a  form,  they  are  immediately  destroyed.  Scholasti- 
cism made  the  assertion  of  the  Church's  Authority :  and 
Bacon  and  Descartes  threw  it  off.  Locke  tended  to 
assert  the  Authority  of  Matter,  and  Berkeley  threw  it 
off.  Berkeley  tended  to  assert  the  Authority  of  Spirit 
or  Universal  Thought,  and  Hume  threw  it  off.  The 
right  of  the  individual  to  construct  his  own  world  of 
Knowledge  and  Thought  and  Life,— this  is  perhaps  the 

/le  dominant  feature  of  the  whole  period. 
When,  after  such  a  general  prospect,  we  look  closer 
into  these  systems,  the  action  and  reaction,  the  con- 
struction and  the  destruction,  the  synthesis  and  the 


B  2 


> 


Ill 

.f  ■III 


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it- 


I 


4  THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 

analysis  strike  us  more  clearly.  PMlosophy  means 
Invention,  says  Bacon :  Philosophy  means  the  assertion 
of  myself  as  a  thinking  subject,  says  Descartes.  Then 
follow  Materialism  in  Hobbes,  Pantheism  in  Spinoza, 
Sensationalism  in  Locke,  Idealism  in  Berkeley,  Scepti- 
cism in  Hume,  Monadism  or  Individualistic  Idealism  in 
Leibnitz,  endless  analysis  in  Wolflf.  The  mere  terms 
of  description  are  so  antagonistic  that  the  whole  period 
looks  like  cliaos.  But  this  makes  still  clearer  the 
business  of  the  historian,  to  disentangle  the  permanent 
elements  from  the  transitory,  to  discover  the  progres- 
sive  tendencies,  and  dissever  tliem  from  the  retrogres- 
sive, to  let  the  various  systems  fall  into  their  proper 
places  of  superiority  and  subordination,  to  discover 
which  for  us  are  the  most  important  and  which 
most  helpful  to  Thought  and  Philosophy  viewed 
as  a  Progress,  and  not  as  a  chaos  of  conflicting 
opinions. 

There  are  two  points  which  are  chiefly  interesting 
in  studying  any  period.  The  first  is  to  see  tJie  limita- 
twm  of  TlmigM — to  see  how  Thought,  as  expressed  in 
the  various  systems,  is  limited  to  one  issue  rather  than 
another,  to  the  one-sided  affirmation  of  one  tendency 
and  the  undue  depreciation  of  anotlier  tendency. 
And  U.e  second  U  to  see  M.  Deteloi»ne,U,  of  Tlumgk- 
to  deny  which  is  indeed  the  dcatliblow  of  Philosophy, 
tlie  cud  of  all  fruitful  relation  between  Philosophy  and 
iiile. 


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INTRODUCTOEY.  6 

Let  us  look  at  the  first  of  these. 
Thought,  we  say,  is  limited  in  its  expression  in  any 
one  system.     Limited  by  what  ?    By  three  things—  ! 
by  the  particular  character  of  the  knowledge  around  ' 
it,  by  nationality,  by  the  particular  moment  at  which  . 
the  system  is  born. 

In  Bacon,  for  instance,  there  is  the  enormous  and  rapid 
development  of  physical  research  going  on  around  him : 
tbere  is  "  the  moment "  wherein  the  individual  thinker 
was  casting  off  the  restraints  of  autliority,  wliether  of 
Church  or  of  Aristotle  :  and  as  to  the  problem  which  ho 
assigned  to  Pliilosopliy,  the  problem  of  Invention,  or 
Human  Mastery  over  Nature's  secrets,— who  can  doubt 
that  such  a  problem  essentially  suited  the  cliaracter  of 
a  grave,  practical,  active  people  like  the  English,  with 
their  spirit  of  enterprise  as  exhibited  in  travel,  and 
their  intolerance  for  metaphysics  and  word-splitting  ? 
These,  in  the  sphere  of  literature,  we  call  «*  predis- 
posing causes,"  because  in  literature   the   diversity 
and  partiality  are  recognised  elements ;  but  we  call 
them  "  limitations "  in  the  case  of  Thought,  limita- 
tions of  that  pure,  distinctionless  spirit,  the  inmost 
nature  of  which  must  be  to  be  above  party  or  creed 

or  nation. 

Or  if,  leaving  Bacon,  we  look  at  the  course  of  philo- 
sophy as  it  expressed  itself  in  Locke,  and  was  then 
.  extended  by  Berkeley  and  Hume,  similar  results  are 
obtained.     We  see  in  Locke  the  incarnation   of  the 


'  1 


:- 


I'! 


0  THE  METAPHYSICS   OF  MILL. 

Englisli  pliilosopliic  temper,  the  massive  common- 
sense,  the  semi-materialism,  the  practical  way  of 
**  sending  a  man  back  to  his  senses."  But  after  Locke, 
tendencies  a  little  alien  to  the  English  mind  come 
in,— Berkeley,  the  too  vivacious  and  spiritual  Irish- 
man, attempting  to  prove  that  Locke's  philosophy  led 
to  Idealism,  and  Hume,  the  too  logical  and  hard- 
headed  Scotchman,  shocking  English  respectability, 
by  showing  that  Locke  led  straight  to  Scepticism. 

I  have  tiken  the  British  philosopliers,  because  it  is 
more  easy  fur  us  to  see  in  their  case  these  liniitiitions 
in  the  expression  of  Thought;  but  the  same  thing 
would  of  course  be  true,  among  others,  of  Spinoza 
and  Wolff.  Spinoza,  the  Jew,  filled  full  with  the 
Jewish  idea  of  God's  unity  and  omnipotence,  naturally 
turned  his  thought  into  a  system  of  Pantheism ;  and 
Wolff,  the  German,  with  his  patient  analysis,  with  his 
spider-like  proi>ensity  of  evolving  thought  out  of  him- 
self, with  his  method,  his  completeness,  his  dulness — 
are  not  these  characteristics  of  hk  nationality  ? 

All  these  considerations  add,  I  think,  to  the  fresh- 
ness of  interest  in  studying  the  History  of  Philosophy, 
but  they  might  lead  us  to  serious  error.  The  effect  is 
to  make  one  believe  too  much  in  individualities  and 
too  little  in  Thought.  Philosophy  is  too  sacred  and 
too  impersonal  a  thing  to  be  resolved  into  mere  con- 
ditions and  limitations  of  epochs  or  nationalities  or 
individual  tempers.    Let  us  then  try  to  correct  this 


11 
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I 


INTBODUCTOEY.  7 

by  turning  to  the  other  point  of  interest,  the  Develop- 
ment of  Thought.  In  the  vast  and  multiform  move- 
ment of  thought  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  what  elements  of  permanent  acquisition  in 
Philosophy  were  being  brought  to  light?-  What 
threads  may  we  disentangle  from  the  complex  web  to 
give  the  clue  to  the  new  pattern  ? 

The  iirst  I  will  instance  is  the  meaning  and  proper 
content  of  the  word  "  Individual."  That  looks  an  in- 
significant result  assuredly.  But  it  is  not  so  really ; 
it  carries  with  it  far  weightier  consequences  than  would 
appear  at  first  sight.  What,  in  the  first  place,  is  an 
Individual  object?  We  apprehend  many  such  every 
day  of  our  lives,  and  without  analysis  wo  should  say 
that  an  individual  object  of  perception  was  the  effect 
or  result  of  a  single  unrelated  moment  of  conscious- 
ness, taking  in  or  grasping  a  single  unrelated  thing. 
That  is,  in  truth,  the  way  it  strikes  Locke ;  he  is,  as  a 
philosopher,  exactly  in  the  same  position  as  we  are  in 
our  unanalytic  common-sense  moods.  But  then  it  is 
from  these  objects,  successively  apprehended,  that  our 
whole  body  of  knowledge,  in  some  way,  grows ;  and 
again  it  is  of  these  objects,  single  and  unrelated,  that 
in  some  way  the  world,  as  a  whole,  is  composed.  Now, 
if  we  put  a  number  of  leaden  bullets  together,  they 
certainly  do  not  mass  themselves  into  one  large  leaden 
l»ullet  by  themselves.  That  is  only  possible  if  they 
are  fused  together  by  melting.    And  a  number  of 


a 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


single,  unrelated  objects  will  never  form  an  articulated 
world,  or  a  complex  body  of  knowledge,  unless  they 
too  are  in  some  way  fused  together.     How  are  they  to 
be  fused  ?    The  obvious  reply  is,  that  the  mind  invents 
some  links   or  relations  between  them.      Are  these 
links,  then,  formed  by   the  mind,   purely  fictitious, 
mere  inventions  ?    Yes,  answer  Locke  and  Hume,  they 
are  not  found  in  the  constitution  of  things.     Then 
the  world,  as  a  totality,  and  not  as  a  mere  heap  of 
objects,  is  a  delusion  ?     Yes.     And  knowledge,  as  a 
synthesis,  and  as  a  unity,  and  not  as  a  succession  of 
single  modes  of  consciousness,  is   a  delusion  also? 
Yes.     itere  then  we   have  the  complete  scepticism 
of  Hume.      But  Philosophy  and  Knowledge  refuse 
to  commit  suicide  in  tliis  way.     And  so,  as  the  whole 
conclusion  seems  to  come  from  the  way  in  which  the 
individual  was    regarded,   Philosopliy  looks    at    this 
"individual"  again,   to    see   if   it    can    be    defined 
differently.     Tliere  are  three  words  :  particular,  indi- 
vidual, universal,  which  seem  to  come  in  a  definite 
order.      Of  these,   it  is   **  particular "   which  should 
properly  be  applied  to  the  single,  unrelated  impression, 
just  as  it  is  "universal,"  which  is  obviously  applied 
to  the  synthesis  of  objects  in  a  world,  or  a  synthesis 
of  perception    in    knowledge.      What  then  is   indi- 
vidual?   It  is   the  meeting-point  of  particular  and 
universal.     In  an  individual  object,  how  much,  if  we 
carefully  analyse,  is  involved  ?    This  much,~there  is 


the  particular  impression  on  the  sentient  organs,  and 
there  is  tlie  action  of  the  mind,  which  grasps  this  im- 
pression, and  retains  it,  by  relating  it  to  other  im- 
pressions :  and  so  the  object  becomes  definite  and 
individual,  distinguished  from  everything  else,  and 
yet  related  to  everything  else.  Another  result,  too, 
follows.  If  the  universal  element,  i.e.,  the  super- 
induction  of  relations,  really  makes  a  world,  and  not 
a  mere  heap  of  unrelated  objects,  it  must  be  due  to 
Thought,  that  we  get  a  real  world  at  all ;  or,  in  other 
words,  Reality  is  the  work  of  Thought,  to  be  found  in 
thought,  and  not  in  a  supposed  Matter,  still  less  in  a 
series  of  sensations. 

Let  us,  before  leaving  this  word,  "  universal,"  look 
at  it  in  another  way.  Take  an  individual  man,  a  finite 
individual.  Is  there  such  a  creature  ?  Spinoza  says. 
No.  He  is  only  an  unreal  fraction  of  the  Universal. 
Hume  would  say  Yes,  the  universal,  on  the  contrary, 
being  a  mere  fiction  of  the  finite  individual.  Here  are 
the  two  extremes,  and  here  is  the  difiiculty.  An  indi- 
vidual man  is  finite  and  separate,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
yet  on  the  other  he  can  arrive  at  universal  notions 
and  have  an  idea  of  Universality  whether  exhibited  in 
a  Perfect  God,  or  a  Cosmic  Unity.  How  is  this  pos- 
sible ?  Only,  as  it  seems,  in  one  way  :  The  individual 
is  a  junction  of  the  Universal  and  the  Particular, 
limited  as  being  "  a  part  of  this  partial  world  "  * — of 

*  Green's  "Hume,"  p.  131. 


10 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


matter,  as  we  rooglily  call  it ;    but  transcending  his 

limitations,  as  being  self-conscious,— because  Thought 
is  univei'sal. 

Such  are  the  momentous  issues  of  a  proper  appre- 
ciation of  this  word,  so  simple  as  it  seems,—"  Indi- 
vidual." 

Again,  we  can  trace  the  same  progress  in  the 
proper  understanding  of  such  words  as  Sensation, 
Percei)tion,  Thought.  Sensation  and  Perception  are 
treated  as  identical,  not  distinguished,  both  by  Locke 
and  Hume :  we  cannot  say  exactly  the  same  of 
Berkeley,  hecause  he  seemed  to  recognise  in  the  second 
edition  of  his  "  Principles,"  that  he  would  have  to 
distinguish  his  "  idea,"  or  passive  sensation,  from  an 
active  something,  which  he  called  "  notion." 

%  reality  it  appears^  Bensation.  Perceptinn^ 

^'^„^L?^<^"o^i*  ^^e Jfel^rrelates  of  the  words,  Par- 

^^^^„..L is^^^i!?^'  Universal      We  do   not  appre- 

Eend  an  Individual  by  Sensation,  as  Locke  thought. 
All  we  can  be  aware  of  by  Sensation  is  a  single 
moment  of  sentience— a  momentary  modification  of 
our  sensibility,  which  is  what  we  call  "  Parti- 
cular." An  individual  object,  however,  is  perceived: 
a  perception,  in  other  words,  is  the  superinduction 
on  the  particular  element  of  sensation,  of  the  uni- 
versal  element  of  Thought-relations.  To  constitute 
an  individual  object,  the  momentary  sensation  has 
to  be  arrested,  fixed,  made  definite,  crystallized,  by 


INTEODTJCTOEY. 


11 


the  putting  on  of  relations,  which  serve  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from,  and  relate  it  to,  everything  else. 
Tliis  is  Perception — the  fusion,  as  it  were,  of  the  uni- 
versal element  of  Thought  and  the  particular  elements 
of  Sensation. 

The  inquiry  naturally  comes  after  all  this, — is  not 
this  mere  elaborate  word-splitting?  Does  it,  after  all, 
make  much  dilfereuce  what  particular  meaning  we 
assign  to  words  of  this  sort  ?  It  makes  no  difference, 
it  may  at  once  be  admitted,  to  the  practical,  common- 
sense  man,  who  wishes  to  carve  out  his  fortune  in  his 
own  practical  way — any  more  than  it  makes  any 
dilLrcnce  to  the  Scientific  man,  who  wipes  away  all 
these  mental  cobwebs,  and  applies  himself  to  experi- 
ment and  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  of  Nature.  The 
only  thing  to  be  remembered  is,  that  underlying  all 
these  experiments  and  all  this  practical  acquaintance 
with  the  world,  there  is  the  further  question,  which 
some  minds  are  compelled  to  ask.  How  is  Nature, 
— How  is  the  world,  known  at  all?  And  then  the 
result  comes  out,  that,  despite  all  this  seemingly 
immediate  perception  of  Nature  and  the  world,  the 
underlying  fact  is  *'  consciousness,"  and  the  appa- 
rently external  thing  is  found  by  an  inexorable  logic, 
to  be  after  all  a  mode  of  consciousness.  Something 
of  course  there  is  of  external,  sometliing  which  is, 
as  it  were,  given  to  the  mind  and  not  manufactured 
by  the  mind,  but  the  whole  envisagement  of  the  thing, 


12 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


the  wliole  *  entmirag'e/tis  it  were,  wliicli  makes  it  for  us 
a  tiling  at  all,  is  the  creation  of  consciousness. 

All  this  preliminary  consideration,  tlie  wliole  of  tliese 
fundamental  conditions,  may  be  taken  for  granted,  but 
cannot  be  denied.  And  the  interest  for  the  meta- 
physical philoso}>her  is  just  this  preliminary  considera- 
tion, these  fundamental  conditions,  the  satisfactory 
explanation  of  which  means  for  him  progress,  and 
their  systematic  neglect,  or  confused  treatment,  means 
for  him  tlie  demolition  of  all  rffison  iVetre  whatsoever. 

And  so  all  these  straiuLs  of  inquiry  and  speculation, 
some  of  which  we  have  been  considering,  are  reduced 
at  length  to  the  one  great  decisive  problem — What  is 
the  relation  of  the  Self  to  the  Not- Self,  of  the  Ego  to 
the  Non-Ego?  To  deny  the  Self,  means  scepticism 
and  despair  of  knowledge  as  a  reasoned  system,  as  it 
did  with  Hume.  To  deny  the  Not-Self,  means  end- 
less analysis  and  sterile  revolution  of  thought  upon 
itself,  as  it  did  with  Wolff.  Progressive  advance  of 
knowledge,  and  knowledge  as  a  reasoned  system,  alike 
imperatively  demand  the  acknowledgment  of  both 
factors,  and  some  necessary  relation  between  the  two. 
What,  then,  is  the  relation  ? 

All  the  speculation  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  seems  to  tend  to  one  result,  which  may 
thus  be  summed.  The  Not- Self  is  the  manifold, 
the  unformed,  the  airctpor,  as  it  successively  conies  in 
upon    our    sentient  organs.      A   sensation    is    this 


I 


INTEODUCTORY. 


13 


momentary  stirring  of  the  sensory  organs  :  a  Percep- 
tion  is  the  individualising,  the  making-definite  of  the 
manifold  of  sensation  by  the  relations  imposed  by 
Thought.  Thought  is  two-fold :  in  relation  to  Percep- 
tion, it  is  the  superinduction  of  forms,  of  categories  : 
in  relation  to  itself,  it  is  the  universal,  which  makes 
these  forms,  these  categories,  the  creator  of  a  Real 
World,  as  a  totality  or  synthesis  of  Phenomena,  the 
creator  of  Knowledge,  as  a  synthesis  or  totality  of  Per- 
ception, a  perfect  and  complete  Self-Consciousness— 
limited,  indeed,  in  the  case  of  men,  by  their  being 
finite  parts  of  this  finite  order,  while  in  God,  it  is 
just  this  Divine  Self-Consciousness,  apart  from  and 
above  all  such  limitations. 

Not- Self,  Self,  God — to  aneLpov,  t6  ircTTcpaa-fjievov, 
TO  TTcpas  :  these  are  the  successive  moments  of  Meta- 
physics, and  it  is  in  progress  to  and  in  realisation  of 
these,  that  it  finds  its  scope,  its  justification,  and  its 
life. 


Wliat  tlie  position  of  Mill  is,  with  regard  to  this 
vast  intellectual  movement,  we  have  now  to  attempt  to 
discover.  For  Hie  present,  we  may  just  indicate  the 
conditions  under  which  his  philosophy  is  attempted. 
He  is  a  Sensationalist,— that  is,  he  belongs  to  that 
line  of  English  philosophy  which  commenced  with 


14 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OP   MILL. 


INTEODUCTOEY. 


15 


Hobbes,  was  continued  by  Locke  and  Berkeley,  and 
culminated  in  Hume.  But,  if  our  review  of  the 
f  period  be  at  all  correct,  Hume  represented  the  high- 
I  water  mark  of  this  sort  of  speculation.  Therefore  Mill 
must  combine  with  Hume  some  newer  elements. 
Above  all,  living  in  a  great  scientific  age,  he  must 
make  his  peace  with  Science,  which  Hume,  to  say  the 
least,  somewhat  gravely  affronted.  And  Science,  for 
most  thinkers,  has  only  one  metaphysical  foundation, 
viz.,  that  of  Realism.  Therefore  Mill  has  in  some  way 
to  combine  Sensationalism  and  Realism.  He  is  a 
Sensationalist  in  his  *'  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton," and  a  Realist  in  his  "  Logic." 

Or  let  us  look  at  him  from  a  different  aspect.  He  is 
an  Empiricist, — one  link  in  that  chain  of  empirical 
research  which  was  formulated  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tuiy  and  vastly  developed  in  the  nineteenth.  But 
empiricism  in  the  hands  of  Locke  and  Hume  is  indi- 
vidualistic; empiricism  in  the  hands  of  Herbert 
Spencer  and  George  Henry  Lewes  is  universal  is  tic. 
To  which  of  the  two  species  of  empiricism  does  Mill 
belong?  Curiously  enough,  the  *' experience"  which 
plays  so  large  a  part  in  his  philosophy,  belongs  to  the 
age  which  preceded  him,  not  to  that  of  his  contempo- 
raries. In  otlier  words,  not  in  an  age  of  individualism, 
he  founds  his  philosophy  on  the  experience  of  the 
individual,  like  Hume,  not  on  that  of  the  race,  like 
Herbert  Spencer.     Living  in  the  nineteenth  century, 


in  the  age  when  conceptions  like  "evolution"  and 
"  development  of  the  race  "  are  in  the  air,  he  still 
turns  back  to  the  time  when  "  the  historic  sense  " 
was  hardly  born. 


/ 


THE  ANTECEDENTS   OP  MILL.     HUME.        17 


TT 

\^ JL JLi JLJk Mini    JL  .JLJ JLIi  JL  JL,  m 

THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL.      HUME. 

The  spiritual  progenitor  of  Mill  is  undoubtedly 
Hume.  Without  Hume,  Mill  would  not  have  been 
possible,  just  as  without  Locke  and  Berkeley,  Hume 
would  not  have  been  possible.  Yet  the  relation  of 
Mill  and  his  predecessor  is  by  no  means  the  same  as 
that  of  Hume  and  his  predecessors.  There  are  times 
when  thought  enters — almost  without  warning — upon 
II  brilliant  and  rapidly-developing  course,  when  every 
step  forward  presents  a  clearly-defined  and  continuous 
progress,  "  churning  life  out  of  a  dead  level  of  habit  and 
custom,"  striking  out  glints  and  gleams  of  meteoric 
brilliance,  till  the  whole  intellectual  horizon  is  glowing 
with  their  fires.  Such  was  tlie  brief  life  of  drama  in 
England,  or  the  sudden  glory  of  Athenian  art :  such 
too,  with  more  sombre  and  subdued  radiance,  was  the 
development  of  Sensationalism  in  England  from  Locke 
to  Hume.  In  these  times,  the  lineal  successor  is  also 
the  more  perfect  mouthpiece  of  the  thought ;  each  step 
brings  out  the  system  into  sharper  and  bolder  relief. 


But  in  other  times,  when  the  animating  impulse  has 
subsided,  and  the  Spirit  has  spent  its  force,  lineal 
succession  becomes  mere  repetition  with  variations, 
dying  away  into  hollower,  artificial,  capricious  echoes. 
And  then  the  thinker  who  takes  up  the  mantle  that 
has  dropped  from  his  predecessor's  shoulders,  is  merely 
sewing  pieces  of  new  cloth  into  the  old  raiment, 
whereby  the  rents  are  made  worse. 

The  peculiar  merit  of  Hume,  as  a  philosopher,  con- 
sists in  his  superior  consistency.  With  him,  the  doc- 
trines of  Sensationalism  which  he  inherited,  are  cleared 
of  their  inconsistencies  and  presented  in  clear  and 
startling  nakedness.  In  many  respects,  his  is  an 
almost  ideal  character  for  a  philosopher.  There  is  his 
absolute  freedom  from  Theological  prepossession,  which 
enabled  him  to  discuss,  without  any  anxiety  about  the 
issue,  the  successive  difiiculties  of  Philosophy,  and 
accept  with  composure  the  sceptical  conclusion.  There 
is  the  literary  vanity— the  last  infirmity  of  philosophic 
minds — which  led  him  to  suppress  his  earlier  work,  and 
suggested  brilliant  paradox  and  intolerant  posturing 
against  Dogmatists  and  Mystics;  and  there  is  the 
literary  strategy  and  skill  which  taught  him  how  to 
arrange  his  arguments  to  win  his  reader's  ears.  Perhaps, 
too,  must  be  added  the  characteristic  frankness  with 
which  he  confessed  that  his  doubts  left  him,  as  soon  as 
he  left  his  study*— the  unconscious  testimony  to  the  dis- 


\ 


*  (( 


Treatise,"  Bk.  IV.,  sec.  rii. 


18 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


THE  ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL.     HUME. 


19 


satisfaction  which  is  the  natural  issue  of  such  a  system, 
and  to  the  obdurate  refusal  of  knowledge  to  commit  such 
suicide,  as  Hume  recommended.    These  merits  enabled 
Mm  to  see  more  clearly  than  ever  was  seen  before  the 
real  problem  which  he  had  to  solve.    The  problem- 
forced  upon  him  by  preceding  thought— was  this  :  given 
the  mind  as  "  a  tabula  rasa,"  a  passive  receptacle  of  ex- 
perience, to  explain  the  progress  of  knowledge.  Locke 
was  inclined  to  fall  back  on  an  exterior  matter,  to  be 
the  cause  of  our  sensations  and  the  progressive  source 
of  experience.     But  if  all  that  we  can  be  sure  of  is 
sensation,  abstract  unperceivable  Matter  is  of  course 
an  impossible  conception.    Berkeley  was  inclined  to 
fall  back  on  Spirit  and  God,  as  the  fountain-head  of 
knowledge ;  but  the  same  line  of  argument,  which  dis- 
posed of  Matter  apart  from  a  series  of  sensations,  was 
equally  fatal  to  Mind,  or  God,  apart  from  a  series  of 
sensations.    And  so  the  cherished  illusions  of  his  pre- 
decessors—whether Locke's  real  primary  qualities  of  a 
real  Matter,  or  Berkeley's  "  Spirits  "  and  "  God,"  are 
dissolved   in  the  glowing  crucible  of  Hume's  logic. 
The  conclusion  stands  forth  in  naked  clearness— that 
all  we  can  be  sure  of  in  consciousness,  is  just  the  sen- 
sations experienced,  and  the  copies  of  them  in  so-called 
ideas.     Such  is  the  ''  pars  destruens  "  of  Hume's  work, 
lict  us  now  remind  ourselves,  constructively,  of  the  main 
positions  of  his  system. 

1 .  All  knowledge  is  resolved  into  sensuous  impres- 


/-' 


sions  and  ideas — the  ideas  being  the  copies  of  the  / 
impressions.     If  then  we  wish  to  find  the  reality  of  '        ^ 
any  idea  that  we  have  in  our  minds,  we  must  find  the  j  \^ 
sensuous  impression  of  which  it  is  the  copy.     In  this 
Hume  shows  himself  a  true  disciple  of  the  school  of 
Locke. 

A^ojaHeJimitation  of  knowledge  is  thusjntroduced. 
In  the  first  place,  knbwledi^e  cannot  be,  in  anvjxuje 
sense,  objective :  for  as  to  the  ori^^inal  of  the  sensuous 
impression  we  can  say  nothing.  We  cannot  speaFof  a 
Matter,  or  a  Material  World,  impressing  our  sense- 
organs,  for  this  is  to  travel  beyond  our  record.  We 
are  stricW  Hmitedto  our  own  perceptions  and  feelings. 
In  the  second  place,  knowledge  cannot  be,  in  any  true 
sense,  subjective ,  that  is,  we  cannot  put  any  faith  in  the 
constructive  power  of  the  mind.  For  an  idea  is  only  so 
fi\y  \-flHfl  n.s  jj— JR^jJTft^njw  of  a  sensuous  impression. 
Thus  the  mind  is  strictly  receptive — working  up,  with 
moTe~of  less  advantage,  the  materials  of  sense-im- 
pression, in  accordance  with  certain  associative  prin- 
ciples. So  ruthlessly  does  Hume  sweep  away  Physics 
and  Metaphysics. 

2.  What  are  these  associative  principles  ?    They  are 

three  in  number:  Resemblance,  Contiguity  in  Time 

and  Place,  and  Causation.     The  mind  is  inclined  to 

class  together  ideas  or  impressions,  which  resemble 

each  other,  or  which  occur  in  close  juxtaposition,  or 

c  2 


V 


iiiill 


20 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


wliich  follow  eacli  other  so  as  to  lead  us  to  infer  that 
one  is  the  cause  of  the  other. 

It  is  the  last  of  these  of  which  we  obviously  make  most 
use  in  constructing  our  knowledge  of  the  world  in 
which  we  live :  it  is  the  principle  of  Causality,  there- 
fore, which  seems  to  be  most  objectively  real,  and  it  is 
to  this  that  Hume's  attention  is  most  directed. 

3.  Knowledge,  in  the  opinion  of  Hume,  may  be 
either  analytic  or  synthetic :  in  other  words,  we  may 
either  get  to  a  clearer  comprehension  of  our  own  ideas, 
or  attain  to  fresh  additions  to  our  knowledge.  Geo- 
metrical axioms  are  instances  of  analytical  knowledge. 
When  we  say  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose 
a  space,  we  are  merely  analysing  what  we  mean  by  a 
straight  line,  the  predicate  of  the  proposition  affirming 
explicitly  what  was  implicit  in  the  subject.  Moreover, 
here  we  get  to  a  connection  which  is  a  necessary  one, 
because  we  are  only  moving  amongst  our  own  ideas. 
The  contradictory  of  an  analytic  proposition  (such  as 
the  principle  that  "  everything  is  either  A  or  not  A," 
or  the  equality  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  to  two 
right  angles),  is  impossible  and  absurd.  Here  then 
is  a  "  necessity,"  but  merely  because  we  are  concerned 
with  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  ideas. 

The  question  is  whether  synthetic  propositions,  (pro- 
positions which  add  something  to  our  knowledge,)  can 
ever  be  necessary.  Now  reasoning  on  matters  of  fact 
depends  principally  on  the  relation  of  Cause  andEfiect. 


THE  ANTECEDENTS   OF  MILL.     HUME.        21 

Have  we  here  a  necessary  connection  or  not  ?  If  it  is  a 
necessary  connection,  the  contradictory  of  an  assertion 
of  such  relation  is  absurd  and  unintelligible.  But  the 
assertion  that  day  is  not  followed  by  night  is  certainly  not 
unintelligible.  Further,  if  it  is  a  connection  which  we 
attain  to  a  jmori^  we  ought,  by  a  mere  analysis  of  the 
cause,  to  be  able  to  arrive  at  the  effect.  Let  us  analyse, 
then,  ''  fire."  Can  we,  by  mere  analysis,  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  that  it  gives  light  ?  Or,  by  the  analysis  of 
one  billiard-ball,  can  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that,  if 
propelled  against  another,  it  will  make  that  other  move  ? 

4.  The  principle  of  Causality,  then,  is  not  a  necessary 
connection,  nor  is  it  an  a  2mori  law  of  our  minds.  Of 
what,  then,  is  it  a  product?  Simply  of  experience. 
Experience  tells  us  that  one  thing  is  followed  by 
another.     Further  than  this  we  may  not  go. 

5.  But  by  what  right,  then,  do  we,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  on  the  occurrence  of  one  sense-impression,  infer 
that  it  will  be  followed  by  another  ?  We  evidently  do 
this,  as  our  every-day  experience  testifies.  What  is  the 
justification  of  this  inference  ?  Habit,  Custom,  answers 
Hume.  We  have  had  many  experiences ;  many  ex- 
periences produce  a  certain  feeling  of  expectancy  :  this 
is  the  product  of  Custom.  Hence,  on  the  occurrence  of 
one  thino-,  we  infer  that  it  will  be  followed  by  another, 
because  we  are  accustomed  or  habituated  to  their  con- 
junction. The  notion  of  a  hidden  tie,  linking  together 
cause  and  effect,  or  the  idea  of  Power,  is  explained  as 


22 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL, 


being  nothing  else  but  an  expectation  grounded  on 
custom.     "  Power  "  could  only  be  a  valid  idea,  if  we 
could  find  its  original,  2>.,  the  sensuous  impression  of 
which  it  is  a  copy.     Can  we  find  such  a  sensuous 
impression  ?     We  cannot,  either  in  the  world  outside 
us— for  all  that  we  there  get  is  *'  sequence  "—or  in 
the  world  within  us— for  all  that  we  are  conscious  of 
within  us  is  a  flux  of  sensations  and  ideas  :  and  neither 
in  the  so-called  power  of  the  soul  over  the  body,  or  the 
power  of  the  Will,  is  there  anything  like  it.     So  the 
"hidden    tie,"  between  cause    and  effect,   and    the 
"power"  of  the  Cause  to  produce  the  Effect,  are  only 
mental  hallucinations.     So-called     necessary  connec- 
tion,"  is  merely  habitual  or  customary  association. 

We  need  not  pursue  Hume's  philosophy  any  further. 
We  have  seen  that  it  rests  on  the  characteristic 
grounds  of  empirical  Philosophy— grounds  which  allow 
of  no  active  or  originative  power  to  the  mind,  and 
which  trace  back  all  human  knowledge  to  sense-im- 
pressions. Thus  to  Hume,  the  only  possible  sources 
of  mental  possession  are  "impressions  of  sense"  and 
"  impressions  of  reflection,"  or,  in  other  words,  sensa- 
tions and  emotions.  From  these  arise  in  a  fainter 
form  ideas,— ideas,  which  may  be  on  the  one  hand,  the 
direct  heritage  of  decaying  sensations,  or,  on  the  other, 
the  product  of  emotional  states,  such  as  "  desire,"  or 


"aversion." 


THE  ANTECEDENTS  OF  MILL.     HUME.        23 

AVith  this  groundwork  Hume  makes  short  work  of 
Locke's  external  matter,  and  Berkeley's  objective  and 
subjective  Spirit.  In  examining  his  philosophy,  we  are 
therefore  freed  from  all  necessity  of  showing  how  little 
the  world,  as  a  totality  of  phenomena,  or  Self-Con- 
sciousness, as  a  totality  of  feelings  and  ideas,  or  God, 
as  the  Absolute  and  Divine  Self-Consciousness,  can  be 
constructed  on  such  a  narrow  foundation.  We  have 
already  seen  that  Hume,  pushing  Locke  to  his  logical 
conclusions,  did  away  with  the  Primary  Qualities  of 
Matter,  and  Cause,  as  an  objective  relation,  and  per- 
forming the  same  service  to  Berkeley,  showed  the 
non-existence  of  a  Self,  and  a  God.  ^^ 

What  difficult  problems  then  remain,  which  Hume's 
philosophy  of  negation  or  scepticism  has  to  solve? 
What  of  the  higher  questions  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics urgently  require  to  be  dealt  with  and  cleared 
up,  if  the  sensationalist  or  empirical  foundation  of 
philosophy  is  to  be  accepted  ? 

Sensationalism,  not  being  absolute  Pyrrhonism,  (or 
absolute  denial  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge,)  has 
at  least  to  find  room  for  the  exact  sciences,  and  the 
physical  sciences.  Now  Mathematics,  broadly  speak- 
ing, depend  on  certain  ultimate  ideas  \-— Number^  Qmn- 
titify  Space^  Time ;  and  Physics  depend,  in  their  turn, 
on  certain  ultimate  ideas,  such  as  the  Uniformity  of 
Nature^  the  conception  of  Cause  and  Effect.  Further, 
the  possibility  of  these  ultimate  ideas  is  found  itself  to 


24 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  MILL. 


THE  ANTECEDENTS  OF  MILL.     HUME. 


25 


L 


L 


depend  on  prior  mental  conditions,  e.g.,  The  Faculty 
ofAhtradion  (the  formation  of  general  ideas),  and  the 
power  of  Association  of  IckaSy  whicli,  in  their  ultimate 
expression,  amount  to  the  power  of  forming  Mental 
Relationsy  distinct  from  and  above  the  changing  im- 
pressions of  sense. 

It  may  easily  be  gathered  that  Hume's  treatment  of 
these  problems  was  not  wholly  satisfactory,  and  that 
the  burden  he  left  to  posterity  was  the  re-consideration 
and  re-construction  of  our  notions  on  these  points. 
Of  this  Mill  himself  is  not  unconscious,  though  his 
relation  to  these  questions  is  peculiar.  Mathematics 
and  Physics— these  must  be  saved  at  all  hazards ; 
these  must  be  placed  on  a  foundation,  safe  from  the 
critical  scepticism  of  Hume.  And  so  it  is  exactly 
on  these  points— on  the  question  of  the  foundations 
of  Mathematics,  and  the  question  of  Causation  and 
Natural  Uniformity  —  that  ]\Iill  differs  from  his 
predecessor.  But  the  groundwork  is  left  by  Mill  un- 
disturbed. Sensationalism  and  Empiricism  are  still 
the  dogmatic  foundations  of  his  creed.  He  saw  that 
Hume's  treatment  of  Science  and  Mathematics  was 
not  eminently  satisfactory,  and  so,  as  we  shall  here- 
aUter  see,  he  tried  to  re-mould  it.  He  did  not  see 
that  that  treatment  followed  with  rigid  consistency 
from  the  essential  groundwork  of  the  Empirical  and 
Sensational  structure,  which  would  itself  retaliate 
on  his  "  re-construction."    The  character  of  Mathe- 


matical  Necessity,  and  the  definition  of  Cause  are 
very  differently  stated  in  Mill  and  Hume :  but  the 
real  dependence  of  these  on  the  prior  condition  of 
Mental  relations,  and  the  impossibility  of  any  recon- 
struction of  them,  unless  the  notion  of  Mental  action 
was  first  re-constructed— to  this  Mill  is  characteristi- 
cally blind.  This  is  just  that  lateral  oscillation  of 
which  any  system  is  capable  in  the  hands  of  a  disciple. 
Widen  the  edifice,  but  leave  the  foundation  as  it  is— 
this  is  the  procedure  of  Mill,  a  procedure  which  is  not 
and  cannot  be  an  improvement,  but  far  more  probably 
the  cause  of  future  disaster  and  downfall. 

Hume  describes  himself  as  "  a  moderate  sceptic."  * 
He  is  right.  For  there  is  one  thing  which  he  assumes 
and  takes  for  granted,  as  an  ultimate  fact,  the  validity 
of  which  is  left  to  depend  on  itself.  This  is 
"  Experience."  For  if  experience  be  explained  by 
causality,  and  causality  be  explained  by  custom,  and 
custom  be  explained  by  experience,  Ve  move  in  a 
vicious  circle,  and  do  not  advance  one  jot  in  our 
explanation.  Experience  is  presupposed  in  the  ac- 
count of  experience :  experience  is  explained  by  expe- 
rience. So  Hume  is  not  a  true  sceptic,  or  rather  let 
us  say  that  he  is  not  a  true  critical  philosopher.  For 
a  critical  philosophy  must  not  take  experience  for 
granted,  but  must  seek  to  explain  it.  This  Kant  saw. 
The  line  of  development  of  Philosophic  Thought  runs 

*  '•  Enquiry,"  xii.,  3. 


26 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


through  Locke  and  Berkeley  and  Hume,  but  Mill  is 
not  the  successor  thereof.  The  real  inheritor  of  Hume's 
philosophy,  the  real  disciple,  the  next  great ''  moment" 
in  the  Intellectual  advance  is  not  Mill,  but  Kant. 


Uxlixir  IxLIa/    ill. 

THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF  MILL — {continued). 

Eighty  or  ninety  years  elapsed  between  Hume's 
capital  work  and  Mill's.  Hume  died  in  1776.  The 
years  of  Mill's  life  fall  between  1806—1873.  The 
question,  then,  naturally  suggests  itself,  what  phases 
of  philosophic  thought  successively  appeared  in  the 
interval  ?  What  systems  arose,  which  presenting  and 
enforcing  new  points  of  view,  could  not  help  leaving 
their  traces  on  any  thinker  of  the  latter  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  ?     Such  is  our  present  problem. 

It  was  natural  that  Hume's  sceptical  tenets  should 
produce  an  immediate  reaction.  It  was  equally  natural 
that  the  reaction  should  take  two  forms,  one  of  which 
should  be  the  normal  rebound  against  an  extreme 
tension  of  thought,  the  other  the  truer  development 
and  expansion  by  means  of  ciiticism  and  a  sounder 
analysis.  The  first  was  to  be  found  in  Hume's  native 
country,  the  second  in  Germany.  The  form  which  the 
English  reaction  took  in  the  hands  of  Reid,  Dugald 
Stewart  and  Brown,  in  reality  showed  a  want    of 


28 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


philosopliic  grasp  and  insiglit.  For,  instead  of  boldly 
attacliing  tliemselves  to  the  analysis  of  experience 
(of  whicli  Hume  made  such  capital),  instead  of 
attempting  to  see  what  elements  were  involved  in  the 
phenomena  of  sensation,  perception,  and  the  formation 
of  conceptions,  and  so  arriving  at  a  truer  interpretation 
of  the  meaning  of  "experience,"  the  immediate 
antagonists  of  Hume  fell  back  upon  the  verdict  of 
Common  Sense,  and  the  somewhat  crude  notions  of 
what  is  called  "  Realism."  A  beneficial  result,  which 
was  perhaps  a  fortuitous  consequence  of  the  "  Common 
Sense "  stand-point,  was  the  beginning  of  an  inde- 
pendent investigation  of  psychology,  destined  to  bear 
greater  fruit,  when  it  came  into  the  hands  of  James 
Mill  and  those  whom  he  influenced.  According  to  the 
view^s  of  this  reactionary  Scotch  school,  we  are  imme- 
diateh  conscious  of  external  objects  and  an  external 
world. 

Tlie  Scotch  school  were  not  unfruitful  in  the  History 
of  Philosophy.  In  France,  a  school  that  mingled,  in 
about  equal  proportions,  fragments  of  Cartesian 
thought,  a  nebulous  spiritualism  and  an  nnedifying 
eclecticism,  carried  on  the  crusade  against  the  spirit  of 
the  age,  which  had  been  taught  to  Royer-Collard  by 
Reid.  As  the  Common-Sense  School  had  a  horror  of 
iHume,  so  the  French  Eclectics  had  a  horror  of  Con- 
\  (dillac  and  Diderot.  Just  as  Reid  and  Brown  re- 
volted from  critical  scepticism  and  atheism,  so,  under 


THE   ANTECEDENTS   OE   MILL. 


29 


the  feverish  rhetoric  of  Victor  Cousin,  lurked  a  nervous 
dread  of  the  Revolutionary  spirit. 

So  far,  then,  we  find  a  reaction  against  Hume  and 
Sensationalism,    animated,    indeed,    by   the    best    of 
motives,  but  deficient   in  such   metaphysical  ability 
and  insight,  as  are  necessary  to  meet  the  acute  specu- 
lations of  men  like  Hume  and  the  Encyclopaedists. 
If  the  results  of  philosophical  analysis  were  such  a 
melancholy  reversal  of  current  notions  and  ordinary 
beliefs,  it  were  better,  in  the  opinion  of  the  reactionists, 
to  give  up  analysis,  and  fiill  back  on  the  broad  uncritical 
methods  of  the  common  consciousness.     If  ordinary 
men  of  the  world  found,  notwithstanding  the  scepticism 
of  Hume,  that  their  wonted  views  of  the  world  outside 
them,  and  the  soul  inside  them,  were  satisfactory,  the 
fault  must  lie  with  the  philosopher,  and  not  with  their 
views.     Perish  philosophical  analysis,  if  its  result  be 
scepticism !     Such  a  reaction  as  this  is  not  singular  in 
the  History  of  Thought,  but  it  has  had,  and  can  have 
but  one  issue.     Analysis  can  only  be  conquered  by  a 
more  perfect  analysis :  philosophy  can  only  succumb 
to  a  truer  philosophy.    Uncritical  oratory  only  dis- 
guises the  wounds,  which  it  cannot  heal.     Rhetoric 
i's  oftener  the  privilege  of  weakness,  than  the  conscious 

overflow  of  power. 

The  true  development  of  Hume's  thoughts  came 
from  Germany.  Woke  from  "  dogmatic  slumber  "  by 
Hume,  Kant,  and  after  him  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 


mhhmii 


30 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MILL. 


THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL. 


SI 


He^el,  have  not  only  materially  altered  the  conditions 
of   all    pliilosopliic  thought   and    inquiry,   hut  have 
perhaps  made  more  positive  contrihutions  to  Meta- 
physical  Science  than  have  heen  made  in  any  one 
period  since  the  time  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle. 
It  is  impossible  to  characterise  the  work  of  Kant  by 
a  single  expression.     Coming  after  Hume  and  the 
English  school  with  its  two  characteristics  of  Indi- 
vidualism and    Sensationalism,   Kant    saw   that   the 
whole  ground-work  of  Human  Knowledge  must  be 
gone  over  anew.     Nothing  short  of  a  revolution  in 
mode  and  method,  it  was  his  claim  to  have  inaugurated. 
<*  Critical "  is  the  title  given  to  his  philosophy,  and 
critical  is  throughout  its  cliaracter.     For  it  set  itself  to 
analyse  the  antecedent  conditions  of  experience,  the 
conditions  which  render  that  very  experience,  which  was 
clung  to  with  such  fervour  by  the  English  scliool,  pos- 
sible at  all.  And  so  Kant's  positive  result  is  the  discovery 
that  in  the  whole  process  of  knowledge,  from  the  earliest 
beginnings  of  Sensation,  there  is  an  interaction  of  two 
factors,  one  of  which  is  supplied  by  the  mind  in  the  so- 
called  "forms,"  the  other  supplied  by  an  external 
element,  of  which  all  we  can  say  is,  that  it  is  not 
mental.     Critical  again  the  Kantian  philosophy  is,  in 
the  affirmation  that  we  can  only  deal  with  phenomena, 
not  with  noiimena,  that  what  Mind  and  Spirit  are  in 
themselves  we  cannot  say,  any  more  than  we  can  say 
what  Matter  is  in  itself.  We  are  limited  to  phenomena. 


t 


the  component  result  of  two  factors,  one  objective,  the 
other  subjective. 

Idealism  in  one  form  or  other  is  the  character 
of  the  philosophy  that  succeeded  Kant:  but  it  is 
idealism  in  different  phases,  and  conceived  in  dif- 
ferent ways.  Fichte's  philosophy,  if  summed  up  in  a 
word,  is  Subjective  Idealism,  Schelling's  is  Objective 
Idealism,  Hegel's  is  Absolute  Idealism.  Tliis  is  all 
the  development  and  carrying  out  of  that  one  side  of 
the  Kantian  philosophy  which  showed  itself  in  the 
mental  forms,  a  priori  conceptions,  and  categories. 
Another  school  of  German  thought  attempted  to 
develope  the  objective  side,  but  with  them  we  are  not 
concerned. 

Two  other  phases  of  thought  appeared  in  the  in- 
terval between  Hume  and  Mill,  which  we  must  briefly 
notice.  The  first  of  these  was  inaugurated  by  Comte 
and  Positivism.  Positivism  is  at  once  a  system 
of  thought,  and  a  system  of  life,  and  has  contributed 
alike  to  logical  and  social  science.  With  the  form  of^ 
socialism,  which  is  connected  with  Positivism,  we  have  )  V, 
o-ot  nothing  to  do.  But  the  chief  features  of  Posi- 
tivism,  as  a  philosophy,  are  the  suppression  of  all 
researches  beyond  phenomena,  the  affirmation  of  a 
o-reat  historic  law  of  Pro^^ress,  and  a  classification  of 

the  Sciences. 

Lastly,  we  must  notice  an  English  Psychological 
School  (generally  connected  with   Utilitarianism   in     - 


32 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILIi. 


Morals)  wliicli  immediately  preceded  and  was  con- 
temporary with  Mill  It  commenced  with  Hartley, 
was  taken  up  by  James  Mill,  and  carried  on  by 
Stimrfc  Mill,  Alexander  Bain,  and  Herbert  Spencer. 
Tlie  chief  characteristic  of  this  Psychological  School  is 
the  stress  it  lays  upon  the  principle  of  Association  of 
Ideas,  which  is  its  key  to  the  explanation  of  all  mental 
phenomena. 

Here  then  we  have  five  schools — the  Common  Sense 
School,  the  French  Eclectics,  tho  German  Metaphy- 
sicians, tlie  Positivists,  and  tho  English  Psychologists, 
wlios©  infiuenco  on  Mill  we  have  now  to  attempt  to 
discover.  It  will  be  better,  at  whatever  penalty  of 
methodical  dulness,  to  take  each  of  these  in  order. 

One  of  them  we  may  at  once  begin  by  dismissing. 
The  tendencies  of  the  French  Eclectics  are  utterly 
alien  to  that  scientific  spirit,  which  is  the  best  element 
of  MiO.  They  emphasized  just  those  features  in  their 
predecessors,  which  are  least  connected  with  the 
scientific  spirit.  For  the  French  school  of  Eoyer- 
Collard  and  others  is  animated  by  two  principles. 
Eclecticism  and  Spiritualism,  and  Mill  is  as  far  from 
the  first  as  he  is  from  the  last. 

The  influence,  however,  of  tho  Common  Sense 
School  upon  Mill  is  real,  though,  being  indirect,  it  is 
by  no  means  easy  to  define.  That  system  whicli 
regards    Nature    as  the  exhibition   of  laws,  which 


THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL. 


33 


B 


T 


4 


*i.t« 


are  invariable,  and  which  combine  to  form  what 
we  call  tho  "  Uniformity  of  Nature," — which  holds, 
further,  that  these  laws  and  uniformities  are  .attainable 
by  the  human  intellect,  while  yet  it  strenuously  denies 
that  they  are  realities,  because  formed  by  thouglit  and 
because  in  and  through  them  Consciousness  is  intel- 
ligibly constructing  the  impressions  given  by  the 
senses — that  system,  I  say,  depends  for  its  meta- 
physical foundation  on  the  doctrines  of  Itcalism.  And 
so  far  as  Mill  adopts  these  uniformities  of  Nature 
without  regarding  them  as  the  product  of  Thought, 
and  conceives  that  in  perception  and  knowledge  we 
are  immediately  in  contact  with  a  world  outside  us, 
(whence  it  results  that  Induction  and  the  four  Ex- 
perimental Methods  are  valid  and  trustworthy,)  so  far 
Mill  is  at  one  with  that  spirit  of  Realism,  which  is 
the  animating  impulse  of  the  Common  Sense  School. 
But,  fortunately  or  unfortunately.  Mill's  metaphysical 
foundationp,  when  he  discloses  them,  are  not  those  of 
Realism.  He  would  call  them  "Psychological;"  we 
may  perhaps  be  allowed  to  call  them  "Idealistic." 
The  so-called  Psychological  Theory  of  Matter  insists, 
in  the  strongest  manner,  upon  the  Relativity  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  External  World;  in  other  words,  that 
Consciousness  cannot  transcend  itself,  and  that  we  are 
and  can  be  only  conscious  of  our  own  subjective  inter- 
pretation of  things,  and  not  conscious  of  things  in 
themselves.     The  conclusion  follows  with  Mill  that  we 


D 


It*. 


I'    ■  I  ^; 


34 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF   MIIiL. 


THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL. 


35 


I 


I 


cannot  apprehend  Matter  and  Objective  Reality  imme- 
diately, but  mediately.  And  fiirtlier,  we  cannot  appre- 
hend Spirit  and  Subjective  Reality  immediately  but 
mediately.  In  these  conclusions,  then,  Mill  is  in 
antagonism  to  tho  School  of  Common  Sense.  That 
school  would  say  that  the  World  outside  us  and  the 
Soul  inside  us  are  matters  of  direct  presentation. 
Mill  holds  that  they  are  matters  of  indirect  pre- 
sentation. And  so,  while  allowing,  or  at  least  seeming 
to  allow,  the  scientific  conclusions  of  the  Realistic  spirit 
of  the  CoinnK»n  Sense  School,  he  denies  their  meta- 
physical foundation.  The  influence,  in  fact,  of  this 
school  upon  Mill  is  filtered  through  channels  of  Brown 
and  Hamilton,  and  while  Brown  is,  in  many  respects, 
by  Mill  admired  and  imitated,  Hamilton,  as  the 
compound  of  Kant  and  the  Common  Sense  School,  is 
ruthlessly  attacked. 

The  next  school  alluded  to  was  formed  by  the 
metaphysical  systems  of  Germany.  In  relation  to 
these  it  is  one  of  the  singular  characteristics  of 
Mill  that  he  knows  or  cares  very  little  about  them. 
He  is  fur  ever  under  the  impression  that  the  wliole 
German  world  is  groaning  and  travailing  in  the 
chains  of  a  false  metaphysical  method :  while  it  is 
plain  to  every  modern  historian  of  philosophy  that 
Germany  is  at  present  leading  the  whole  world 
even  in  cmpiriciil  research.  More  than  this.  He 
makes  a  startling  remai-k  about  Kant    The  only  part, 


he  thinks,  of  Hume's  doctrine  about  Causality,  which 
"his  great  adversary  Kant"  contested,  was  that  Cause 
meant  "  the  invariable  antecedent."  Now  surely,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  result  of  Hume's  analysis  of  Cause 
was  to  show  that,  as  it  rested  upon  mere  custom,  it  was 
variable,  or  at  all  events,  not  objectively  invariable : 
while  the  result  of  Kant's  analysis  was  above  all  this 
— that  Causation  was  necessary  and  invariable  as 
being  dependent  on  a  mental  Category,  which  made 
it  real  (for  Reality  was  the  work  of  Thought)  and 
objectively  valid.* 

The  truth  is  that  Mill,  in  Idealism,  never  got  beyond 
such  Idealism  as  is  to  be  found  in  Berkeley,  which  is 
not  in  reality  Idealism  at  all,  or,  at  most,  is  subjective 
Idealism.  More  accurately,  it  would  be  called  Sensa- 
tionalism, qualified  by  foregone  Theological  conclu- 
sions. It  is  SensationaUsm,  so  far  as  the  human 
Consciousness  is  considered  as  a  merely  sentient  con- 
sciousness, and  not  a  thinking  one.  It  is  Idealism,  so 
far  as,  the  .analysis  being  imperfect.  Thought,  Spirit, 
Soul,  God  are  instinctively,  though  not  logically, 
retained. 

But  Idealism,  such  as  Berkeley's,  would  never  lead 
Mill  to  the  understanding  of  Kant,  much  less  of 
Hegel.  He  is  quite  indignant  with  the  German  meta- 
physicians on  this  ground — that  they  made  mere  con- 

•  Cf .  Dr.  Stirling,  *  Supplementary  Notes '  to  Schwcgler's  History 
of  riiiloBopby,  p.  4u5. 

D  2 


;I6 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF   MttL. 


THE   ANTECEDENTS    OF   MILL. 


37 


t 


ccptioos  of  mind  take  the  place  of  things.  He  is 
in  such  a  horrj  to  establish  this,  that  he  never  stops 
to  think  whether  his  own  doctrines  (as  exhibited,  e.y., 
in  the  Psychological  Theories  of  Matter  and  Mind) 
would  permit  him  to  consider  "  things  "  as  anything 
more  than  the  construction  of  mind.  Assumptions 
of  noumena  he  cannot  away  witli ;  yet  he  too,  when 
pressed,  has  to  admit  that  things  in  themselves  may 
exist,  though  we  do  not  know  exactly  what  they  are, 
because  we  only  know  them  through  their  sensations — 
the  very  doctrine  of  Kant. 

We  shall  perliaps  better  understand  tlie  position  of 
..^lili  when  we  understand  his  great  obligations  and  his 
coose€|uent  adherence  to  the  English  Psychological 
School,  which  immediately  preceded  him.  That  school 
really  began  with  Hartley.  The  characterisrie  doctrine 
of  Hartley  was  his  theory  of  "  vibrations  *' — the  doc- 
trine, namely,  that  all  nervous  actions,  as  well  as  the 
phenomena  of  light,  heat,  and  electricity,  consist  of 
vibrations,  an  hypothesis  by  which  he  further  explained 
the  processes  of  sensation.  But  tlie  doctrine  which 
most  influenced  his  successors,  was  that  insistence  on 
the  Law  of  Mental  Association,  which  made  Mill  call 
him  "the  First  Father  of  Association."  It  was  in 
this  that  his  influence  upon  Mill  was  most  decided. 

James  Mill  carried  out  and  elaborated  the  doctrine 
of  Association  which  he  had  derived  from  Hartley, 
and  which  has  been  coniijleted  not  only  by  Mill,  but 


much  more  by  Bai:i  and  Herbert  Spencer.  The  im- 
perfections of  Mr.  James  Mill  have  been  so  well  stated 
by  his  son  in  his  Preface  to  the  "  Analysis  of  the 
Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mind,"*  that  I  may  repro- 
duce two  of  them  here.  "  First,  the  imperfection  of 
physiological  science  at  the  time  at  which  his  book  was 
written.  Secondly,  a  certain  impatience  of  detail  and 
a  consequent  love  of  simplification  which  cannot  always 
be  trusted."  For  instance,  the  laws  of  Association  of 
Ideas  are  reduced  to  the  one  principle  of  contiguity  in 
.space  and  time,  (whereas  even  Hume  allowed,  as  we 
liave  seen,  of  three,)  a  simplification  which  Stuart  Mill 
says  is  "  perhaps  the  least  successful  in  the  work."  t 

The  tendency  towards  physiology  and  the  stress  laid 
on  Mental  Association,  as  the  source  and  origin  of  all 
Mental  Ideas,  are  the  two  elements  which  Mill  prin- 
cipally derived  from  his  father  and  from  Hartley,  and 
both  will  explain  his  expressed  abhorrence  of  meta- 
physics. With  regard  to  the  first,  however,  there  is 
this  much  to  be  said,  that  the  early  disciples  of  the 
Association  School — James  Mill  and,  to  a  large  extent, 
Stuart  Mill — did  not  connect  their  speculations  with 
biology  in  the  same  explicit  way  in  which  the  later 
advocates  of  the  doctrine  do.  The  dependence  of  our 
moral  and  spiritual  nature  on  our  physical  nature  is 
the  result  of  the  later  English  psychologists.  Bain, 
Spencer,  and  George  Henry  Lewes. 

♦  Vol.  i.  p.  XV.  to  p.  XX.  t  Ibid,  note  35. 


o8 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


THE   ANTiilCEDENTS   OF   MILL. 


39 


We  turn  fimllj  to  the  Positive  Scliool  and  Comte, 
aiKl  we  liave  to  ask  how  far  Mill  is  indebted  to  that 
system  whicli  Comte  inatigura ted.  The  relation  of 
Mill  to  Positivism  is  hy  no  means  so  easy  to  discuss 
as  tlie  relations  we  have  already  examined,  nor  is  it 
easy  to  give  very  decided  opinions  on  tlie  point.  A 
good  many  of  the  o])ponents  of  Mill  liave  a  tendency 
to  merge  liim  lu  tlie  wider  doctrines  of  Positivism  :  on 
the  other  haiidj  i^Iill  liimseif  seems  inclined  to  repu- 
diate the  connection,  and  in  his  hook  "Auguste  Comte 
and  Positivism  "  delivers  some  trenchant  criticisms  on 
til  is  particular  School 

The  Positive  Sj'stem  is  the  product  we  find  at  once 
of  the  positive  sciences,  and  of  Saint-Simonism,  a  com- 
bination of  empiricism  and  socialism.  The  latter 
element  we  have  a.greed  to  droj)  out  of  the  considera- 
tion ;  and,  indeed,  sotne  of  tlie  speculations  of  M.  Comte 
on  this  point  have  been  repudiated  by  his  best  modern 
followers — M.  Littre  and  others. 

Further,  there  are  two  sides  to  Positivism.  There  is 
tlie  destructive  side,  wherein  we  find  the  search  for  final 
j  causes  and  first  causes  is  distinctly  abandoned.  With 
the  beginning  and  end  of  things  we  have  nothing  to  do, 
we  are  only  concerned  with  what  lies  between  these 
two  extremes.  Tlius  all  forms  of  theology,  all  forms  of 
metaphysics,  are  practically  discarded. 

Now,   so  far  as  this  point  is  concerned,  it  is  un- 
doubtedly true  that  much   the    same  truly  positive 


standpoint  must  be  ascribed  to  Mill.  He_  too  is_jj  . 
phenomenalist,  an  empiricist :  one  who  relies  on  ex-  \ 
perience  to  hnd  Mws  of  co-existenCe,  and  does  not  busy 
himsetfl^itlThiore  thari"the  middle  levels  of  knowledge,  j 
eliminating  all  transcendental  researches.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  this  aspect  of  things 
is  by  no  means  confined  to  Positivism  ;  nor  can  Comte 
claim  to  have  been  its  author  or  expounder.  As  Mill 
himself  says  in  *^  Comte  and  Positivism,"  "The 
Philosopliy  called  Positivism  is  not  a  recent  invention 
of  M.  Comte,  but  a  simple  adherence  to  the  traditions 
of  all  the  great  scientific  minds  whose  discoveries  have 
made  the  human  race  what  it  is."  That  is  to  say. 
Positivism  is  only  a  particular  form  of  the  modern 
scientific  spirit— that  spirit  which  had  its  rise  in  Descartes 
and  Newton,  and  animated  all  the  men  of  science. 
But  though  Mill  thus  agrees  with  the  range  of  subjects 

fiJoi'^SseTlorjiK^^  lil^'G-.- Comte, 

abandonmetaphysical  speculation  altogether—witness 
niany'of  his  chapters  in  "  An  Examniation  of  Hamil- 
ton." Moreover,  with  regard  to  the  fundamental 
questions  of  knowledge— the  whence  and  the  whither— 
Mill  is  not  so  truculent  as  Comte ;  he  says,  that  "  it  is 
a  mistake  on  the  part  of  M.  Comte  to  leave  no  open 
questions."     He  says  again,  that  "  tliejositive  rnoik^ 

of  thinkingLi&-n£it»nece»sa«^^ 

natural"     This  is  an  important  qualification  of  Mill's 

agreement  with  the  destructive  side  of  Positivism. 


r^e. 


' 


40 


THE   METxlPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


THE   ANTECEDENTS   OF   MILL. 


41 


Beside  tbe  destructive  side,  however,  there  is  a  con- 
stmctive  side  to  Positivism  which  shows  itself  in  two 
main  positions. 

(i.)  The  historic  conception — the  "loi  des  trois  etats" 
— that  the  human  mind  necessarily  passes  through 
three  stages,  the  theological,  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
Dositive. 

■JL 

(ii.)  The  co-ordination  of  the  Sciences — a  hierarchy  of 
arrangement, — in  which  each  later  or  more  complex 
science  depends  on  the  one  above  it,  and  each  ad- 
ditional complexity  has  to  be  met  by  new  devices  in 
experimental  inquiry.  And  tlie  order  is.  Mathematics, 
Astronomy,  Pliysics,  Chemistry,  Biology,  and  Sociology. 

Now,  with  regard  to  the  first  of  these,  Mill  appears  in 
the  main  to  accept  it.*  With  regard  to  the  second,  how- 
ever, there  is  more  antagonism  on  the  part  of  jMill.  He 
notices  omissions  from  the  Scheme — Logic,  for  instance, 
and  Political  Economy.  But  the  gravest  omission  is 
Psychology.  Comte  expressly  repudiates  Psychology, 
and  for  him  the  only  way  to  arrive  at  the  results  at 
which  Psychology  aims,  is  to  pursue  Physiology,  or 
some  improved  kind  of  Phrenology.  Here  Mill,  as  the 
true  descendant  of  a  Psychological  School,  is  up  in 
arms.  He  points  out  in  answer  to  Comte's  criticisms 
that  the  mind  can  attend  to  a  great  number  of  im- 
pressions at  once ;  that  tlie  mind  can  study  some  of 
its  own  phenomena  by  the  aid  of  memory ;  and  that 

•  **  Coiiitc  and  rositivism,"  p.  33. 


Psychology  is  much  further  advanced  than  that  portion 
of  physiology  which  corresponds  to  it.* 

We  find,  in  fact,  that  Comte's  attack  on  Psychology 
is  not  supported  by  Comtists,  e.g.^  Littre  and  Lewes. 
It  had,  however,  its  effect  in  leading  to  the  substitu- 
tion of  a  study  of  minds  in  history,  in  the  place  of  an 
exclusively  individual  introspection — to  a  larger  inter- 
pretation of  experience  tlian  the  merely  individual  ex- 
perience which  formed  the  staple  of  Psychology  before. 
But  now  it  is  not  doubted  that  Psychology  is  a  science  ; 
the  only  question  is  wliether  it  should  be  considered 
a  part  of  Biology,  or  hold  an  independent  place  after 
Biology  and  before  Ethology,  as  with  Mill.t 

Lastly,  with  regard  to  Sociology  itself,  Mill  refuses 
to  allow  that  the  merit  of  its  acknowledgment  as  a 
science  belongs  to  Comte.  t  '*  He  has  not  created 
Sociology."  The  reason  of  this,  in  Mill's  eyes,  is  that 
Sociology  depends  on  Ethology,  and  Ethology  on 
Psychology,  and  Comte  did  not  do  justice  either  to 
Ethology  or  Psychology.  But  MilFs  assertion  is 
perhaps  too  sweeping.  Anyone  who  compares  Mill's 
chapters  on  Sociology,  §  with  Comte's  '*  Philosophie 
Positive,"  will  see  that  without  the  foundation  of 
Comte  Mill's  edifice  would  never  have  been  reared. 
Yet  still,  perhaps,  there  is  some  truth  in  the  assertion 

•  Mill's  "Logic,"  vol.  ii., b.  ri.,  c.  iv.  "  Comte  and  Positiyism,"  p.  <17. 

t  "  Logic,"  b.  vi. 

I  "  Comte  and  Positivism,"  pp.  70  and  130.  §  "  Logic,"  bk.  vi. 


m 


42 


THE    METAPnYSICS   OF    MILL. 


THE    ANTECEDENTS    OF    MILL. 


43 


tliat  tliat  part  of  tlie  new  science  of  Sociology  wliicli  is 
"  Statics  "  must  be  referred  to  Aristotle  as  its  author, 
while  tliat  which  is  *'  Dynamics  "  is  nothing  more  than 
the  historic  law  of  evolution  discussed  above.  But 
Conite's  application  of  the  law  of  evolution  to  a 
Pliilosophy  of  History  seems  to  Mill  to  have  been  a 
great  achievement. 

Sucli  is  the  result  of  an  analysis  of  Mill's  relations 
to  Comte  and  Positivism,  which,  perliaps,  unduly 
lessens  his  obligations ;  for,  after  all,  the  Ibrmulator 
find  systcmatiser  of  a  particular  point  of  view  deserves 
to  be  called,  in  a  certain  sense,  an  inventor,  and  the 
man  who  comes  after  him  finds  his  work  materially 
lightened.  What  Mill  liimself  says  of  his  obligations 
to  Comte  is  i)erha|)s  too  absolutely  put.*  "  My  work 
is  indebted  to  Comte  for  several  important  ideas,  but  a 
short  list  would  exhaust  the  chapters  and  even  the 
pages  wliich  contain  them." 

In  concluding  this  general  review  of  the  interval 
which  elapsed  between  Hume  and  Mill,  and  of  Mill's 
relations  to  the  successive  schools  of  thought  wliich 
ap|)eared  in  the  interval,  we  may,  perhaps,  venture 
upon  a  generalisation.  Mill  is  the  product  of  Hume, 
Hartley,  and  Comte.  He  is  indebted  to  Hume  for 
Sensationalism,  and  to  Hartley  for  his  Assoc iation- 
alism,  wliile,  in  accordance  with  Comte,  he  adopts 
Phenomenalism. 

•  *'  Examiiiatioii  of  Hiimilton,"  eh.  xiv.,  p.  206,  note  2, 


/ 


nmP 


In  many  ways,  however,  it  is  Herbert  Spencer,  and 
not  Mill,  who  is  the  true  culmination  of  this  school. 
For  instead  of  merely  accepting  the  associational 
psychology,  he  has  merged  it  in  the  broader  law 
of  evolution.  The  doctrine  of  the  development  of 
psychical  states  out  of  inseparable  associations,  is  only 
a  special  example  of  the  great  law  of  Evolution.  This 
universal  doctrine  of  evolution  Herbert  Spencer  has 
sought  to  apply,  not  only  to  the  development  of  all 
forms  of  being,  wdiether  material  or  spiritual,  but  to  the 
evolution  of  the  relations  necessary  to  knowledge.  Thus, 
so-called  a  priori  conditions  of  knowledge  are  shown  to  be 
the  results  of  the  development  of  experience  in  the  race. 

In  modern  times  the  experimental  school  of  Philo- 
sophy has  widened  itself  in  many  directions.  Besides 
the  application  of  the  conception  of  Evolution,  and  the 
larger  interpretation  of  Psychology,  which  we  have 
already  noticed,  there  is  a  profounder  study  of  Biology, 
and  the  beginnings  of  an  appreciation  of  the  results  of 
Philological  labours  (as,  e.g.^  in  Mr.  Morell).  James 
Mill  saw  the  importance  of  this  point,  but  his  philo- 
logy is,  of  course,  anticpiated,  being  based  on  nothing 
better  than  Home  Tooke.  These  results  are  due  in 
large  measure  to  the  influence  of  the  better  elements 
of  Positivism,  and  to  the  labours  in  Germany  of  Her- 
bart,  Fechner,  and  Helmholtz.  The  English  writers  to 
whom  I  principally  refer  are  Bain,  Spencer,  Lewes, 
Carpenter,  Maudsley,  Darwin,  Morell,  and  Sully. 


.r  ,> 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


45 


CHAPTEE    IV. 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


Mill  liimself  mjs  that  lie  al»jures  Metaphysics.  In 
8peakio<5^  of  liis  relations  to  Comte  and  Positivism,  he 
I  says  that  he  agrees  with  the  position  of  that  school,  so 
far  as  it  rejects  First  Causes  and  Final  Causes;  his 
only  concern  being  with  "  Physical "  Causes.  But  he  too 
is  a  Psychologist — one  of  those  men  through  whoso 
labours,  as  he  says,  rather  grandiloquently,  '^  The 
Sceptre  of  Psychology  has  decidedly  returned  to  Eng- 
land." And  in  the  foundations  on  which  his  Psycho- 
logy rests,  he  has  to  deal  with  metaphysics,  and  with 
those  questions  on  which  metaphysics  claims  to  be 
heard.  A  passage  from  his  "  Examination  of  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  Philosophy  "  *  contains  explicitly 
this  avowal.  "  England  is  often  reproached  by  con- 
tinental Thinkers  with  indifference  to  the  higher  philo- 
sophy. But  England  did  not  always  deserve  this 
reproach,  and  is  already  showing  by  no  doubtful  symp- 
toms that  she  will  not  deserve  it  much  lonirer.     Her 


•  (( 


Examination,"  p.  2,  the  references  througliout  are  to  the  3rd  edition. 


thinkers  are  again  beginning  to  see,  what  they  had 
only  temporarily  forgotten,  that  a  true  Psychology  is 
the  indispensable  scientific  basis  of  Morals,  of  Politics, 
of  the  science  and  art  of  Education :  that  the  difficul- 
ties of  metapliysics  lie  at  the  root  of  all  science  :  that 
those  difficulties  can  only  be  quieted  by  being  resolved, 
and  that  until  they  are  resolved,  positively  whenever 
possible,  but  at  any  rate  negatively,  we  are  never  as- 
sured that  any  human  knowledge,  even  physical,  stands 
on  solid  foundations."  No  clearer  or  franker  avowal 
could  be  made  by  one  who  is  often,  though  inaccurately, 
called  an  English  Positivist. 

The  first  of  these  metaphysical  questions  is  undoubt- 
edly concerned  with  *•' Consciousness."  Here  again 
]\Iill  is  explicit.  ''  When  we  know,"  he  says,  "  what 
any  philosopher  considers  to  be  revealed  in  Conscious- 
ness, we  have  the  key  to  the  entire  character  of  his 
metaphysical  system."  *  By  Mill's  own  invitation, 
then,  we  have  to  consider  what  he  believes  to  be 
revealed  in  Consciousness ;  though,  to  a  great  extent, 
we  can  only  gain  this  indirectly  by  discovering  his  own 
opinions  from  his  criticisms  on  Hamilton.  Three 
chapters  in  his  "  Examination  " — *'  The  Relativity  of 
Knowledge,'*  ''  Consciousness  as  understood  by  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,"  and  ''  The  Interpretation  of  Conscious- 
ness " — will  suffice  to  acquaint  us  with  Mill's  opinior 
on  this  question.     We  shall  then,  after  summing  up 

*  "  Examination,"  p.  132. 


46 


THE   METAPHYSICS  OF   MILL. 


the  main  features  of  tliat  opinion,  be  able  to  consider 
how  far  it  may  be  considered  adequate  or  satisfactory. 

"The  Relativity  of  Human  Knowledge"  merely 
means,  in  its  broadest  and  simplest  statement,  that  we. 
know  no  more  of  external_obiects  than  what  the  senses 
tgTuI  But  the  doctrine  itself  may  be  held  in  two 
different  forms.  We  may  either  mean  that  not  only 
are  the  sensations  all  that  we  can  possibly  know  of  the 
objects,  but  all  that  we  have  any  ground  for  believing 
to  exist.  Or  else,  without  committing  ourselves  to 
such  extreme  Idealism,  we  may  only  wish  to  signify  by 
the  doctrine  tliat,  while  the  Ego  and  the  Non-Ego  are 
undoubtedly  realities,  yet  that  they  are  for  us  unknow- 
able, because  all  that  we  know  about  them  are  the 
impressions  they  make  upon  us.  A  further  discrimi- 
Bation  can,  however,  be  made  between  two  varieties  of 
opinion,  contained  in  the  last  form  of  the  statement. 
According  to  one  school,  we  have  in  Consciousness, 
over  and  above  sensations  plus  an  unknowable  cause, 
certain  forms  of  sense  and  categories  of  the  under- 
standing (t'.y..  Time,  Space,  Substantiality,  CausaUty, 
Ac)  which  are  modes  under  which  we  are  forced  to 
represent  to  ourselves  Things-in-themselves.  Accord- 
ing to  another  school,  these  conceptions  of  Time,  Space, 
Substance,  and  Cause  are  not  innate  forms  of  the 
mind,  but  merely  "  conceptions  put  together  out  of  ideas 
of  sensation^  by  the  known  laws  of  Association."  It  is, 
of  course,  to  this  last  expression  of  the  doctrine,  that 


V 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  47 

1 

Mill  commits  himself.  For  him,  the  Relativity  of 
Knowledge  means  two  things  :  that  our  knowledge  is 
strictly  subjective ;  and  that  we  are  limited  to  expe- 
rience, the  mind  gradually  gaining  its  ideas,  by  putting 
together  sensations  and  ideas  of  sensations  l)y  known 
laws  of  association.  This  is  the  true  Sensationahst 
opinion,  differing  not  a  whit,  so  far,  from  that  of  Hume. 
Let  us  now  turn  to  another  chapter, — that  entitle 
"  On  Consciousness  as  understood  by  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton." According  to  Mill,  Hamilton  has  two  definitions 
of  "  Consciousness,"  which  are  by  no  means  consis- 
tent, and  only  one  of  which  can  be  approved.*  '^  In 
the  one  definition,  it  is  synonymous  with  direct,  im- 
mediate, or  intuitive  knowledge  ;  and  we  are  conscious 
no,t_onl^^-ouj:&elve%Jjut  of  outward  objects^  ^"^'[^j  in 
our  author's  opinion,  we  know  these  intuitively." 
This  is,  of  course,  Realism,  and  in  this  point,  Hamilton 
is  but  showing  his  adherence  to  the  Scotch  philo- 
sophers of  Common  Sense,  Reid  and  others.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  Mill  refutes  this  opinion,  as  he 
invariably,  in  the  *'  Examination,"  does  any  approach 
to  Realism.  AVhen  Hamilton  says,  in  accordance 
with  a  Realistic  standpoint,  that  "  it  is  palpably  im- 
possible that  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  act,  without 
being  conscious  of  the  object  to  which  that  act  is 
relative,"  Mill  retorts  that,  if  the  principle  is  to  hold 
good,  Belief  becomes  identical  with  Knowledge ;  for 


A 


/ 


/ 


/ 


«   n 


Examination,'  p.  138. 


48 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF    MILL. 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


49 


when  we  believe,  we  must  be  conscious  of  tlie  objects 
of  belief,  and  so  the  objects  of  Belief  become  one  witb 
the  objects  of  Knowled^^e.* 

But  Hamilton  bas  anotber  definition  of  Conscious- 
ness. According  to  this,  "Consciousness  is  the 
mind's  recognition  of  its  own  acts  and  affections."  t 
He  does  not  mean  by  this,  says  Mill,  that  the  mind's 
acts  and  affections  are  one  tiling,  and  tbe  mind's 
recognition  of  tbem,  anotber  tbing.  No,  be  denies 
Bucb  an  inference.  He  denies  tbat  we  bave  one  faculty 
by  wbicli  we  know  or  feel  and  another  by  which  we 

fr    ■*"" '" 

kn,ow  that  we  kno^f^ and „ kn,QW- that  we  feel.     And 

Mil  thoroughly  agrees  with  him.  A  long  passage  is 
quoted  from  James  Mill's  "Analysis,"  (i.  170-172,) 
tlie  whole  purport  of  wliicli  is  to  prove  "  the  identity 
of  our  various  mental  states,  and  our  consciousness  of 
them."  In  Mill's  opinion,  then.  Sensation,  and  the 
Consciousness  of  a  Sensation  are  one  and  the  same 

tbinir'.l 

The  chapter  that  follows  the  one  we  bave  been  just 
ftnalysing,li  elucidates,  to  a  large  extent,  Mill's  own 
position,  and  illustrates  tbe  method,  which,  according 
to  bim,  Psychology  ought  to  pursue.  Tlie  verdict  of 
Consciousness,  «>.,  our  immediate  intuitive  conviction, 

♦  *■•  Examination,"  p.  145.  t  I^ i'"*.  P- 1'^8- 

I  In  his  notes  on  James  Mill's  Analysis.  "Mill  says  much  the  same 
thinsr,  altliou<7h  with  some  limitations  (which  arc,  however,  more 
apparent  than  real),  aiul  mnch  unnecessary  vei-l)in?e. 

[[  ••  On  the  Interpretation  of  Conseiousnciis,"  c.  Ix. 


«-  * , 


I 


ffl 


being  admitted  to  be  without  appeal,  the  question 
naturally  arises.  To  what  does  Consciousness  bear 
witness?  Hamilton  draws  a  distinction  between  ''  the 
facts  given  in  the  act  of  consciousness  "  which  must 
remain  undoubted,  and  "  the  facts,  to  the  reality  of 
which  it  only  bears  evidence,"  which  have  been  largely 
doubted  by  the  majority  of  Philosophers.  This,  says 
Mill,  is  a  mis-statement  of  the  question  at  issue.  For 
it  is  not  questioned  whether  the  factsjcstifiedjoby 
consciousnessare  true,  but  whether  consciousness  dm^s^ 

ac^UiaUy  tes%^^  It  il not  thatjhe 

testimony  is  undoubted,  and  the  leradty  of  the  testi- 
iiio^'caired  in  question,  but  whether  consciousness  is 
ever  witness  to  anything  beyond  itself.     As  a  matter 

of  fact7l^iaso|)heif^  ^^ 

^^^Pinn^noc^^  ]^  rather  the_f^ict  of  its  testimony. 
Nor  is  this  absurd.  Substitute  for  "  consciousness," 
the  words  *' intuitive  knowledge,"  and  it  is  at  once 
clear  that  intuition  itself  will  not  tell  us  what  know- 
ledo-e  is  intuitive.     It  is  therefore  quite  open  to  doubt 

o 

whether  consciousness  does  or  does  not  affirm,  any 
given  thing,  although  at  first  sight  such  a  doubt 
appears  impossible.  The  question  "  what  do  we  know 
intuitively,"  or  "to  what  does  our  consciousness 
testify,"  is,  then,  not  a  matter  of  simple  self-examina- 
tion, but  of  science.  There  are  two  methods,  Mill 
continues,  in  which  tbe  question  is  sought  to  be 
solved.     The  first,  the  Introspective  Method,  attempts 


A 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


by  carefully  sifting  our  present  states  of  consciousness 
to  pronounce  tliose  to  be  ultimate  and  primary  truths, 
which  we  cannot  by  our  analysis  resolve  into  something 
simpler.  But  inasmuch  as  the  laws  of  Mind  are 
capable  of  constructing  some  conceptions  which 
become  so  identified  with  all  our  consciousness  that 
we  cannot  but  think  them  intuitive,  this  process 
appears  to  be  unsafe.  The  only  way  is  to  discover 
what  truths  there  are  in  the  mind,  whose  origin  can- 
not in  any  reasonable  way  be  accounted  for.  AMien, 
after  a  study  of  the  modes  of  generation  of  the  mental 
facts  confessedly  not  original,  we  have  applied  the 
.same  jn-ocess  to  those  which  are  supposed  to  be  original, 
tlieu  only  can  we  say  that  the  phenomena,  which 
remain  unaccounted  for  by  those  modes  of  generation, 
are  primary  and  original  elements  of  the  mind.  This 
is  the  true  psycliological  method,  and  Locke,  says 
Mill,  was  right  in  laying  the  main  stress^upon^  the 
' '  origin  of  ourjikas . ' ' 

If  now  w^e  add  to  the  foregoing  Mill's  theories  of 
Mental  Association,  the  device  by  which  the  growth 
of  our  Ideas  out  of  sensations  is  to  be  explained,  we 
shall  have  exhausted  the  whole  content  of  "  Conscious- 
ness "  according  to  Mill.  Hume,  we  remember, 
enunciated  three  principles,  according  to  which  ideas 
were  associated  :  Ilesemblance,  Contiguity,  and  Causa- 

-  tion. 

Accordin*?    to  Mill    the    Law  of   Association  has 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


51 


four  exemplifications.*  Ideas  are  associated  through 
Similarity,  and  through  Contiguity  (which  may  be 
equivalent  either  to  Simultaneity  or  Immediate  Suc- 
cession). The  two  remaining  laws  run  as  follows : 
"  Increased  certainty  is  given  by  repetition  to  Ideas 
associated  by  contiguity,"  and  '^  the  inseparability 
of  the  Associated  Ideas  is  transferred  to  the  facts 
answering  to  them."  The  characteristic  properties 
of  the  Law  are  that  the  suggestions  they  produce 
are  for  the  time  irresistible,  and  that  the  suggested 
ideas  (at  least  when  the  association  is  of  the  syn- 
chronous kind  as  distinguished  from  the  successive) 
become  so  blended  together  by  a  species  of  ^^  mental 
chemistry,"  f  that  the  compound  result  appears  to  our 
consciousness  simple.  Secondary  actions  of  the  Law 
connect  themselves  with  "  laws  of  obliviscence,"  and 
"  unconscious  mental  modifications,"  I  but  these  we 
need  not  here  particularly  define. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  Mill's  theory 
of  "  Consciousness."  Let  us  try  and  sum  up  the  main 
features. 

In  the  first  place,  we  now  see  with  what  propriety 
Mill  is  classed  with  the  Sensationalist  School.  For 
with  him,  as  with  them  all^  man's  knowledge  is  the 
result — a  complex  result  it  is  true,  but  still  a  result — 


•  "  Examination,"  pp.  219,  220.    "  Logic,"  Bk.  \i.,  c.  4. 

t  Ibid,  p.  307. 

i  Ibid,  pp.  313,  314,  335,  341—343. 

E  2 


o2 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MILL. 


COXSCIOUSNESS. 


53 


of  what  lie  derives  from  the  communications  of  sense. 

'*  ^Jaiows^n^ythiiig^ PL^iiS^2^^-^-^!5^.1^^ 

senses  tell  him/'  Mill,  in  fact,  expressly  disavows 
any  other  flictor  of  knowledge  in  his  criticisms  of  the 
"  pretensions  "  of  the  a  priori  school.  There  are  no 
innate  forms  or  categories  of  the  mind  with  him. 
Those  notions  which  are  mistaken  for  such,  are,  in 
reality,  complex  results  of  certain  associations  set  up 
among*  the  intimations  of  sense.  Nor  yet,  according 
to  Mill,  can  we  embrace  the  alternative  opinion— that 
in  sensation  we  are  immediately  conscious  of  objects. 
We    are    not    so    conscious    immediately,    but   only 

Wcliately^ Tliese oljcctg are_ not  intuitions,  they  arc 

inferences.  Mill^  then,  is  equally  the  antagonist  of 
the  Kantian  school,  and  of  the  Scotch  school  of  Com- 
mon-Sense, or  Realism.  He  is  a  follower,  an  exiionent 
of  that  mode  of  iiliilosopliy  which  was  inaugurated  by 
Locke,  and  carried  on  by  Berkeley  and  Hume. 

All  we  know,  then,  in  the  first  and  ultimate  resort, 
are  Sensations.  But  with  the  Sensation,  there  is 
something  more.  Mill  thinks,  than  the  momentary 
modification  of  the  sensibility.  Tliere  is  also  the 
Consciousness  of  the  Sensation.  ^'  Sensation  and  the 
consciousness  of  a  sensation  are  one  and  tiie^?iame 


i.  JLAJIjhhi|  <• 


Tlie  Sensation,  in  fact,  carries  with  it,  as  a 
component  part  of  itself,  or  as  identical  with  itself 
(given  seemingly  in  one  act),  the  Consciousness  of  the 

Sensation, 


i 


In   the  third  place,  ideas,  as  we  have  them, are 

merely  worked  up  (a»  it  were)  out  of  sensfttions  by 
certain  laws  of  AssociatiDn.  These  are  the  all-powerful 
instruments  of  the  Psychological  school,  tlie  potent 
alchemy  by  which  all  sort  of  unexpected  results  are 
made  to  appear.     Thiis  it  comes  about  that  we  are 

l)0ssessed  ofjiotions^^  .ideas,  of  which  we 

can  iroTtlivest  ourselves,  wliicli  we  cannot  hejp  apply-, 
inglo  things,  and  which  ap])ear  to  be  a  necessary  part 
(.f  our  thinking  processes,  but  which  are,  in  reaFity, 


4> 


but  *^  the  baseless  fabric  of  a  vision."  AVhen  the 
Sensation,  the  Consciousness  of  a  ISensation,  and  the 
Laws  of  Association  are  enumerated,  we  have  the 
whole  content  of  Consciousness,— at  least  on  its  intel- 
lectual side.  Phenomena  of  volition,  and  phases  of 
emotion  do  not  come  within  our  present  scope. 

Let  us  make  a  few  remarks  on  these  three  points  in 
turn.     The  first  position  is,  as  Mill  points  out,  com- 
mon to  all  those  who  believe  in  ^Hhe  Relativity  of   | 
knowl^dgCall— J3erkeley,  Kant,  and  MiH  agree  in  this. 


that  all  that  we  can  know  of  objects  is  what  the  senses 
tell  us,  i.e.,  phenomena.  The  divergence  appears 
later.  Is  Sensation  the  only  factor  in  the  body,  or 
complex,  of  our  knowledge  ?  Is  the  whole  reality  of 
knowledge  to  be  explained  as  the  mere  product  of^, 
Sense?  Tliegg2gg^of_our^^nsntions,  whatever  iiunay  * 
be,  must^  be  piit-miLof  court^  for  tliatjs^nknowable. 
Can  knowledge,  then,  be  exactly  resolved  into  Sensa- 


54 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


55 


f-  tions,  plus  an  unknowable  cause,  or  is  there  anytliing 
I      more  to  be  said?     Does  the  mind  interfere  in  any  way, 
does  it  add  somethin^j^  to    experience,  which  is  not 
gained  from  experieuec?     It  does,  answers  Kant,  it 
adds  "  forms."     It  does  not,  answers  Mill :  wliat  you 
call  "forms"    are   merely   the    result  of   sensation, 
V     worked  up  by  purely  natural  processes  of  association.* 
Knowledo:e,  tlien,  is  experience,  and  experience  is 
sensation,  accordin^^  to  Mill.     Now  in  knowledge,  there 
must  be  some  distinction  between  Reality  and  Un- 
reality.    What  is  the  Real  ?    Why  is  any  object —that 
chair,  say— a   real  object  for  me?     Tliere   are  two 
adequate  answers,  and,  so  far  as  I  know,  only  two. 
You  may  say,  "  The  object  is  real  for  me,  because  in 
sensatioE  I  am  immediately  conscious  of  an  object, 
because  I  am,  in  this  instance,  in  immediate  contact 
with  ol»jective  reality."    Tliat  is  the  answer  of  Common 
Sense,  which,  in  Philosophy,  goes  by  the  name  of 
Realism.    Or  you  may  say,  "  The  object  is  real,  because 
it  is  the  construction  of  my  thought,  reality  being 
nothing?  else  than  this  mental  construction.     The  sensa- 
tion  comes  and  goes,  but  my  mind  fixes  it,  by  bringing 
it  into  relation  with,  and  distinguishing  it  from,  every- 
thing else,  and  so  it  becomes  a  real  part  of  my  know- 
ledge."    That  is  the  answer  of  what  may  be  called 
Idealism.     Mill   is  precluded  from  the   first  answer, 
because  with  him,  in  opposition  to  Hamilton,  we  arc 

•  See  note  at  end  of  Chapter  V. 


a 


not  conscious  of  objects  intuitively.  He  is  precluded 
from  the  second  answer,  because  with  him  the  mind 
does  not  bring  a  priori  relations  to  bear  upon  its 
experience.  Wliat  tlien  is  reaU  The  Sensation. 
Remember,  too,  that  ]\Iill  cannot  fall  back  upon  the 
general  experience  of  Humanity,  or  Universal  Sen- 
sationalism, because  tliis  is  just  that  further  contribution 
made  by  Spencer  to  the  interpretation  of  Experience. 
His  position  demands  tliat  in  each  man's  case  his  stores 
of  knowledge  arise  out  of  the  sensations  he  has  in  past 
time  experienced.  "  The  real,"  then,  is  just  an  indi- 
vidual man's  individual  personal  sensations.  A  truly 
Protagorean  answer. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  we  must  analyse  "  Sensation," 
and  this  leads  us  to  Mill's  second  position.  Sensation 
is  not  merely  sensation ;  it  is  more,  it  is  the  Conscious- 
ness of  a  Sensation.  Now,  in  one  sense  of  the  words, 
to  say  that  a  sensation  and  the  consciousness  of  a 
sensation  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  is  to  utter  a 
truism.  It  may  only  be  cciuivalent  to  saying,  "  When 
I  feel,  I  feel,"  which  is  obvious  and  unimportant 
enough.  But,  of  course,  on  such  a  slender  foundation 
as  this  cannot  be  reared  even  the  ground-plan  of 
knowledge.  In  reality  this  is  not  what  we  are  intended 
to  infer  from  the  words.  The  consciousness  of  a  sen- 
sation is  "the  realising"  of  a  sensation;  and  the 
realisation,  the  making  a  reality  of  it,  means,  when  we 
analyse  it,  the  bringing    it    into   relation  with,  and 


i 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


differentiating-  it  from,  any  and  every  other  sensation 
we  experience.     To  be  conscious  of  a  sensation  means 
that  for  lis  we  accept  it  into  tlie  mind  as  one  thing,  we 
so  regard  it  as  to  make  it  our  own,  so  that  we  are  able 
to  identify  it  again  when  it  recurs.     But  a  mere  sensa- 
tion cannot  of  itself  (unless,   indeed,  we  accept  the 
doctrines  of  Realism)  make  itself  different  from  every 
other,  so  that  it  can  be  identified  when  it  recurs.    How 
can  it  ?     It  is  but  an  impression  on  our  sensibility, 
that  sensibility  being  comi.letely  passive,  ex  hjpothesL 
To  raise  it  from  such  mere  passive  impression,  to  make 
it  real,  must  be  the  work  of  the  mind  in  some  way  or 
otiier  (liowever  we  name  it)  going  out  to  it,  ])uttuig 
relations  on  it,  and  then  bringing  it  into  Consciousness 
as  one  thini?.     Now,  such  "  a  consciousness  of  sensa- 
tion'^  as  this  is  by  no  means  the  same  thing  as  sensa- 
tion ;   it  is  different  with  all  the  difference  between 
having  and  receiving,  between  activity  and  passivity. 
,  When  Mill,   however,   says   that  a  sensation  and 
(the   consciousness   of  a    sensation    are   one  and  the 
[same  thing,  we   accept  the  sentence,   unthinkingly, 
because  it  strikes  us  as  a  truism  in  the  first  sense  of 
the  words.     But,  really,  to  raise  out  of  Sensation  \\\q 
edifice  of  knowledge,  it  must  be  used  in  the  second 
sense  of    the   words,  because    only    such    confusion 
between  sentient  and  mental  acts  could  lead  to  the 
success  of  the  attempt  to  educe  all  knowledge  out  of 
sensation.     Mill  gets  all  the  benefit  out  of  the  first 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


67 


sense  of  the  words,  when  really  what  he  must  mean  is 
the  second  sense.  But  Aristotle  knew  better,  when 
he  discriminated  between  the  separate  intimations  of 
sense  (Ihiai  ala67](T€Ls)  and  something  more  than  mere 
sense  {to  b'oTi  ala-OavoixeOa.)* 

Nor  can  such  an  analysis  of  the  primary  acts  of 
sensation   be    possibly   distasteful  to  Mill.     For  the 
whole   spirit  of  his   treatment  of  Hamilton   {e.g.  in 
the  chapter  "The  interpretation  of  Consciousness")  is 
just  this,— that  we  must  not  take  what  appears  to  be 
primary  as  if  it  were  really  such :  it  may  be  secondary: 
it  may  be  complex,  and  not  simple :  and  only  further 
analysis  can  tell.     And  the  Experiential  Philosopher 
is,  as  we  have  seen,  justly  sceptical    of   words  like 
"  ultimate  "  and  "  primary."     So  we  are  quite  within 
the  procedure  of  the  proper  Psychological  method  of 
Mill,  when  we  take  such  a  sentence  as  "  sensation  and 
the  consciousness  of  a  sensation  are  one  and  the  same 
thing,"  and  see  whether  such  a  supposed  primary  act 
is,  or  is  not,  primary,— whether  these  two  are  one  and 
the  same  thing,  or  not,— whether  "  a  consciousness  of 
a  sensation "   is  really  a  simple  thing,  or  a  complex 

thing. 

AYith  Mdl's  successors,  the  question  is  solved  in  a 
bolder  manner.  To  later  exponents  of  the  Psycho- 
logical method,  consciousness  in  its  primitive  condition 
is  resolved  into  two  acts,  first,  the  consciousness  of  a 

*  De  Anima,  iii.  1 ,  2. 


US 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


COXSCIOUSNESS. 


59 


difference,  then  the  consciousness  of  a  siniihirit  v.*  But 
if  sensation  at  once  iinplies,  in  one  and  the  same  act, 
the  perce])tion  of  a  difference  between  itself  and  every- 
thing else,  what  else  is  this  bnt  *'  consciousness  testify- 
ing to  something  other  than  itself "—'' the  knowing 
not  only  that  I  know,  but  also  nhat  I  know"— that 
identical  doctrine  of  Realism,  on  which,  wlien  uttered 
by  Hamilton,  Mill  pours  out  all  the  vials  of  his 
scatliiiiir  criticism? 

We  come  now  to  the  third  point,  _the_  Laws  j^ 
Mental  Association.  In  his  study  of  Association,  Mill 
is,  perhaps,  not  so  explicit,  nor  does  he  embark  on 
so  complete  a  study,  as  some  of  his  school,  notably 
Bain.  Yet  tlie  matter  is  one  of  paramount  importance 
to  liim,  for  by  him  the  idea  of  cause  is  reduced  to  an 
inseparable,  unconditional  association,  and  on  cause 
Mill  rests  his  entire  theory  of  reasoning.  Tliat  Mill 
was  not  unduly  insensible  to  this  importance,  we  may 
gather  from  the  following  sentence:  t  ''That  which  the 
Law  of  Gravitation  is  to  Astronomy,  that  which  the 
elementary  properties  of  the  tissues  are  to  Physiology, 
the  Law  of  the  Association  of  Ideas  is  to  Psychology." 

What  that  Law  includes  we  have  already  seen.  What 
we  now  have  to  see,— and  it  is  a  question  to  which 
Mill  never  addresses  himself,— is  what  such  Association 

•  Cf.,  among  others,  Bain,  "Senses  and  Intellect,"  Introduction  ; 
aiKl  "  Emotions  and  Will,"  p.  oiUJ  and  foUuwing. 
f  "  Comtc  and  Positivism.,"  P*  ^^• 


implies^  what  conditions  it  postulates  either  lu  the 
things  that  are  known  or  the  thing  tliat  knows.  Such 
a  question,  obviously  prior  to  all  the  exhibitions  of  the 
principle  such  as  we  have  them  in  Mill,  is  exactly  that 
which  no  Sensationalist  or  Experientialist  philosopher 
handles.  And  to  ignore  it  means  one  of  two  tilings, 
either  to  be  a  Eealist  and  not  a  Sensationalist  at  all,  or 
else  to  be  guilty  of  a  want  of  analysis  in  those  very 
intimations  of  Consciousness  which  it  is  the  bounden 
duty  of  the  experimental  psychologist  (according  to 
Mill)  thoroughly  to  sift  and  analyse. 

What  then  do  we  mean  by  the  Association  of  Sen- 
sations and  Ideas?  What  does  such  a  faculty  pre- 
suppose ? 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  clear  that  associating  power 
should  naturally  belong  to  a  mind  that  is  active* 
(actively  dealing  with  and  transforming  sensations) 
rather  than  to  a  mind  that  is  passive  (passively  re- 
ceiving such  sensations  as  they  successively  present 
themselves).  "To  associate"  is,  of  course,  to  do, 
rather  than  to  suffer,  by  the  very  force  of  the  term. 
Such  an  objection  may  appear  mere  haggling  over 
words,  but  in  reality  it  leads  us  to  the  very  core  of 

♦  Mill  was  afterwards  not  insensible  to  tliis.  Cf.  "  Dissertations 
and  Discussions,"  vol.  iii.,  art.  on  Bain.  "  Those  wlio  liave  studied 
the  writinjrs  of  the  Association  Psychologists,  must  often  have  been 
unfavourably  impressed  by  the  almost  total  absence,  in  their  analy- 
tical expositions,  of  the  recognition  ol  any  active  element  as  spon- 
taneity in  the  mind  itself  "  (p.  Ili0« 


60 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


CONSCIOUSXESS. 


61 


the  qaestion.  We  shall  see  this  more  clearly  by 
adtlressiDg  ourselves  to  a  second  point.  "  Sensations 
and  the  resultant  ideas  are  associated  according  to 
certain  hiws."  What  does  this  mean?  It  means, 
obviousljj  that  certain  sensations  being  held  in  con- 
sciousness, and  their  relations,  whether  of  contiguity 
or  resemblance,  being  ai)i)rehended  by  the  mind, 
they  ai'e  associated  togetlier.  Any  process  less  than 
this  would  never  result  in  association.  Think  what 
association,  in  popular  senses  of  the  word,  means.  I 
associate  together  the  idea  of  this  paper  with  the  idea 
of  an  essay.  That  is  to  say,  having  received  tlirough 
my  senses  certain  impressions  of  a  particular  kind,  to 
which  after  due  consideration  I  apply  the  name  of 
paper,  I  tlien  think  of  them  in  relation  to  other  im- 
liressions  wliich  I  call  writing  or  reading  an  essay.  It 
is  clear  that  if  my  first  impressions  had  come  and  gone, 
and  not  been  retained,  lixed,  made  permanent,  made 
real,  l)y  my  ever-present  consciousness,  I  could  never 
liave  tliought  of  them  in  relation  to  my  second  impres- 
sions, because  they  would  not  have  been  there  to  be 
thouglit  of.  In  otlier  w^ords,  thought  has  to  make 
sensations  real  before  they  can  be  associated ;  and, 
further,  they  cannot  be  associated,  unless,  being  made 
real,  they  can  be  identified  when  they  recur. 

This  is  all  upon  the  supposition  which  Mill  himself 
makes  for  us  when  he  says  (as  indeed  all  Sensationalists 
must)  that  all  that  we  can  know  of  things  is  the  sensa- 


r 


tions  we  experience.  If  that  is  the  case,  if  sensation 
does  not  testify  to  anything  beyond  itself,  then  a  sen- 
sation, on  analysis,  is  discovered  to  amount  to  nothing 
more  than  a  particular  impression,  out  of  which,  by 
some  further  process,  knowledge  and  reality  are  pro- 
duced. And  then  naturally  we  have  to  consider,  as  we 
have  done,  whether  a  sensation  has  not  to  be  trans- 
formed in  some  way  before  it  can  become  a  permanent 
item  of  knowledge ;  and,  further,  whether,  unless  it 
be  thus  transformed,  it  can  ever  become  real  enough  to 
be  associated  with  any  other  sensation.  t^ 

There   is,   however,   another   supposition    which   is 
possible.     The  sensations  may  come  ready-formed,  in  a 
certain  way,  into  our  mind.  As  ready-formed,  they  must 
have,  of  course,  their  similarities  to  and  differences 
from  otlier  sensations  already  fixed.     Then  to  a  mind, 
purely  passive,  there  would  certainly  be  open  the  ten- 
dency to  associate  them,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the 
sensations  themselves  in  their  resemblances,  naturally 
and  of  themselves,  tend  to  coagulate  into  groups.     This 
supposition  I  say  is  possible,  but  it  certainly  is  not 
possible  for  Mill.      For  what  does  it  imply  ?    That  1/ 
sensations  are  fixed  in  a  certain  objective  order.     That 
is,  that  when  we  are  conscious  of  sensations,  we  are 
not  merely  limited  within  the  bounds  of  consciousness, 
but  that  we  are  passively  recipient  of  a  certain  objec- 
tive order,  obviously  heyond  consciousness.     And  this 
means  that  sensations  do  not  merely  imply  themselves, 


J^ 


62 


THE   METxlPHYSICS   OF    MILL. 


? 


but  sometliing  more  tlian  themselves,  viz.,  their  rehi- 
tions,  their  differences,'  their  resemblances,  to  and 
from  one  another.  But  this  is  a  Hamiltonian  doctrine, 
in  other,  words,  Realism.  As  such,  then,  it  is  not 
open  to  Mill. 
The  conclusion  would  appear  to  be  this.    If  Realism 

be  accepted,  then  Sensations  ca^n  be associated,  because 

they  may  be  conceived  as  already  existing  in  a  certain 
objective  order:  but  if  Sensationalism  be  accepted, 
I  then  Sensations  cannot  be  associated  at  all,  for  there 
'  must  first  be  a  mental  process  (not «  feeling")  to  bring 
them  into  relations  with  one  another,  in  order  that 
they  may  be  associated.  So  little  is  it  true  that 
Association  exi)laiiis  Thought,  that  the  reverse  is  the 
case.  It  is  Thought  which  explains  the  possibility  of 
Association. 


I 


CHAPTER    V. 


BODY  AND   MIND. 


After  the  metaphysical  question  as  to  the  contents 
of  Consciousness  and  the  extent  and  validity  of  its 
testimony,  we  come  to  the  equally  serious  meta|)liysical 
difficulties  which  surround  the  words  "  Matter  and 
Body,"  and  "  Mind  or  Self."  Here  we  have  very  ex- 
plicit theories  on  the  part  of  Mill  in  the  two  chapters 
of  his  *'  Examination,"  entitled  respectively  '^  The 
Psychological  Theory  of  the  Belief  in  an  External 
AYorld,"  and  *'  The  Psychologic ;al  Theory  of  Matter 
how  for  applicable  to  Mind."*  With  these  theories  we 
must  now  do  our  best  to  acquaint  ourselves. 

"The  Psychological  Theory"  begins  by  postulating 
certain  conditions  "  in  nature,"  and  certain  conditions 
in  the  mind  itself  The  conditions  it  postulates  in 
Nature  are  as  follows : — 

(i.)  Sensations. 

(ii.)  Succession  and  simultaneousness  of  Sensations. 

(iii.)  The  union  of  these  sensations  (both  successive 

*  "  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosopliy,"  Chaps.  XI.  and  XII. 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


BODY  AND    MIND. 


bo 


aocl  simultaneous)  into  groups,  so  tliat  tlie  experience 
of  one  sensation  authorises  lis  to  expect  all  the  rest, 
proviilecl  that  certain  antecedent  sensations,  called 
organic,  are  first  experienced. 

The  conditions  which  tlie  theory  postulates  in  the 
mind  itself  are — 

(i.)  The  Law  of  Expectation  and  Memory, 

(ii.)  Tlie  Laws  of  the  Association  of  Ideas  (which  we 
have  already  enumerated). 

With  these  assumptions,  the  Psychological  theory 
nndertid^es  to  prove  that  the  conception  of  External 
Matter  would  necessarily  be  generated  (if  it  was  n( )t  an 
original  datum  of  consciousness)  by  the  known  laws  of 
the  Mind.  The  steps  in  tliis  gradual  belief  in  Exter- 
nality may  be  reduced  to  four  : — 

1.  We  have  a  present  sensation,  and  we  conceive  of 
possibilities  of  sensation  (by  exj)erience).  The  possi- 
bibties  of  sensation  are  permanent,  while  the  present 
sensation  is  fiii»-itive. 

2.  The  possibility  of  sensation  refers  not  to  a  single 
sensation,  but  to  a  group  of  sensations.  Now  if  I 
experience  one  of  them,  I  know  I  could  experience  all. 
Hence  the  possibilities  of  sensation  are  conceived  of  as 
permanent,  not  only  in  opposition  to  the  temporariness 
of  my  bodily  presence,  but  to  the  temporary  character 
of  any  one  of  the  sensations,  of  whicli  the  group  re- 
ferred to  is  composed.  Here  we  observe  that  the  idea 
of  a  "  substratum  "  is  in  process  of  formation. 


i 


3.  Experience  of  an  order  in  our  sensations  leads  to 
the  belief  in  the  law  of  Cause  and  Effect.  Now  the 
antecedent  of  a  sensation  is  in  most  cases  a  possibility 
of  sensation,  involving  a  group  of  contingent  sensa- 
tions. The  Idea  of  "  Cause,"  therefore,  is  connected 
with  tliese  pcrnuinent  possibilities,  as  are  also  ideas  of 
"l)0wer,"  "activity,"  *' energy,"  and  the  like:  and 
the  aetual  sensations  are  supposed  to  have  a  back- 
ground in  the  possibll'dks  of  sensation.  The  idea  of  a 
*^  substratum"  is  now  fully  developed. 

4.  One  more  step,  and  the  analysis  is  complete.  We 
find  other  people  acting  on  tlie  supposition  of  these 
permanent  possibilities  of  sensation  as  well  as  our- 
selves :  whereas  our  actual  sensations  are  not  common 
to  our  fellow-creatures.  The  World,  tlien,  of  Possible 
Sensations,  belonging  to  other  people,  as  well  as  to 
me,  is  held  to  constitute  an  External  World. 

Sucli  is  ]\Iiirs  extremely  acute  and  subtle  analysis  of 
tlie  growth  of  our  belief  in  Externality.  Tlie  conclu- 
sion is  plain.  If  we  ask  What  is  Matter  ?  the  only 
answer  which  a  i)sychol()gist  can  give,  is  that  it  is 
merely  "  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  Sensation."  This 
is  all,  says  Mill,  that  is  essential  to  the  belief  in  Matter, 
whether  held  by  philosophers  or  ordinary  humanity. 

Can  the  same*  analysis  be  extended  to  '^Mind?" 
Will  believes  that,  to  a  large  extent,  it  can.  Just  as 
the  Non-Ego  might  easily  have  been  formed  as  a 
conception,  by  the  known  laws  of  the  mind,  even  if 


F 


66 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OP  MILL. 


it  was  not  in  consciousness  from  the  becrinnin<r,  so 
also  (subject  to  a  somewhat  grave  difficulty,  to  which 
we  shall  return  later)  the  notion  of  the  Ego,  as  "  a 
substratum,"  might  have   been  formed.      For  it  is 
evident  that  we  have  no  conception   of   the   Mind, 
as  distinguished  from  its   conscious    manifestations, 
le.,  sensations  and  internal  feelings.     The  belief  in 
mind,  therefore,  is  nothing  more  than  a  belief  in  a 
Permanent  Possibility  of  Sequent  Feelings.     If  this 
be  so,  what  evidence  have  we,  on  this  hypothesis,  of 
the  existence  of  our  fellow-creatures,  of  the  existence 
of  God,  of  Immortality  ?    Just  as  much  evidence,  Mill 
thinks,  as  we  have  on  the  ordinary  theory.    AVe  believe, 
for  instance,  that  our  fellow-creatures  have  minds,  be- 
cause our  senses  assure  us  that  they  have  the  antece- 
dent conditions  for  feelings,   (bodies,)   and   the  sub- 
sequent effects,   (acts  and    outward    demeanour.)     I 
know  in  my  own  case  tliat  the  first  link  produces  the 
last  only  through  the  intermediate  link  of  feehngs.     I 
infer  that  this  must  be  tlie  case  with  tliem.     ]^ow  this 
inference  is  just  as  valid  on  the  assumi>tion  that  neither 
Mind  nor  Matter  is  anything  but  a  permanent  possibi- 
lity of  Sensation.     I  am  conscious  of  my  own  body,  as 
a  group  of  possible  sensations,  connected  in  a  peculiar 
way  with  all  my  sensations,  and  I  observe  other  bodies 
closely  resembling  mine,  except  that  they  are  not  so 
connected.     I  conclude,  therefore,  that  they  are  con- 
nected with  some  other  than  myself,  judging  from  my 


BODY   AND    MIND. 


67 


own  experience  of  my  sensations.  So,  again,  these 
bodies  exhibit  phenomena,  which  I  know  in  my  case  to 
be  the  effects  of  consciousness.  Therefore  I  infer  that 
these  other  bodies  have  a  consciousness  simihir  to  mine. 

Similarly,  this  theory  would  resolve  the  Mind  of  God 
into  a  series  of  Divine  thoughts  and  feelings,  prolonged 
through  Eternity,  which  would  cause  a  belief  in  it,  at 
least  as  strong  as  the  belief  in  my  own.  And  the  con- 
ception of  Immortality,  as  a  thread  of  consciousness 
prolonged  to  Eternity,  leads  essentially  to  the  same 
results  as  the  ordinary  conception. 

But  still  there  remains  ''  a  final  inexplicability." 
Besides  present  feelings  and  possibilities  of  feelings, 
we  have  Memory  and  Expectation.  But  how  can  a 
series  of  feelings  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series,  so  as  to 
remember  a  sensation  that  actually  existed  in  the  past, 
or  expect  that  a  particular  sensation  will  exist  in  the 
future?  Here  we  are  face  to  fiice  with  an  insoluble 
metaphysical  problem.*  *'  I  think  by  far  the  wisest 
thing  we  can  do,  is  to  accept  the  inexplicable  fact, 
witliout  any  theory  of  how  it  takes  place.  No  such 
difficulties,  however,  attend  the  Psychological  theory 
in  its  application  to  Matter." 


We  are  now  acquainted  with  the  manner  in  which, 
according  to  Mill,  by  ''  known  laws  of  the  mind"  are 
generated  those  notions  of  the  World  outside  us,  and 


"  Esamiuation,"  p.  212. 


F  2 


68 


THE   METxlPIIYSICS    OF   MILL. 


BODY   AND    MIND. 


69 


of  the  Self  witliin  lis,  of  wliich  we  appear  to  be  so 
immediately  and  directly  conscious.  With  Mill,  as 
the  preceding  analysis  will  liave  shown,  tliese  are  not 
direct,  immediate  facts  of  inhiition,  but  acts  of  pro- 
gressive belief,  which  can  be  demonstrated  to  have 
grown  to  l)e  what  tliey  are.  It  will  1 )e  convenient,  for 
many  reasons,  to  examine  tlie  account  of  Mind,  or 
Self,  first,  before  proceeding  to  the  treatment  of 
Externality. 

"  Tiie  Self"  is  by  Mill,  as  a  disciple  of  Hume,  duly 
shown  to  be  but  "states  of  consciousness."*  "  AYe 
neither  know  nor  can  imagine  it  except  as  represented 
by  the  succession  of  manifold  feelings."  But  wliat  of 
the  permanent  something  we  seem  to  be  conscious  of, 
in  contrast  with  tlie  flux  of  sensations  ?  This,  says 
Mill  (just  lilvc  the  Permanent  Substratum  we  seem 
to  be  conscious  of  with  regard  to  "matter")  is  wholly 
covered  by  the  expression  "Permanent  PossibiUty :'' 
and  so,  the  mind  is  nothing  but  a  series  of  Feelings. 
At  the  end  of  the  chapter,  however,  we  find  that  "the 
permanent  something "  is  not  wholly  covered  by  the 
bare  expression  "  permanent  possibility."  There  is 
something  else — there  is  expedatmij  and  there  is 
memmy,  still  unaccounted  for.  How  can  a  mere  series 
be  aware  of  itself  in  the  past,  as  in  memory,  or  project 
itself  into  the  future,  as  in  expectation  ?  Here,  says 
Mill,  we  are  face  to  face  with  "  a  final  inexplicabili ty," 

♦  -  Examination,"  p.  235. 


and  the  wisest  thing  is  to  accept  the  inexplicable  fact 
and  be  content. 

Contentment,  however,  is  not  an  easy  virtue,  and  we 
cannot  help  pausing  over  this  "final  inexplicability," 
which  looks  so  remarkably  like  a  confession  of  failure 
by  the  very  words  in  wliich  Mill  states  it.  Let  us 
turn,  for  a  moment,  to  the  Psychological  Theory  of 
the  Belief  in  an  External  World.  What  does  it  postu- 
late according  to  Mill?  It  postulates,  first,  tluit  the 
human  mind  is  ca^^able  of  expcdatmi*  But  expecta- 
tion, we  find,  is  just  that  which  the  theory  of  mind 
cannot  explain  and  has  to  acce})t  as  a  final  inex- 
plicability. Consequently  the  Theory  of  the  External 
World  rests  on  a  function  of  the  Mind,  which  the 
corresponding  theory  finds  itself  unable  to  explain. 
That  is  to  say,  if  words  have  any  meaning,  that,  as  the 
one  theory  rests  on  the  other,  they  both  rest  on  a  final 
inexplicability.  Yet,  says  Mill,  with  almost  un- 
paralleled hardihood,  "  No  such  difficulties  attend  the 
theory  in  its  application  to  matter."  f 

Though  Mill  allows  himself  here  to  speak  of  a 
"  final  inexplicability  "  he  will  not  allow  others  to  do 
the  same.  In  the  earlier  part  of  his  "  Examination,"^ 
he  notices  with  pain  that  Hamilton  had  left  the  rela- 
tions of  Belief  and  Knowledge  unsolved.  This  he 
calls  "an  extremely  unphilosophical  liberty"  to  take. 
The  next  words  are  exactly  applicable  to  the  present 

*  "  Examination,"  p.  219.        f  Ibid.  p.  212.         \  Ibid.  p.  116. 


■uaA^iBi^^^^_ 


70 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


case.*  *«But  wlieo  a  tliinker  is  compelled  by  one 
part  of  liis  pliilosopliy  to  contradict  another  part,  lie 
cannot  leave  the  conflicting-  assertions  standing,  and 
throw  the  responsibility  of  his  scrape  on  the  arduous- 
ness  of  the  subject.  A  palpable  self-contradiction  is 
not  one  of  the  difficulties  which  can  be  adjourned,  as 
Monging  to  a  higher  department  of  science."  Yet 
here,  notwithstanding  these  brave  words,  is  an  in- 
stance of  lilill  talving  an  «  extremely  unphilosophical 
liberty,"  precisely  similar  to  that  which  he  reprobates 
in  Hamilton. 

Of  course,  the  truth  is  that  Mill  has  here  got  hold  of 
that  which  must  be  a  stumbling-block  in  Sensational 
scliemes  of  Philosophy,     You  reduce  IMind  to  a  series 
of  feelings,  and  then  have   to   answer   tlie  pertinent 
question,  How  can  a  series  be  aware  of  itself  in  past 
and  future  time  ?    The  fact  is  that  such  a  series  can 
never  be  summed;  and  Personal  Identity  vanishes  in 
the  process.    And  yet  Mill  says  that  this  theory  leaves 
Immortality  just  as  it  was  before.     "  It  is  precisely  as 
easy  to  conceive  that  a  succession  of  feelinos,  a  thread 
of  consciousness,  may  be  prolonged  to  eternity,  as  that 
a  spiritual  substance  continues  to  exist."  t     If,  indeed 
despite  the  feet  of  Self  being  "sequent  feelings," 
Personal  Identity  remains  all  the  same,  perliaps  this 
is  conceivable.     But  the  ambiguity  lurks  in  the  words 
"thread"  and  "succession."    If  it  is  "a  thread"  of 

•  •*  Examination;'  p.  147.  f  ibid.  p.  240. 


BODY   AND   MIND.  71 

consciousness,  it  may,  of  course,  be  prolonged.  Bat  a 
^'  thread"  means  something  one  and  continuous,  and 
Sensations  coming  and  going  (sequent  feelings)  are 
not  one  and  continuous.  "  Successive  feelings"  are  by 
no  means  the  same  thing  as  "  a  succession  of  feel- 
ings," despite  Miirs  assertion*  that  "  we  are  conscious 
of  a  succession,  in  the  feet  of  having  successive  sensa- 
tions." For  "a  succession'^  of  feelings,  is  only 
possible  to  a  self-consciousness,  which  remains  constant 
and  identical  throughout  all  the  successive  sensuous 
modifications.  But  a  self-consciousness,  constant  and 
identical,  can  never  be  admitted  by  Mill. 

There  is  another  objection  to  Mill's  account  of  Mind 
or  Self  which  is  urged  by  Dr.  M^Cosh  in  his  Examina- 
tion of  Mill's  Logic,  and  which  furnishes  us,  at  all 
events,  with  a  fair  "  argumentum  ad  hominem."  The 
system,  of  which  Mill  is  an  advocate,  aims  at  assuming 
as  few  original  principles  as  possible.  Sensationalism, 
like  Nominalism,  accepts  AVilliam  of  Ockham's  maxim, 
"  Entia  non  multiplicanda  sunt  prseter  necessitatem." 
Tliis  is  why  it  wishes  to  destroy  the  a  priori  element 
of  knowledge,  and  postulates  only  the  ''  a  poster  tori 
experience.     Let  us  apply  this  to  our  present  case. 

The  old  Ileal istic  way  of  regarding  Mind  was,  of 
course,  to  say  that  we  have  in  our  mental  modifications, 
an  original  and  intuitive  presentation  of  Self.  In  sensa- 
tion it  is  always  "  the   Ego  having  the  sensation." 

*  Appendix,  p.  256. 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


BODY   AND   MIND. 


73 


No  sensation  comes  witliout  liaving-,  as  its  uniform  ac- 
companiment tlie  consciousness  of  the  Self  which  feels 
it.     This  is,  in  trutli,  the  position  of  Dr.  McCosh— that 

in  Sell;  we  have  an  immediate  presentation  or  intuition. 

Mill  would  replace  this  bj  sometliing  more  scientific. 
Instead  of  tlie  Self;  then,  one  and  immediate,  what  have 
we  accordin.cr  to  Mill  ?  First,  we  liave  Sensations ;  then 
a  series  of  Sensations;  then  we  have  a  belief;  then,  a 
lielief  in  Time;  then  a  belief  in  Time  as  permanent, 
and  of  possibilities  in  Time.*  Tlicse  are  ol»viously  not 
all  one  and  tlie  wime,  j-et  tliey  are  all  seeming-ly  ultimate 
elements..  So  that  instead  of  one  ultimate  ehiment,  as 
in  Realism,  we  liave  got  five  or  six.  This  is  hardly  in 
accordance  witli  tlie  spirit  of  Ockliam. 

Somewhat    different  is   the    conclusion    to    which 
Idealism  commits  itself  in  the  hands  of  Kant.     Of 
course,   like  all  those  wlio  admit  the   essential   Re- 
lativity  of  Human    Knowled^re,   he    must    say  that 
what  the  M'ind  is  in  itself  we  cannot  soy,  any  more 
than  we  can  say  what  Matter  is  in  itself.     The  Self  or 
Mind  can   only  be  known    by   its    own   Forms,   its 
Cateo:ories,  its  Relations.     Apart  from  such  relations 
and  forms,  no  human  knowledge,  we  find,  is  i)ossible. 
ow,  the  iii>j>lication  of  permanent  cate^i^'ories  and  re- 
lations is  of  course  necessMrily  a  limitation  of  know- 

•  The  sentence  in  Mill  is  (p.  211) :-'»  Tliey  are  attended  with  the 
pecnliaiitj  that  each  of  them  iiivohfs  a  lielief  in  more  tlian  its  own 
present  existtnee,"  /./-.  a  permanent  l.elief  of  possiltle  sensations  in  the 
future.  Jlcie  is  Time  implieit  in  tlie  earliest  operations  of  consciousness 


ledg-e;  it  is  just  that  which  makes  it  Relative  instead  of 
Absolute. 

Ag'ain,  human  knowledge  can  only  exist  as  a  joint 
effect  of  two  opposite  factors,  Object  and  Subject.  Con- 
sequently, there  cannot  be  knowledge  of  merely  one  of 
the  component  factors.  Thus  what  Self  is  iu  itself  must 
for  ever  remain  unknown. 

But  this  is  not  the  same  tiling  as  reducing  Self  to 
Sequent  Sensations  as  Sensationalism  does.  For  ob- 
serve that  we  know  the  Self  by  the  permanency  of  the 
relations,  which  it  applies  in  the  construction  of  its 
exjierience.  Permanent  mental  categories  mean,  of 
course,  as  we  have  all  along  said,  a  permanent  Self- 
Consciousness,  ever  present  as  one  and  identical  to  all 
the  impressions  of  sense,  transmuting  and  transform- 
ing them  out  of  the  bewildering  flux  into  the  constant 
conditions  of  knowledfie.  It  is  thus  that  Self-Con- 
sciousness  and  Self  are  assured  by  an  a  priori  system 
of  metaphysics. 

To  some  of  the  successors  of  Kant,  this  limitation  of 
our  knowledge  of  Self  seems  unnecessary  and  unreal. 
Of  Self  we  oudit  to  have  an  absolute  consciousness — 
difierentiating  itself,  as  in  the  categories,  retiuiiing 
again  upon  itself  as  in  the  conclusions  of  a  rational 
Psychology.  "  It  is  an  unity  in  difference,  an  unity 
whieli  can  only  be  known  in  difference,  but  still  an 
unity.''  ♦ 

•  "  The  Philosophy  of  Kant,"  by  Edward  Caird,  pp.  481, 484,  553,  558. 


'S 


74    _  THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MILL. 

Wliat  is  Matter,  External  Reality,  Objective  AVorld, 
to  Mill?  It  is  ddiiuMl  as  ''  the  Permaiieot  Possibility 
of  Sensation."  What,  are  tlie  conditions  i)ostulated  in 
arrivincr  at  this  result  ?  Three  in  the  mind :  dz,,  Ex- 
pectation, Memory,  and  tlie  Laws  of  Association  :  tliree 
in  "  iiatnre  " :  th.,  Sensations,  Succession  or  Simul- 
taneonsness  of  Sensations,  and  the  union  of  these  sensa- 
tions  into  ffronps.  And  so  Mill  is  not  wliolly  averse  to 
the  idea  "  that  the  non^ego  altogether  may  be  but  a 
mode  in  which  the  mind  represents  to  itself  the  possible 
modifications  of  tlie  egoJ'    As  he  says  in   another 

passage,*  "I  do  not  believe  that  the real  externality  to 

IIS  of  any  thing,  excei>t  oHier  minds,  is  capable  of  proof— 
The  view  I  take  of  externality  could  not  be  more 
accurately  expressed  tlian  in  Professor  Fraser's  words  : 
'  For  ourselves  we  can  conceive  only  (1)  an  externality 
to  our  present  and  transient  experience  in  mr  mm 
possible  experience  past  and  future,  and  (2)  an  ex- 
ternality  to  our  own  conscious  experience  in  the  con- 
temporaneous, as  well  as  in  the  i.ast  or  future  ex. 
perience  of  oi/^er  mim/s.' "' 

The  conclnsion  is  certainly  not  one  with  wbich  any 
Idealist  can  disagree.  The  question,  of  course,  is  how 
iar  the  means,  by  which  the  conclusion  is  readied,  are 
satisfactory.  Ihe  conclusion  is  one,  wliich  is  in  reality 
forced  ujion  Mill  hj  his  predecessors  in  tlie  English 
school,  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume.     But  we  \vish  to 

*  *•  Examination;'  p.  232,  note. 


BODY   AND    MIND. 


'^     Ml 


\ 


know,  whether,  given  tlie  essential  position  of  Sensa- 
tionalism, we  can  from  it  explain  all  that  our  ordinary 
belief  in  the  Existence  of  an  External  AYorld  contains. 

Idealism,  as  I  understand  it,  believing  that  all  reality 
(and  therefore  the  rejility  of  the  External  AYorld)  is  tlie 
work  of  Thought,  proceeds  to  show  how  the  mind, 
by  "  a  priori''  action,  by  super-imposition  of  forms, 
categories  and  relations,  intelligibly  constructs  its 
experience  into  all  the  Order  and  llegularity  of  an. 
External  Worl(L__jizirot?  elSecrt  btavrSiv  t7]v  fxidobov 
TTOLovfjiivq*  tjiit  Sensationalism,  necessarily  believing 
that  all  reality  is  actual  sensatioii "-^^jj-^g legiti- 
mate inferences,  has  to  show  how  far  sensations  by 
themselves  can  combine,  congeal,  and  crystallise  into 
what  we  call  External  Facts,  and  thus  give  rise  to  the 
idea  we  have  of  an  uniform  Order  of  Nature.  » 

Turning  to  ]\Iill  for  guidance,  we  are  first  attracted 
by  his  mental  postulates.  The  last  of  these,  the 
Association  of  Ideas,  we  have  already  discussed  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  and  the  difiiculty  we  there  found 
was  to  understand  how  sensations  can,  of  themselves 
and  prompted  by  themselves,  associate — which  they 
must  do,  if  the  mind  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  purely 
passive.  The  other  two  postulates.  Expectation  and 
Memory,  Mill  himself  gives  up,  when  he  comes  to 
explain  ''  Mind."  They  are  the  "  final  inexplicability :  " 
those  conditions  of  mental  action,  which  the  theory  of 

•  Plato,  Rep.  vi.  s.  510. 


fi^ 


76  THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 

Sensationalism  cannot  exidain.     So  that,  so  far  as  the 
Bulijective  postuhites  go,  we  are  not  much  helped  by  the 

Psychological  Tlieory. 

We  turn,  then,  to  the  objective  postulates,  or  Sensa- 
tions viewed  in  their  objective  aspect  (for  Mill's  own 
expression  "postulates  in  Nature"  is  rather  mislead- 
iog,  inasmuch  as  it  is  tlie  growth  of  the  belief  in 
Kature  which  we  are  trying  to  explain).  They  are 
Sensations,  sin)ultaneousness  and  succession  of  Sensa- 
tions, and  unions  of  Sensations  into  groups.  A  fourth 
conditiun  of  Mill  which  he  brings  in  as  testimony  to, 
or  veritication  of  his  process,  we  cannot  lay  much  stress 
on  here:  it  is  our  ex])erience  of  what  "  other  people 
do''  in  relation  to  tltcir  sensations.  Of  course,  we  do 
not  as  yet  believe  in  other  i)eople's  existence,  unless  we 
prove  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  Externality.  At  all 
events,  we  cannot  assume  the  existence  of  other  people, 
and  bring  them  in  as  confirmation  of  our  own  sulyective 
proee>ses,  when  we  are  actually  tracing  the  growth  of 
an  Existence  other  than  ourselves. 

"With  regard  to  tlie  other  three,  Sensations,  of  course, 
are  their  own  evidence;  but  there  is  a  serious  gap 
between  tliem  and  "succession,"  "  simultaneousness " 
and  "  union  into  groups."  Tlie  (question  here  again  is 
the  old  question— Can  "  relations  "  grow  out  of  sen- 
sations ?  For  that  "  simultaneousness,"  "  succession  " 
and  "  union  into  groups,"  are  "  relations,"  and  not 
sensations  at  all,  requires  very  little  proof.    Sensations 


BODY   AND    MIND.  77 

are  one  thing :  "the  links,  which  unite  and  coml)ine 
them  into  groups,  are  quite  another.  Now  by  "  rela- 
tions," Idealism  means  the  ** «  jyriori'''  action  of  the 
mind,  working  up  sensations  :  biit  Mill  cannot  accept 
such  "a  priori''  action;  consequently  the  problem 
becomes  pressing — Can  sensations  in  and  by  themselves 
combine  and  arrange  themselves  into  "  unions  "  and 
"  groups"?  If  Association  be  the  weird  alchemy  which 
explains  such  combination,  well  and  good;  Ijut  if 
Association  itself  be  impossible,  except  to  an  active 
and  synthetic  self-consciousness,  it  cannot  help  us  out 
of  the  difficulty.* 

Such  appear  to  me  to  be  the  difficulties  of  ^Jill's 
"  postulates,"  and  as  the  whole  theory  of  Externality 
rests  on  the  [)ostulates,  to  these  difficulties  that  theory 
is  liable.  That  the  conclusion  is  that  of  the  Idealist 
needs  no  further  assertion.  If  MilFs  llip'>^y  rnp^^^^g 
anything,  it  certainly  means  that  Matter  is  for  us  not 
sometliing  objective  Invt  merely  subjective.  Or,  as  he 
expressly  states  it,  ''  we  know  no  more  of  things  tlian 
wliat  sensations  give  us,"  and  sensations  testify  to 
nothing-  but  themselves. 

That  being  so,  we  desire  to  ask  two  questions  liefore 
proceeding  further.  In  the  first  place,  what  are  we  to 
understand  that  knowledge,  according  to  Mill,  is? 
The  answer,  if  we  take  these  chapters  we  have  been 
considering,   is   perfectly  plain.      Knowledge  is    the 

*  See  note  at  end  of  Chapter. 


IB 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  MILL. 


process  by  wliich  ideas  are  formed  out  of  sensations, 
and  tiie  agreement  or  disagreement  of  tliese  ideas  would 
seem  to  be  knowledge.     l\^e  turn  to  tlie  "  Logic,"  * 
and  we  find,   to   our    auiazcnient,    tliat    the    theory 
that  knowledge   has   to   do   with  ideas   is   described 
as  "  one  of  the  most  iatal  errors  ever  introduced  into 
the  philosoi>hy  of   Logic."      "  Propositions    are   not 
assertions  respecting  our  ideas  of  things,  but  assertions 
respecting  the  things  theaiseives  :  "  the  doctrine  that 
"  the  investigation  of  truth  consists  in  contemplating 
and  handling  our  ideas,  or  conceptions  of  things,  instead 
of  the  things  themselves"  is  described  as  "  tantamount 
_  to  the  assertion  that  i/ie  o/Jf/  mm/i;  ofmqtdruig  knowledge 
\  qf  nature  m  to  simig  it  at  sero/^/  haml^  as  rejm'sented  in 
otir  mil  minds"     ^Yhlit  are  we  to  make  of  this  ?     The 
very  doctrine  "that  the  only  mode  of  acquiring  know- 
ledge of  nature  is  to  study  It  at  second  hand,  as  repre- 
sented in  our  own  minds,"  wliich  Mill  so  earnestly  re- 
pudiates in  his  "  Logic,"  is  an  exact  description  of  the 
doctrine  which  he  as  earnestly  maintains  in  **  The 
Psychological  Theory  of  the   Belief  in   an   External 
World."     A  better  proof  could  hardly  be  furnished  of 
the  very  difierent  philosopliical  bases  on  which  his  two 
treatises  respectively  rest. 

In  the  second  place,  we  wish  to  know,  with  exact- 
ness, what  Mill  means  by  "  a  phenomenon  "  ?  f    Does 

*  "  Logric,"  bk.  I.  c.  V.  sec.  1 . 

t  Cf.  Hume,  edited  bv(Jr<-('n  jiiid  Gi-  -sc,  TntTCKlnction,  vol.i.  p.  inS. 
"  The  Juggle  whicli  the  nioaciii   lo-ic   performs  with  the  word— 

*  phenomenon.*  " 


BODY   AND   MIND. 


79 


he  mean  a  simple  intimation  of  a  sense-perception,  or 
does  he  mean  a  single,  individual,  concrete,  real,  fact  ? 
The  first  is  what  he  ought  to  mean,  by  the  require- 
ments of  his  Sensationalist  position.  Sense  gives  us 
phenomena  ;  with  phenomena  only  we  have  to  deal  in 
opposition  to  the  so-called  noiimena,  or  things  in 
themselves  ;  a  phenomenon  then  is  a  fact  as  it  appears 
to  us,  and  as  it  is  represented  by  our  modes  of  con- 
sciousness. But  "  phenomenon  "  does  not  mean  this, 
when  we  are  told,  as  in  the  "  Logic,"  that  a  pro- 
position deals  with  ''  phenomena,"  and  that  we  are  to 
study  Nature  first-hand,  and  not  at  second  hand,  as 
represented  in  our  own  minds.  "  Phenomenon  "  does 
not  mean  this,  when  the  Inductive  Methods  are  applied 
to  phenomena  to  elicit  their  laws.  Then  it  means  a 
real,  objective,  concrete  feet,  and  if  that  is  immediately 
known  by  us,  then  we  are  not  in  the  position  of  Ideal- 
ism but  of  Realism. 

The  fiict  is  that  Mill  as  an  Inductive  Logician 
supposes  that  phenomena  (objective  facts)  are  imme- 
diately cognised  by  us,  while  Mill  as  a  Psvcholoirist,  a 
critic  of  Hamilton,  and  a  metaphysician,  supposes  that 
phenomena,  the  facts  immediately  cognised  by  us,  are 
mere  subjective  presentations. 

Kant,  when  he  uses  the  word  Phenomenon,  means 
the  product  of  an  objective  and  a  subjective  factor, 
the  result  of  a  sensation  on  which  has  come  the  mental 
relation  of  Individuality.     Mill  must  mean  what  Kant 


80 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF    MILL, 


means,  minus  the  a  priori  mental  relation.  But  only 
a  Realist  like  Hamilton  can  mean  tliat  a  phenomenon 
as  an  olijective  fact,  is  imiiicdiately  cognised, — a  i)hilo- 

soplier  wh.o  believes  th,e  Sensation  testifies  to  somethinf^ 
beyond  itself,  viz.,  somctliiu^-  external.* 

♦  It  is  very  iliffieiilt  to  be  sure  of  Mill's  opinions  on  some  of  the 

pointH  ili>ru»r(l  in  tlii>  rli;iptei\  !iMM,vitli-t:m(iiM'_r  Mill's  iiiiitortajit 
**  Appendix"  in  the  iinl  edition.  The  ditlieulties  may  be  brietiy 
suiiiniari-cd. 

1,  Are  "  tVelin«rfi  "  ''nid  •'  sensations"  e^inivrdent  expressions  ?    AFill 

8a,ys  jis  n;nirh,.  \vli(,'n  he  t|Uutes  witli  ;ipiii"obatii>n  .hnnics  villi's 
remark,  "  liavimj'  a  sensation  and  haviiMj  a  feelin«r  are  not  two 
thin;is.  The  \hiv.\i,  is  one.  tlie  names  only  are  twd"  (p.  1H1»). 
Bnt  ill  the  Apiterulix,  Mill  >^.-i'ins  to  imply  more  l^y  the  word 
'*  feelin;,'' "'  :  and  in  the    1.  (  I'k.  i.)  he  says.  ••  l-'eelinif  is  a 

L'-emis.  (»f  wliicli  Sensation,  E mot  ion,  and  Tliouglit  are  .suljordi- 
natc  specie*;.'' 

2.  I)(i  ••  relai  intis  "  ctow  out  of  sensations  by  the  Laws  of  Assoeia- 

tion  in  Mi  Ms  oi»ini(>n  /  On  pa'je  IH.  lie  says,  speak  in«^^  of  the 
opinions  of  his  (»\vn  selmol.  ••  I'hiee,  Extension,  tSii!>stanee, 
Vu\'-<\  f/tif/  fitf  ff'sf,  :m:  eonee jit  ions  put  toiretlier  ont  of  ideas 
of  sensation  by  the  known  laws  (tf  assoeiation."  As  1k>  lias 
jnst  licen  speakiiij;  of  Kantian  fnrms,  T  supjiose  that  'Time  and 
iJelaiions  jsenerally  are  in<  liidod  in  the  ex|)rt>ssi(.n  •*  ajid  t])e 
rest."  In  the  Appendix,  liowever.  he  takes  a  ditferent  tone. 
**  \\'*,'  are  fln-.rfit/  i*on>-ei<:»iis  i.l'  -rtecvN-ion.  in  ttie  faet  of  liaving 
siieeessive  sensations"  (p.  2.')<i).  l^iiit  in  the  next  jiage  lie 
contradicts  liimsell.  *'  We  are  fMir-...l  to  aiiprehend  ever}-  jiart 
of  tlie  series  as  lird;ed  witli  tli  .r  i>arts  by  sometliing  in 

CNirninnn,  w7//V7/    i\-  not  fhr  I'aTindx  thtitt.s/ 1 lu  s.  ti nt(  inon-  ///an 


fitc  itfireemhni  of  fhr  J}yTi it  '  Jtr  fiiTinijj<  fheittitrlt'eM "  (p.  2.17 ). 

Are  "relations  "  *•  the  (Mhuiinais  whieii  are  themselves  sensa- 
tional," of  wliieh  he  >i»eMks  (m  page  249?    Are  tliey  Hume's 
"  Tnanners  of  feelintr."  or  n-t  ' 
3.  Tlie  words  '*  iierniai  •  d  "  p(ls^ibility  "  arc  very  [lerplex- 

iiiL'.  "  I'crnianent  "  mn-i  mean  '•  ]»resent  with  every  state  of 
coiiscioiisness."  and  *•  |Nis>iltiliiy  "  onglit  to  mean  '■  idea."  In 
tliat  case.  **  matt) -r  "  defined  a*-  ■*  jiennanent  possibility  of  sen- 
sat  ie.n  ■'  is  an  (Xplanaliiin  which  sadly  needs  to  lie  ex].hiine<l. 
For  what  is  tlie  *'  po>sil>le  "  but  the  **  ideal  "  ?  And  how  then 
can  knowled*_('  be  said  to  be  concerned,  not  with  ••  ideas,"  but 
%vitL  "  things. ""  /, 


f 


l> 


CHAPTER    VI. 

THE    PRIMARY   QUALITIES   OF   MATTER. 

"Of  our  sensations,"*'  says  Mill,  "there  are  some 
which  we  usually  refer  to  that  thread  of  consciousness 
of  which  they  form  a  part,  and  there  are  others,  which 
we  are  in  the  habit  of  referring  to  those  Permanent 
Possibilities  of  Sensation,  which  are,  in  a  sense,  realised 
in  them."     For  instance,  we  have  the  Sensations  of 
Pleasure  and  Pain.  These  are  not  referred,  as  a  general 
rule,  to  any  outward  object,  because  they  are  much 
more  important  to  us  in  relation  to  our  own  conscious- 
ness.    But  there  are  other   sensations,  of  which,  as 
sensations,  we  have  only  a  momentary  consciousness : 
we  immediately  pass  from  them    to   the  Permanent 
Possibilities  of  sensation,  of  wliich  they  are  a  mark. 
In  this  latter  case,  what  we  really  know  only  as  an  in- 
ference is  thought  to  be  cognised  directly,  and  Percep- 
tion takes  the  place  of  Sensation.     The  distinction  here 
noted,  corresponds  to  the  distinction  between   "  the 
Primary  "  and  "  the  Secondary  "  qualities  of  matter. 

*  *'  Examination,"  c.  xiii. "  Psychological  Theoiy  of  Primary  Qualities." 

a 


82 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


Having  given  the  rationale  of  this  historical  distinc- 
tion, MOl  proceeds  to  the  examination  of  what  these 
Primary  Qualities  are.    Although  it  is  possible  that  we 
might  get  an  idea  of  Matter  from  the  sensations  only 
of  Smell,  Taste,  and  Hearing,  iis  a  matter  of  fact,  these 
sensations  of  Smell,  Taste  and  Hearing  are  not  active 
by  themselves,  but  only  lead  to  the  formation  of  groups 
of  Possibilities  of  Sensation  through  their  connection 
with  the  sensations  referable  to  the  sense  of  Touch  and 
the  Muscles :    in    other  words,   these  sensations  are 
directly  connected,  either  by  laws  of  co-existence  or 
causation,  w^ith   the  sensations  w^hich  answer  to  the 
terms   Resistance,   Extension,  and  Figure.     In  con- 
sequence,   the    Possibilities  of    sensations    of    touch 
and  the  muscles,  form  a  group  within  the  group,  an 
inner  nucleus;    and   the   remaining    possibilities  are 
regarded  either  as  effects,  of  which  this  nucleus  is  the 
cause,  or  attributes,  of  wliich  the  nucleus  is  the  sub- 
stance.    So  our  idea  of  Matter  comes  ultimately  to 
consist  of  Resistance,  Extension,  and  Figure:  these 
axe  held  to  be  its  essential  constituents. 

Of  these  Primary  Qualities  of  Matter,  Resistance  is 
^  the  most  fundamental.  "  Resistance  "  is  a  sensation 
of  muscular  action  impeded,  simultaneously  with  which 
is  felt  the  sensation  of  touch.  These  two  sensations 
are  always  felt  together.  We  feel  contact,  and  we 
know  that  were  we  to  exercise  our  muscles,  we  should 
experience  resistance.      By  the  Law   of  Inseparable 


THE  PHIMAHY  QUALITIES  OF   MATTER,        83 

Association,  no  sooner  do  we  feel  contact,  than  we 
cognise  sometliing  external,  because  the  former  sensa- 
tion is  a  mark  of  the  Permanent  Possibility  of  the 
sensation  of  resistance  and  muscular  action.  Matter, 
consequently,  is  considered  a  "  resisting "  object, 
because  we  experience  simultaneously  a  sensation  of 
touch  (of  contact)  and  a  sensation  of  muscular  action 
impeded. 

More  important,  however,  in  many  ways,  is  the 
account  given  of  ^*  Extension."  The  Psychological 
Theory  of  Extension  derives  it  also  from  a  sen- 
sation of  muscular  energy.  It  supposes  a  dismmi- 
native  semibiUfi/  in  muscular  action,  wliich  leads  the 
patient  of  the  sensation  to  derive  from  the  duration  of 
the  muscular  action,  the  notion  of  Matter  as  an  ex- 
tended object,  just  as  he  derives  from  the  intensity  of 
muscular  effort,  the  notion  of  Matter  as  a  resisting 
object.  Extension  then  may  be  construed  as  the  sen- 
sation of  a  muscular  effort  having  a  certain  continuance, 
gained  by  ''  the  sweep  of  the  arm  "  or  ^^  the  sweep  of 
the  limb,"  *  and  synonymous  with  a  certain  "  volume 
of  feeling."  Now  it  is  evident  that  this  notion  of  Ex- 
tension expresses  it  as  a  series  of  muscular  efforts— a 
consciousness  of  successive  states  of  muscular  activity. 
Whence,  then,  the  "  simultaneity^'''  with  which  we  grasp 
the  attribute  of  extension  ? 

Altliough  Mill  seems  to  think  that  tbe  simultaneity 

*  "  Exaiuination,"  pp.  269,  270 

a  2 


81 


THE   METAPIITSICS   OF   MttL. 


THE  PEIMAEY  QUALITIES  OF   MATTEE.        85 


may  be  transferred  to  it  from  the  experience  (gained 
previously,)  of  tlie  possible  simultaneity  of  two  sensa- 
tions in  the  mind  at  once,  lie  tliinks  it  most  probable 
that  the  action  of  the  eye  contributes  to  the  notion  of 
Extension  this  idea  of  simultaneity.  The  Eye  gives,  in 
a  moment  of  instantaneous  consciousness,  the  notion  of 
an  extended  object*  The  action  of  the  visual  organ, 
whether  in  "  its  sweep  over  a  wide  prospect/'  or  "  its 
adjustment  for  a  distant  view,"  enables  the  visual 
sensations  to  stand  as  "symbols"  for  muscular  and 
tactual  sensations,  which  might  be  experienced  or  were 
actually  experienced,  as  slowly  successive.  Hence  it 
comes  that  our  consciousness  of  extension  is  connected 
as  an  appendage  with  our  Sensations  of  Sight  (which,  in 
itself,  is  limited  to  the  impressions  of  Colour)  although, 
10  reality,  derived  from  the  sensation  of  continued 
muscular  action. 

Just  as  the  sensation  of  continued  muscular  action 
gives  the  notion  of  linear  extension,  and  extension  in 
any  direction,  so  it  will  also  give  the  notion  of  situation 
and  "  Figure."  And  further,  it  will  enable  us,  by  the 
muscular  sensibility  connected  with  it,  to  compare 
dilFerent  degrees  of  the  attribute  of  space,  le,,  difference 
of  length,  surface,  situation,  and  form.  And  lastly, 
the  velocity  of  the  motion  will  be  also  given  by 
muscular  sensibility,  and  we   discover   that  a  «low 


/i 


•   u 


Examination,"  p.  281. 


motion  for  a  long  time  is  the  same  as  a  (quicker  motion 
with  less  duration. 

Thus  the  Psychological  Theory  maintains  that  the 
notion  of  length  in  space,  not  being  in  our  conscious- 
ness originally,  is  constructed  out  of  the  notion  of 
length  in  time  by  means  of  muscular  and  tactual  sen- 
sations. But  the  participation  of  the  Eye  in  our  actual 
notion  of  extension — its  action  taking  the  place,  and 
standing  as  the  symbol  of  possible,  or  actually-realised 
muscular  sensations — very  much  alters  its  character, 
and  makes  us  imagine  that  for  us  Extension  derives  its 
meaning  from  a  phenomenon  which  is  synchronous  and 
not  successive,  the  reverse  of  which,  according  to  Mill, 
is  really  the  case. 

Our  first  task  must  be  to  see  Mill's  position  histori- 
cally, in  this  question  of  the  Primary  Qualities  of 
Matter.  Mill  had  to  explain  constructively,  what 
Hume  and  Berkeley  had  done  destructively.  Locke's 
position  is  that,  more  or  less,  of  Common-Sense. 
Secondary  Qualities  are  subjective.  Primary  Qualities 
are  objective.  With  regard  to  the  first,  we  are  not 
outside  of  the  limits  of  our  own  consciousness;  with 
regard  to  the  second,  we  are  outside,  because  we  are 
able  to  state  what  are  the  "  real  "  qualities  of  matter. 
Berkeley  simply  destroyed  all  difference  between  the 
two  sets  of  qualities  ;  a  quality,  like  "  sweetness,"  and 
a  quality,  like  "  solidity,"  were  both  equally  relative 


86 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


THE  PEIMAEY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER.       87 


to  our  own  conscious  and  subjective  apprehension. 
Hume  went  even  fartlier  than  this  :  the  so-called 
Primary  were  in  a  sense,  less  real  than  the  Secondary, 
because  more  dependent  on  mental  construction. 
'*  Solid  it}-,"  for  example,  is  more  of  "  an  idea,"  and 
therefore  less  **  real,"  tlian  a  feeling:  to  which  we  g^ive 
the  name  "  sweet,"  which  is  an  immediate  sensuous 
impression. 

After  these  two  philosophers,  the  question  still 
remained,  and  required  an  answer — whjj  if  both  sets 
of  qualities  rest  on  the  same  subjective  basis,  is  our 
idea  of  substance  made  up  rather  of  qualities,  like  Re- 
sistance,  Extension,  and  Figure,  than  of  qualities  like 
Hot,  Sweet,  and  Cold  ?  Tliis  is  the  question  to  which 
Mill  had  to  address  himself:  and  his  answer,  practi- 
cally, comes  to  this — that  sensations  given  in  touch 
I  have  more  the  character  of  permanency.  For  the  rest, 
his  reply  merely  is  a  re-affirmation  of  the  fact :  we  do, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  connect  our  ideas  of  Externality 
and  Matter  with  sensations  of  Touch  (and  afterwards, 
he  says,  of  Sight)  rather  than  with  Sensations  given  by 
the  other  three  senses,  Taste,  Smell,  and  Hearing. 

What,  then,  are  the  Primary  Qualities,  according  to 
Mill  ?  Resistance,  Extension,  and  Figure.  Of  these, 
incomparably  the  most  important  to  the  metaphysician 
is  the  account  given  of  Extension.  "  Figure  "  requires 
no  discussion,  if  the  others  are  established ;  and  "  Re- 
sistance" need  not  occupy  us  long.      Resistauce  is 


h 


gained  by  the  sense  of  energy  impeded,  the  intensity  of 
effort  giving  us  the  notion  of  Matter  as  a  Resisting 
Object.  Of  course  it  is  obvious  that  mere  touch,  as  "  a 
surface-sense,"  cannot  yield  us  these  results :  there 
can  be,  in  mere  touch,  no  measure  of  intensity  of 
effort,  or  impeding  of  energy.  These  indications  are 
the  results  of  a  sort  of  sixth  sense,  newly-invented, 
of  which  Hume  was  ignorant — tlm  Muscular  Seme,* 

Mere  touch  gives  us,  we  are  told,  only  *'  the  peri- 
phery "  of  our  bodies :  the  muscular  sense  gives  us 
something  further — resistance  outside,  corresponding 
to  muscular  reactions  inside.  Physiologically,  the 
Muscular  Sense  is  defined  as  "  a  Motor  Nerve,  under 
the  control  of  the  will,  going  out  from  the  Brain,  and 
moving  the  muscle  attached  to  it;  and  of  a  Sensor 
Nerve,  going  back  to  the  brain  and  giving  intimation 
of  the  motion."  Sir  Charles  Bell  and  Dr.  Thomas 
Brown,  the  one  a  physiologist,  the  other  a  psycho- 
logist, brought  into  prominence  the  muscular  sense : 
Mill  and  Bain  make  large  use  of  it ;  in  Germany, 
]\Iiiller,  in  England,  Dr.  Carpenter,  have  carried  on  an 
extensive  inquiry  into  its  nature,  f 

But  we  must  not  allow  this  account  of  the  Muscular 
Sense  to  disconcert  us,  just  as  though  we  had  here 
some  means  of  appreliending  an  actuality,  external  to 
our  consciousness.     For  of  course,  when  we  say  that 

*  Cf.  "  Logic,"  bk.  i.  c.  iii.  s.  7.  par.  3. 
t  McCosh,  "  Examination  of  Mill." 


o8 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


the  Muscular  Sense  gives  us,  by  means  of  the  sense  of 
energy  impeded,  the  idea  of  Resistance,  accurately  in- 
terpreted, this  language  does  not  refer  to  any  pheno- 
mena  other  than  strictly  subjective.  "  Sense  of  energy 
impeded  "  is,  of  coiu-se,  relative  to  our  own  conscious- 
Dess,  just  as  "  resistance  "  is  strictly  a  feeling,  and 
does  not  of  itself  and  by  itself  testify  to  anything  more. 
If  once  we  have  given  to  us,  in  some  way,  tlie  External 
Object,  then  we  see  at  once  that  the  Muscular  Sense 
may  immediately  acquaint  us  with  the  fiict  that  that 
External  Object  is  a  resisting  one  :  but  if  all  that  we 
have  to  start  with  is  the  Muscular  Sense,  as  a  feeling 
of  some  sort,  and  its  intimation  to  us,  viz.,  Resistance, 
we  cannot,  except  witli  an  obvious  "salto  mortal^" 
arrive  at  an  External  Object,  of  which  this  Resistance 
(wliich  we  only  know  as  ''  feeling  ")  is  a  quality. 

Possibly,  too,  it  is  right  to  give  some  weight  to  an 
objection  urged  by  Dr.  McCosh.  He  notices,  in  the 
account  given  of  tlie  action  of  the  j\Iuscular  Sense,  the 
part  played  by  voliimn^  which  at  once  introduces  an 
element  above  sensations.  We  may  draw  out  the 
objection  in  this  way.  The  Motor-Nerve  is  under  the 
control  of  the  Will.  Now  if  the  Will  is  to  act,  if 
volition  determines  on  setting  a  particular  member  in 
action,  we  must  obviously  have  formed  some  idea  of 
the  member,  before  we  can  make  a  volition  concerning 
it.  That  is  to  say,  before  the  Muscular  Sense  can  be 
exerted,  we  must  have  some  idea  of  a  member,  which 


THE  PEIMAEY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTEE. 


89 


member  is,  of  course,  external  to  consciousness,  and 
yet  the  Muscular  Sense  is  supposed  to  originate  the 
idea  of  Externality. 

Nor  is  the  whole  theory  free,  even  physiologically, 
from  doubt.  That  on  which  the  inference  of  Ex- 
ternality mainly  depends, — the  Muscular  Sense  and  its 
(Uscriminatke  seufiibiUtjj  (the  power,  that  is,  which  it 
has  of  distinguishing  between  a  lesser  and  a  greater 
amount  of  intensity  of  effort  or  impediment  of  energy) 
— has  been  actually  denied  by  some  physiologists.* 

Sensationalist  schemes  of  Philosophy  find  "  Space  " 
a  difficult  conception  to  account  for :  nor  is  this  re- 
markable. For  our  conception  of  Space  is,  essentially, 
"  synchronous,"  ?'.<?.,  we  embrace  together,  in  one  and 
the  same  notion,  the  various  parts  into  which  Space 
may  be  and  is  divided.  But  if  we  rely  on  ^'  sensation" 
and  "  experience,"  we  can  get  to  nothing  more  than  a 
"  succession "  of  parts  in  Space,  not  to  that  "  co- 
existence "  of  parts,  without  whicli  to  us  the  conception 
of  "  Space  "  is  meaningless.  For  feelings  must  be 
successive:  and  therefore  the  notion  of  Space  which 
is  constructed  out  of  feeling,  must  be  a  "^^  succession  " 
also. 

It  will  be  interesting  to  observe  Hume's  account  of 
'' Space,"  t  as  illustrating  this  Sensationalistic  diffi- 


•  Cf.  E.  H.  Weber,  quoted  in  Abbot's  "  Siglit  and  Touch,"  who 
refers  also  to  Auljcrt  and  Kanimler. 
f  Hume's  *'  Treatise,"  bk.  ii.  s.  iii. 


'Wv 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


culty,  before  we  turn  to  Mill,  and  his  attempt  to  over- 
come it.  From  whence  is  derived  the  Idea  of  Space  ? 
Hume  tells  us,  it  is  derived  from  eyesight.  What, 
then,  we  ask,  does  the  ej'esigiit  testify  to,  considered 
as  mere  feeling?  Obviously,  Colour.  We  have  a 
feelino^  of  colour,  in  the  case  of  a  table  (which  is 
Hume's  illustration),  a  feeling  of  brown  colour.  Can 
it  testify  to  anything  more  ?  Certainly  not,  for  directly 
we  rise  from  mere  sensations  of  colour,  and  speak  of 
colour,  as  appearing  in  different  relations, — shaded  in 
one  part,  bright  in  another — and  go  on  to  speak  of  a 
particular  object,  which  is  revealed  to  us  by,  or  is  the 
complex  of,  these  relations,  we  are  deserting  the  sphere 
of  mere  feeling:  we  have  got  to  conceptions,  to  mental 
grouping  of  sensations. 

Then,  if  extension  be  derived  from  the  eyesight,  and 
the  eyesight,  considered  as  pure  feeling,  testifies  only 
to  colour,  is  "  extension"  the  mere  feeling  of  colour? 
This  will  hardly  be  satisfactory  for  the  mathematical 
sciences,  which  are  founded  on  the  abstract  idea  of 
space  or  extension,  for  they  can  hardly  rest  on  such  a 
meaning  of  extension  as  this.  Moreover,  as  feelings 
are  successive,  one  gone  before  another  comes  (unless 
they  are  held  together  by  the  constructive  force  of  the 
mind),  the  only  idea  of  space  they  can  give  rise  to,  is 
equivalent  to  "  a  sequence  of  sense-impressions : " 
in  which  case,  the  table,  as  interpreted  by  eye- 
sight,  can  be  only  a  succession  of  brown  feelings. 


THE  PEIMAEY  QUALITIES  OE  MATTER.        91 


and  not  (what  it  should  be)  a  co-existence  of  brown 
parts.  Of  course  Hume's  literary  skill  enabled 
him  to  disguise  this  difficulty.  In  the  sentence,  in 
which  lie  discusses  the  growth  of  the  idea  of  extension 
lie  speaks  of  *'  my  senses  conveying  to  me  the  impres- 
sions of  coloured  pointSy  disposed  in  a  certain  manner,'''* 
The  artifice  here  lurks  in  the  italicised  words.* 

By  what  right  does  Hume  introduce  these  "coloured 
points"  —  this  ''disposition  of  points  in  a  certain 
manner?"  Here  is,  at  once  an  illegitimate,  quasi- 
oltjective  reference.  For  he  cannot  mean  by  "coloured 
[)oints,"  mere  "  moments  of  sentient  consciousness," 
'*  moments  of  feeling,"  because  these  cannot  be  said  to 
be  disposed  in  a  certain  manner.  Yet,  by  the  substitu- 
tion of  ''  coloured  points,  disposed  in  a  certain  man- 
ner" for  "mere  sensations  of  colour,"  Hume  has 
gained  exactly  that  co-existence  and  reality,  which  we 
find  in  our  common  idea  of  space,  but  which  his  system 
cannot  in  verity  allow  of. 

Let  us  turn  now  to  MilFs  theory  of  the  gradual  for- 
mation of  the  Idea  of  Extension.  Shortly  put,  it  is 
this.  Just  as  the  intensity  of  muscular  eftbrt  gave  us 
the  idea  of  Resistance  or,  as  Mill  puts  it  (with  what- 
ever amount  of  truth),  the  idea  of  matter  as  a  resisting 
body :  so  does  the  duration  of  muscular  effort  give  us 
the  idea  of  Extension,  or  Matter  as  an  extended  object. 
The  growth  of  the  idea  of  Space  can  be  traced  as  the 

♦  Cf.  Green's  ''  Introduction  to  Hume,"  vol.  i. 


02 


lilJii    Ml!iTAi Hi SICS    OF    mUjIj. 


deTelopment  of  Toiicli-sensations,  combined  witli  a 
certain  effort  of  tlie  Muscular  Sense,  continued  for  a 
certain  time. 

Now  it  is  worth  noticini:-,  in  passing,  that  the  Idea  of 
Time  *  is  pre-siipposed  in  the  account  of  the  origin  of 
Space.  Tlie  very  w^ord  "  duration  "  of  Effort  has  no 
meaning  without  the  acknowledgment  of  Time,  as  a 
pre-supposed  Idea,  This  is,  of  course,  obvious,  but  it 
is  not  therefore  unimportant.     For  Time  appears  to  be 

♦  Witli  regard  to  "  Time,"  and  our  pcree|»tion  thereof,  ]MiIl  ap- 
pears, in  tlic  main,  to  accein  the  po>irioii  of  Hume  that  tlie  Idea  of 
Time  is  merely  abstraetetl  fr«»m  our  exiK'iit'Tico  of  the  succession  of 
sensations.  (Cf.  "  Examination,"  p.  217.  >•  An  entity  called  Time,  I 
do  not  and  need  not  postulate."  Cf.  what  he  i>ay.>  in  the  oi>ening 
ehai)ter  on  "the  llehitivity  of  Knowledge,"  and  James  Mill's 
"Analysis."  Vol.  ii.  p.  I'M.  ••  Tim.'  is  a  collective  name  for  the 
feeling  of  the  snceession  of  feelings.")  It  is  not,  then,  a  form, 
or  conceittion  prior  to  Kxpcrience.  and  ap|)lied  to  any  arw-l  e\'ery 
experience  we  obtain  by  an  inexitahh;;  necessity  arising  from  the 
mind  itself  :  it,  like  everytliing  else,  is  a  product  of  Experience  :  and 
so  far  as  the  i»rincii)le  liolds  that  an  aljstraction,  as  the  work  of 
thought,  is  less  in  contact  with  reality  than  the  concrete  "facts" 
from  which  it  is  obtained,  the  idea  of  Time  is  less  real  than  that 
succession  of  scn,sations  from  which  it  is  an  abstraction. 

If  this  be  Mill's  position  (and  his  system  as  an  Experimental  System 
demands  it)  the  criticism  is  pertinent  which  asks,  whether  any  amount 
of  sue  nsations  can  give  rise  to  the  conception  of  a  succession 

of  sensations  /  It  can  oidy  in  one  way,  if  there  be  a  mind  present  to 
each  seniation.,  holding  tlicm  in  due  relations  to  one  another,  and 
transforming  into  permanencies  tlie  pcrisliing  serieeof  sense-im|>res- 
sions.  For  we  can  only  talk  of  a  succession,  if  the  first  of  the  series 
be  in  our  minds  cfiually  with  the  last.  Time,  as  a  mental  form, 
applied  U>  -.  ii>e,  gives  rise  to  the  concejjtion  "  a  succession  of  sensa- 
tions:" but  the  reverse  hardly  holds  in  the  same  way;  sensations 
sncceeding  one  another  cannot  and  do  not  give  rise  to  the  Idea  of 
Time. 


THE  PEIMAKY  QUALITIES   OF  MATTER.        93 


itself  a  derivative,  not  a  primary  idea.  It  is  derived 
from  the  sequence  of  sense-impressions.  Tlierefore 
Space  is  derived  from  that  which  is  itself  derived  from 
sequent  sensations.  And  so  before  we  get  to  Space  at 
all,  we  have  to  face  the  difficulty,  how  can  sequent 
sensations  give  rise  to  the  idea  of  Sequence  itself? 
The  difficulties  of  Space-derivation  are  dependent  on 
the  prior  difficulties  of  Time-derivation. 

Let  us  however  pass  over  this  point,  and  look  nar- 
rowly at  the  language  in  wdiich  Mill  and  Bain  describe 
how  these  Tactual  and  Muscular  Sensations  originate 
the  idea  of  Extension. 

The  muscular  sensation  *  "  gives  the  feeling  of  linear 
extension,  inasmuch  as  this  is  measured  by  the  sweep 
of  a  limbj  or  other  organ,  moved  by  muscles."  And 
again,  on  the  next  page,  words  meet  us  like  ''  the  range 
of  an  arm,"  "  the  total  sreecp  of  the  arm,"  &c.  Now 
here  is  a  piece  of  Hterary  artifice,  not  quite  so  clever  as 
Hume's,  because  the  elder  philosopher  was  an  adept  at 
such  strategy.  These  words  "sweep"  and  "range" 
are  at  once  intelligible,  if  we  pre-suppose  the  idea  of 
space:  but  what  meaning  are  we  to  attach  to  them 
without  such  pre-supposition  ?  Wliat  is  "  sweej),"  if 
not  "  sweep  through  space  ?  "  f    ^^^  if  Hiq^q  words 

♦  "Examination,"  p.  209,  &c. 

t  The  argument  is  urged  by  many  critics.  Mill's  answer  in  the 
note  to  the  13th  chapter  is,  that  both  he  and  Bain  have  been  careful 
to  limit  the  expressions  to  "  feelings."  In  that  case,  how  is  "  space  " 
originated  at  all  ? 


94 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MHX. 


are  only  used  metaphorically,  how  are  we  one  step  in 
advance  in  the  origination  of  Space,  or  what  definite 
meaning  can  they  be  supposed  to  convey?  I  say 
nothing  of  the  words  "  of  the  arm  "  in  these  expres- 
sions :  though  indeed  they  must  mean  that  in  some 
way  or  other,  we  have  got  hold  of  "  the  arm"  as  an 
objective  reality,  apart  from  and  beyond  our  mere  sub- 
jective consciousness.  Hume  talked  of  "  points,"  and 
"  disposition  of  points  " — words  which  have  an  unmis- 
takable objective  reference,  if  they  are  to  mean  any- 
thing. Mill,  in  his  turn,  talks  of  "  sweep  *'  and 
"range  of  arm  and  limb,"  which,  if  they  are  to  mean 
anything,  must  likewise  involve  an  objective  reference, 
viz.,  the  pre-supposition  of  Space  itself,  as  a  reality. 

However  this  may  be,  the  Sensational  is  tic  difficulty 
of  constructing  co-existence  out  of  succession,  still 
remains.  Tlie  idea  of  Space  grows  somehow  out  of  the 
idea  of  Time.  Successive  sensations,  given  by  Touch 
and  the  Muscular  Sense,  produce  ultimately  the  idea  of 
Space,  which  is  not  successive — which  is,  in  reality 
nothing,  if  it  is  not  the  co-existence  of  parts. 

It  is  the  merit  of  Mill  that  he  sees  this  difficulty 
clearly,  and  that  he  tries  to  meet  it.  It  is  the  Eye,  he 
gays,  which  converts,  or  seems  to  convert  succession 
into  co-existence  *  "  The  conception  we  now  have  of 
Extension  or  Space  is  an  eye-picture,  and  compre- 
hends a  great  number  of  parts  of  Extension  at  once,  or 

•  P.  275. 


THE   PRIMAEY  QUALITIES  OE  MATTER.        95 

in  a  succession  so  rapid  that  our  consciousness  con- 
founds it  with  simultaneity."  Feelings  of  Touch  are 
successive  ;  then  come  the  feelings  given  us  by  the 
Eye,  and  the  result  is  that  that  which  is  originally 
known  as  successive,  now  becomes  "embraced"  as  a 
co-existence. 

The  exact  opinions  of  Mill  with  regard  to  the  Sensa- 
tions given  by  the  Eye,  are  hard  to  be  sure  of  I  am 
by  no  means  certain  that  I  really  apprehend  his  mean- 
ing. What,  in  the  case  of  the  Eye,  is  immediate,  in- 
tuitive, and  what  is  derivative,  inferential  ?  Berkeley, 
in  "  the  Essay  on  Vision,"  said  that  Colour  is  the  im- 
mediate object  of  the  Eye,  and  Distance  is  an  inference. 
Mill,  if  we  may  judge  from  what  he  says  in  other  places 
— as  e.g,  in  his  "  Dissertations  and  Discussions  "  * — 
seems  to  defend  Berkeley's  theory  of  vision  against  his 
critics.  So  here  he  seems  to  agree  that  "  the  distinctive 
impressibility  of  the  Eye  is  for  Colour."  t  If  that  is 
the  case,  it  is  obvious  that  the  Eyesight,  as  feeling, 
must  give  us  successive  sensations,  in  our  notion  of 
Space,  just  like  any  other  Sense,  and  not  co-existence 
of  parts.  The  case  is  not  really  altered  by  speaking  of 
the  active  or  muscular  sensibility  of  the  eye.  The 
"  sweep  "  of  the  eye  cannot  give  us,  any  more  than  the 
sweep  of  an  arm,  aught  but  successive  sensations.  Still 
the  idea  of  co-existence  of  parts — the  essential  idea  of 
Space — remains  unaccounted  for. 

*  Vol.  ii.  art.  on  Bailey.  f  P-  280. 


»jO 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


Later  speculations  cut  the  knot  by  practically  deny- 
ing the  truth  of  Berkeley's  analysis.  Miiller  supposes 
that  vision  at  once  and  immediately  perceives  a  super- 
ficies.* Thus,  length  and  breadth,  two  dimensions  of 
8i>ace,  are  at  once  perceived.  It  is  only  when  we  come 
to  the  perception  of  a  Solid,  that  we  leave  the  sphere 
of  immediate  intuition,  and  reach  inferences  from  sen- 
sations, or  a  judgment.  A  superficies,  accordingly,  is 
immediately  perceived  by  the  eye:  a  solid  is  only 
mediately  perceived,  or  reached  by  a  judgment  or  infe- 
rence. If  Mill  believed  this,  he  could,  of  course,  prove 
that  co-existence  of  parts  is  given  by  the  Eyesight : 
for  the  Eye  would  then  immediately  *  embrace '  as  a 
superficies  (which  is  extension)  that  which  is  only  sue- 
c«U  ..Led  b.  ..„h  J....i..,.    But  he  ™,M 


*  patlicr  different  is  Helmholtz — who  disa.[^rees  witli  and  criticises 
Miiller.  See  Wb  article  on  "■  ITie  Recent  rr<^'"  r»f  the  Theory  t»f 
Vi-i  )!i  "  in  the  '*  Preussische  Jahrbiicher  "  of  is<;.s.  transhited  in  Dr. 
Atkinson's  "  Popalar  Scientific  Lectures  of  Hehiilioltz."  In  that 
esisay,  althoogli  there  are  many  8cntencr'>,  which  are  thorouglily  in 
the  spirit  of  the  Berkleian  analysis  (ejj.j  '*  It  is  clear  that  the  (iiiality 
of  onr  sensations,  and  es{)ecially  our  sensations  of  sight,  does  not 
Ifive  us  a  true  impression  of  corrcsjionding  ciualities  in  the  outer 
world  "'),  the  Binocular  system  of  vision  is  supposeti  to  make  some 
difference,  and  (if  I  understand  it  aright)  to  generate  our  notions  of 
distance.  For  the  two  eyes  look  each  at  different  part.s  of  the  object 
tefore  them.  Of  course,  one  lias  to  learn  to  interpret  one's  signs  ; 
but  the  Idealist  contention  is  that  one  cannot  do  this  without  the 
m  prwn  form  of  Space.  Once  given  that,  the  signs  can  l>e  inter- 
preted, the  different  pictures  given  by  the  two  eyes  being  now 
recognised  as  bein;^^  in  different  parts  of  Space.  But  only  starting 
from  one's  different  eye-feelings,  how  is  the  notion  of  Space  to  be 
gained  ? 


THE   PEIMAEY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER.        97 

only  do  so  by  practically  denying  Berkeley's  Theory  of 
Vision  (which  he  is  far  from  doing)  :  and  then  it  would 
surely  be  a  work  of  supererogation*  to  trace  the  growth 
of  '  Space '  out  of  Tactual  and  Muscular  Sensations,  for 
to  the  Eye,  Space  would  be  an  immediate  intuition. 

Here,  as  elsewhere.  Mill  would  seem  to  halt  be- 
tween the  Sensationalism  he  inherited  from  Hume  and 
Berkeley,  and  the  later  speculations  of  the  Experiential 
School.  He  acknowledges  that  Space,  according  to 
Tactual  intimations,  can  only  be  a  succession  of  sensa- 
tions ;  but  he  seems  to  think  that  the  Eyesight  can 
grasp  succession,  as  co-existence,  which  it  can  not  do, 
unless  it  immediately  perceives  Space  in  two  dimen- 
sions. If  it  does  so  perceive  Space,  the  whole  Psyclio- 
logical  analysis  is  unnecessary.  Space  is  not  an  inference 
at  all,  it  is  an  Intuition. 


*  At  least,  for  the  present  purpose.  Tlic  inquiry  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  persons  born  blind  derive  "  Space"  fi'om  Touch,  of  course, 
remaiua 


C  IT  4  PT  F 1 ^     V  T  T 

V-y  -"•«■  '-An.  life.  ~]l.  win.     «JL  -JI...-JI  ...JL.  Ik.1  T     JL,  J>,  # 


r 


CAUSATION   AND   THE   UNIFOKMITY   OF   KATUIIE. 

After  our  concei.tions  of  Body  and  Space,  and  tlie 
uiaiiner  io  wliieli  we  come  to  enter  tain  them,  our  next 
c*onccrn  is  with  the  constitution  of  the  Natural  World 
•3^1.011  l^'elief  in  the  processes  of  Nature.  AVe  have, 
tliat  is  to  sa}',  to  examiue  Mill's  o|)iiiions_ on.tlie  ques- 
tions of"  Causation  "  and  "  Natural  Uniformity." 

On  what  do  In  luction  and  Inductive  processes  de- 

jH*nd  ?    The  ground  of  Induction  *  answers  Mill,  is  the 

Uniformity  of  Nature,  which  may  he  tluis  defined  :— 

,iJBt what  is  true  in  certain  cases  is true  of  every 

other  case  rt'semhlini^  the  former  in  certain  assign al)le 
fes2)ects.     How  is  this  Uniformity  of  Nature  HovedJ 

It  is  a  generalisation  from  all  our  Inductions, a  con- 

elusion  "per  enumerationem  siroplicem  "  from^nduc- 
tions  that  we  have  carried  out  in  past  time. 

Tlie  question  naturally  occurs,  "  Is  not  an  'inductio  ' 
per  simplicem  enunierationem  '  a  very  fallacious  one  ?  " 

•  "  Logic,"  hk.  iii.  c,  iii 


CAUSATION,   AND  UNIFORMITY  OF  NATURE.    99 

It  is,  and  it  is  not,  answers  Mill.     It  is  in  certain 
cases — cases  of  a  limited  range  of  experience.     It  is 
not  in  others.     In  the  particular  case  we  are  consider- 
ing, it  is  not  fallacious  for  this  reason :  the  evidence 
for  the  axiom  of  "  Natural  Uniformity  "  is  ohtained 
from  so  large  a  field  of  experience,  that  any  real  excep- 
tions, if  any  such  existed,  must  have  come  under  our 
notice.     These  innumerahle  Inductions,  coinciding  in 
one  result,  and  all  pointing  in  one  direction,  cover  the 
whole  field  of  Nature's  operations.     Therefore  here  the 
*'  enumeratio  simplex  "  is  adequate  to  prove  the  conclu- 
sion.  Or,  as  he  says  in  a  later  chapter,*  ''  The  suhject^ 
matter  of  our  law  is  so  widely  difiused  that  there  is  no 
time,  place,  or  set  of  circumstances  in  which  it  is  not 
fulfilled.     It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  law  can  not  be 
frustrated  by  any  counteracting  causes,  exce[)t  such  as 
never  occur,  and  cannot  depend  upon  any  collocations 
except  such  as  exist  at  all  times  and  places."    Further, 
of  those  phenomena  of  wliich  we  do  not  positively  know 
it  to  be  true,  one  after  another  is  constantly  passing 
from  this  class  into  that  of  known   examples  of  its 
truth,  and  any  deficiency,  or  absence  of  positive  know- 
ledge of  its  truth,  may  always  be  accounted  for  by  the 
variety  and  obscurity  of  the  phenomena  in  these  special 
cases. 

At  the  same  time,  Mill  adds,  we  cannot  extend  the 
validity  of  this  Law  of  Causation  beyond  the  limits  of 

*  "  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  xxi.  vol.  ii. 

H  2 


-"--     --^'  ■— *— 


IttO 


TITT?      lirVT  \ 'DTT'VGTPQ     AT?     UrTT  T 


OUT  Experience :  we  cannot  say  that  every  event 
follows  from  a  cause  in  distant  stellar  worlds,  for 
example :    such  an   extension   is    unauthorised    and 

illeg*itimate.* 

Anotlier  difficulty  occurs.     If  Indiiction  itself  rests 

f ■ ~ "" "*"""■■■"■■ 

for  its  validity  on  the  Uniformity  of  Xatiire  (as  its 
major  premiss),  and  the  Uniformity  of  Nature  rests 
on  a  number  of  Inductions,  Jire  we  not  here  in  a 
vicious  circle  of  inference?  Tlie  answer,  says  ^lill, 
lies  in  a  proper  view  of  the  function  of  the  llnjor 
Premiss  in  a  Syllog-ism.  If  we  suppose  that  the 
conclusion  really  rests  on,  and  is  proved  by,  the 
Major  Premiss,  then  obviously  we  cannot  but  suppose 
that  the  circular  form  of  the  reasoning-  given  above,  is 
fatal  to  its  validitv.  But  such  is  not  tlie  function  of 
the  Major  Premiss.  It  is  but  the  summary,  the 
record,  the  memorandum  in  concise  language  of  our 
experience,  so  far  as  it  has  gone.  Both  the  conclusion, 
therefore,  and  the  major  premiss  are  alike  conclusions 
from  the  antecedently  observed  particular  cases. 
Hence,  both  the  conclusion  reached  by  Induction,  and 
the  major  premiss — the  Uniformity  of  Nature — are 
proved  by  the  instances  we  have  observed  before,  ?>., 
by  our  experience.! 

After  these  statements  of  the  absolute  validity  of 
the  Uniformity  of  Nature,  we  proceed  to  Causation, 

*  "  Logic,"  l.k.  iii.  c.  xxi.  8.  4,  last  par. 
t  Ibid.,  bk.  iii.  c.  iii.  s.  1  j  c.  xxi.  s.  4. 


<.l 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATUEE.    101 

and  the  d^^nition  of  a  "  Cause."*  "The  notion,  of 
Cause,  being  the  root  of  the  wliole  theory  of  Induction, 
it  is  indispensable,"  says  Mill,  "  that  this  idea  should, 
with  the  utmost  practicable  degree  of  precision,  be 
fixed  and  determined."     Now  the  Law  of  Causation  is 


y  . 


this  :  (1)  That  everv  phenomenon,  which  has  a  beo^iur 
lung,  must  have  some  Cause,  and  (2)  That  given  the 
CausCjlhe  effect  will  invariably  follow  {mmus  counter- 
actTiig  causes).  What,  then,  is  a  Cause?  It  is  an 
antecedent,  and  further,  it  is  an  utcarlaUe  antecedent. 
But  we  must  not  suppose  that  "  cause  "  is  necessarily 
one  single  phenomenon  :  it  is,  most  frequently,  an 
assemblage  of  phenomena,  the  effect  following  upon  a 
sum  of  several  antecedents.  We  may,  it  is  true,  draw 
a  distinction  between  a  Cause,  and  the  Conditions  or 
the  Occasion,  the  Cause  being,  as  it  were,  the  last  in 
order  of  time,  immediately  following  on  which  occurs 
the  event;  but  this  is  a  convenient,  more  than  a 
logical  distinction.  The  Cause  is  the  sum  of  condi- 
tions :  the  sum,  in  feet,  of  positive  and  negative  con- 
ditions ("  positive  "  being  "  the  conditions  which  must 
be  present,"  "  negative  "  being  "  those  which  must  be 
absent ").  These  negative  conditions  are  further  speci- 
fied as  being,  either  "  Counteracting  Causes  "  (which 
neutralise  the  effect  of  the  other  antecedents  by  pro- 
ducing their  own)  or  "Preventing  Causes"  (which 
destroy  the  effect,  by  simply  arresting  it). 

*  "  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  2. 


102 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   mLL. 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATURE.    10,3 


So  far  tliCD,  Cause  is  defined  as  "  tlie  iiivariablt^ 
antecedent,  or  anteced-ents."  Is  tliis  all  that  tliere  is 
in  onr  idea  of  Cause  ?  No,  for  day  is  the  invariable 
antecedent  of  ni<;lit  (and  vice  versa),  and  yet  no  one 
calls  day  tlie  cause  of  nig^lit.  Why  is  this?  Because 
the  sequence  of  ni»;lit  ui>ou  day  depends  n[)on  another 
condition— viz.,  tlie  rotation  of  the  earth  and  the  con- 
sequent  absence  of  the  sun.  The  cause  then,  must 
be  **  nncoiiditioiial  "  :  it  must  produce  the  effect,  under 
^any  iniaginal>le  su|)position  withreg'ard  to  other  things. 
If  night  followed  day,  whether  the  rotation  of  tlie  eartli 
ceased  or  not,  then  d;iy  niiglit  rightly  be  called  the 
cause  of  night.  But  it  does  not,  therefore  it  is  not 
the  cause.y  The  Cause,  then,  is  the  invariable,  uncon- 
ditional antecedent  "  The  Cause  is  the  antecedent,  or 
concurrence  of  antecedents,  on  whicli  the  effect  is  in- 
variably and  unconditionally  consequent."  * 

Some  furtlier  questions,  relative  to  this  general  sul)- 
ject,  are  discussed  by  Mill,  which  we  may  briefly 
summarise. 

Is  the  distinction  between  "  agent  "  and  "  patient  " 
a  real  one  ?  No,  it  is  merely  verbal,  patients  are  always 
agents.  A  man's  condition,  when  he  takes  prussic  acid, 
is  as  much  the  cause,  or  agent  of  his  death,  as  the 
prussic  acid,  f 

Must  a  cause  always  precede,  by  ever  so  short  an 


interval,  its  effect  ?     No,  Mill  seems  to  answer ;  some- 
times it  is  simultaneous.* 

Is  the  type  or  Causation,  and  the  only  source  from 
which  we  derive  the  idea,  our  own  voluntary  agency  ? 
Certainly  not.  For  the  idea  of  "Power"  cannot  be 
derived  from  my  will  producing  my  bodily  motions, 
from  Mind  acting  on  Body,  because  Mind  only  acts  on 
Body  medkttebjj  through  a  chain  of  antecedents  and  con- 
sequents (our  nerves  and  muscles)  of  wdiich  we  are  not 
conscious.  Nor  yet  can  it  be  said  that  the  Idea  of 
Power  comes  from  the  pow'cr  of  Self  over  the  volitions, 
"from  myself,  producing  my  Will,"  because  Mill  pro- 
fesses that  so  far  as  he  is  concerned,  he  is  not  conscious 
of  this  power  at  all.  The  fact  is  that  the  notion  of 
'^  productive  power  "  as  applied  to  causation,  is  merely  a 
delusion :  all  tliat  experience  does  or  can  generate  is  an 
idea  of  invariable  sequence.! 


It  is  not  difficult  to  find  difficulties  in  Mill's  account 
of  Causation,  for  Mill  himself,  with  that  frank  incon- 
sistency, w^ith  which  many  of  his  theories  are  ex- 
pounded, has  taken  care  to  leave  them  on  tlie  surface. 

The  first  difficulty  is  concerned  with  the  relation 
whicii  he  exhibits  between  the  Law  of  Causation  and 


•  **  Logic,'*  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  C. 


t  Ibid.  s.  4. 


ml 


*  "  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  7. 

t  3Iiirs  "  Examiiiatioii  of   namilton,"  c.  xvi.  pp.  Sod-^Gl. 
"  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  U. 


Cp. 


104 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATUEE.    105 


the  Law  of  the  Uniformity  of  yat-iira.  Tliey  are,  of 
"■("'ourse,  not  the  same  tiling.  The  first  means  that 
no  tiling  happens  without  a  cause  of  some  sort,  the 
second  tliat  tlie  wliole  pliysical  workl  exhibits  uniform, 
methods  and  hiws.  The  first  means  that  we  are  com- 
pelled to  Iielieve  that  every  antecedent  has  a  conse- 
quent, a,nd  every  consequent  an  antecedent,  the  second 
that:  wt'  a,re  com  [jelled  to  believe  that  uniform  sequences 
of  events  and  causes  hold  in  every  possible  department 
of  our  knowledge  about  Xfiture. 

What  is  the  relation  between  these  two?  Evidently 
this — tliat  from  tlie  first — viz.,  that  there  is  a  regidar 
succession  in  phenomena — we  arrive  at  tlie  second — 
that  all  nature  exhibits  uniform  laws.  But  in  all 
extensions  of  our  knowledge  of  physical  and  other 
jihenomena,  Iiow  do  we  proceed  ?  Vie  assume  that,  if 
we  look  long  enough,  the  event  we  are  inspecting  will 
be  proved  to  have  a  cause,  because  all  nature  is  uni- 
form. Thus  the  ground  of  a  fresh  Induction  is  that 
which  is  itself  the  last  result  of  an  Induction.  We 
may  press  the  difficulty  even  a  little  fiirther.  It  is 
obvious  that  until  we  have  exhausted  all  the  different 
departments  of  knowledge  about  Nature,  we  cannot  be 
perfectly  sure  tliat  the  Law  of  Causation  holds  every- 
jyhere.  It  must  be  therefore  dangerous  to  bring  in  the 
assumption  of  uniformity  to  fortify  ourselves  in  reducing 
fresh  investigations  into  cases  of  this  law  of  uniformity. 

Mill's  answer  to  this  is  that,  in  reality,  the  conclu- 


i-l 


sion  of  our  syllogisms  about  Nature  is  proved  along 
witli  the  assumed  major  premiss  by  the  amount  oL 
cases  we  have  observed  befor^.  That  is  to  say  that 
l^xperience  proves  concurrently  loth  the  increasing 
Talidity  of  the  General  Law  of  Uniformity  and  the 
[.articular  instance  we  are  at  present  observing.  Such 
a  concrusion,  then,  depends  strictly  on  the  Experience 
crone  throuo-li,  and  both  General  Law  and  Particular 
Fact  are  valid  exactly  to  the  same  extent— viz.,  so  far 
as  thev  are  inferences  from  past  experience.  This  is 
all  the  necessity  and  universality  of  the  Law,  that  any 
*'  inductio  per  simplicem  enumerationem  "  can  possibly 

attain  to. 

The  difficulty  with  regard  to  this  circular  argument 
—that  Induction  depends  on  the  Law  of  Uniformity 
and  Uniformity  itself  depends  on  Induction—lias  been 
met  in  other  ways,  and  some  of  them  appear  certainly 
more  satisfactory  than  Mill's  avowal,  which  makes  our 
belief  in  Uniformity  depend  on  our  past  experience. 

Tlie  later  Experiential  School  would  meet  it,  I 
suppose,  in  this  way.  It  is  true  that  in  fresh  cases  of 
Induction,  the  Uniformity  of  Nature,  as  a  Law,  is 
logically  prior  to  this  or  that  uniformity  which  we  prove 
by  its  means.  But  though  logically  prior,  it  yet  may 
be  historically  posterior.  Logically,  a  postulate,  it  yet 
may  be,  historically,  a  product.  In  other  words,  men 
start  now  in  their  fresh  explorations  with  the  belief  in 
Uniformity,  but  the  belief  itself  is  the  slow  result  of 


108 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


accumulated  experiences  in  past  generations.  Prior  to 
tlie  Individual,  it  is  posterior  to  tlie  Race,  just  like 
tliose  notions  of  Time  and  Space,  which  men  begin 
with  DOW,  as  a  priori  notions,  though  in  reality  they 
are  (according  to  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer*)  the  products 
of  tlieir  fathers'  a  posteriori  experience.  The  same 
discrimination  between  logical  priority  and  historical 
posteriority  serves  also  to  ex^dain  other  notions. 
Thus,  for  examide,  logically,  the  Universal  is  prior  to 
the  Particular :  historically,  the  Particular  is  prior  to 
the  Universal.  Logically,  Duty,  as  an  idea,  is  prior 
to  particular  cases  of  "  what  ought  to  be  done : "  his- 
torically, we  arrive  at  our  idea  of  Duty  after  a  series  of 
particular  dutiful  acts. 

But  this  exi)lanation  is  due  to  that  enlarjxement  of 
the  sphere  of  Experience,  which  we  have  as  '  the 
note'  of  more  modern  experientialists  than  Mill. 
Experience,  to  them,  is  not  experience  of  the  indi- 
vidual, but  experience  of  the  race :  and  so  many  of 
these  difficulties  (among  others  tlie  proof  of  the 
validity  of  Geometrical  axioms)  are  met.  But  in  Jlillj 
with  liis  use  of  "simplex  emimeratio"  all  we have  is  a 
belief  in  Uniformity  seemingly  proportionate  to  the 
experience  which  ?/v',  not  our  forefathers,  have  under- 
gone. However  capaUcTof  extension  the  theory  may 
be,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  by  Mill  it  is  not  so  extended. 

♦  H.  Spen,cer'8  "  First  Principles,"  [.p.  1G2— 165.    "  rsjchol.;><ry;' 

vol,  i.,  pp.  460—468. 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATTJEE.    1C7 


The  other  method  of  explanation  is  "  the  Simple 
lutuitionist  Method,"  as  Mill  calls  it,  which  he  ex- 
pressly rejects.  In  its  best  expression,  it  is  this  : — 
tEat  Causation,  Causality,  is  a  mental  category,  with 
which  we  start  to  make  our  experience  of  Nature  in- 
telligible for  us.  It  cannot  be  intelligible,  unless  it  is 
reduced  to  order.  Experience,  as  furnished  by  sequent 
sensations,  is  a  chaos.  Only  Thought  can  produce 
Order  by  the  superimposition  of  forms,  relations, 
categories.  Only  Thought  can  produce  therefore  (in 
the  only  sense  in  which  the  word  is  capable  of  any 
meaning)  "  lleality."  Causation  being,  then,  a  cate- 
gory, a  form,  with  which  we  start — prior  to  experience, 
and  not  given  l)y  experience, — it  is  as  clear  as  daylight 
why  the  ground  of  Induction  is  the  belief  in  Universal 
Causation.  We  reduce  our  fresh  experiences  to  order 
simply  by  bringing  upon  them  the  category  of 
Causality. 

From  this  point  of  view,  all  Mill's  instances  to 
prove  that  the  belief  in  Uniformity  has  grown  to  be 
what  it  is,  and  was  not  believed  in  originally,  are  so 
many  fresh  proofs  of  the  originality  of  our  form  of 
Causality.  Tvxn,  to  avTOfxaTov,  and  the  rest  of  them,  were 
so  many  provisional  explanations  of  Causation,  await- 
ing further  experience.  The  whole  content  of  our  form 
of  Causality  was  not  yet  complete ;  and  in  the  absence 
of  such  full  content,  (only  to  be  gained  by  experience) 
the  explanations  of  the  Greek  philosopliers  are  to  us 


108 


THE   META?nYSICS   OF   MILL. 


inadequate,  tliougii  tliey  were  to  tlieiii  possibly  quite 
fwleqoate  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  incomplete 
experience.  The  form  was  there,  as  a  bvra^Ls,  waiting 
for  content,  waiting  ft>r  experience,  waiting  to  become 
cjTeAc'xeta.  The  very  age  of  Mythology  gives  the 
l)e:^t  illustration  of  liow  natural  it  is  for  men  to  apply 
categories  of  Causation.  Tlic  Greeks,  in  a  ^lytho- 
logical  age,  were  anxious  to  provide  causes  for  every- 
thing,— causes  for  the  wind,  in  an  ^olus,  causes 
fi)r  thunder  in  Hephajstos,  causes  for  sea-storms,  in 
Poseidon.  They  did  not  realise,  it  is  true,  the 
Uniformity  of  Nature, — that  all  Nature  exhibits  uni- 
form processes  of  action  and  abjures  tlieories  of  Oc- 
casionalism ;  they  simply  could  not :  they  had  not  had 
the  experience.  But  they  strictly  believed  that  every 
event  has  a  cause  of  some  sort,  liowever  foncifully  the 
category  of  Causation  was  applied.  Still  less,  of 
course,  can  it  be  urged  that  Human  Volition  forms 
any  exception  to  this  process.  Mill  himself  notes  that 
some  Intuitionists  believe  that  the  relation  of  the  Will 
or  Ego  to  action,  forms  the  type  of  all  Causation.  And 
naturally  so :  for  men,  in  their  application  of  the 
category  of  Causality,  are  guided  by  those  phenomena, 
of  ivhicli  they  have  earliest  experience.  That  some 
philosophers  do  not  beheve  in  "  the  uniformity  of 
Nature"  as  applied  to  the  sphere  of  human  volition, 
does  not  in  any  way  affect  the  question  of  the  origin- 
ality of  the  form  of  Causation.     Whether  they  do  or  do 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATURE.    109 


not  believe  that  a  motive  stands  to  an  act,  in  precisely 
the  same  relation  as  a  physical  antecedent  stands  to  a 
pliysical  consequent,  they  do  not,  therefore,  believe 
that  human  action  is  uncaused  :  the  Ego,  the  Self  is 
the  Cause, — a  free  cause,  a  first  cause. 

Leaving  now  the  relation  between  Causation  as  a 
Law  and  the  belief  in  the  Uniformity  of  Nature,  let  us 
l)roceed  to  Mill's  definition  of  C^^     Here  we  had 

1.  «■ ■" ' "•«■*»««—*»-• « ■•"•« •'*"" 

better  put  aside  all  collateral  issues,  and  confine  our- 
selves to  the  main  point* 

What  is  a  Cause  ?  It  is  an  invariable  unconditional 
Antecedent^  Let  us  take  each  of  these  attributes  iu 

turn. 

The  relation  of  Cause  and  Effect,  of  Antecedent 
and  Consequent,  is  discovered  by  Experience,  and  yet 
Cause  is  the  invariable  antecedent 

Does  not  this  word  "invariable"  open  the  whole 
difficulty  again ?  for  what  does  '^invariable"  in  com- 


*  Difficulties  tlicre  undoubtedly  are  in  some  of  Mill's  subsidiary    ^ 

remarks.  Kf/.  Tlie  cause  precedes  the  event,  says  iMill,  sometimes, 
and  yet  the  distinction  between  Agent  and  Patient,  is  utterly  unreal, 
the  Patient  is  always  an  Agent.  If  so  it  would  obviously  be  truer  to 
say,  tlie  Cause  never  prectdes  the  Effect,  for  the  Effect  (being  the 
Patient)  is  always  a  Cause  (Agent)  and  therefore  can  never  be 
posterior  to  it.  Or  again,  it  is  not  true,  according  to  Mill,  to  say 
"  cessante  causa  cessat  ct  effectus,"  for  a  body  through  which  a  sword 
has  passed,  continues  dead,  even  when  the  sword  has  been  removed. 
That  is  to  say,  the  patient  continues,  the  agent  is  removed.  Yet 
Patients  are  always  Agents.  The  r>ody  must  be  conceived  of  a< 
continuously  the  C:iuse  of  its  own  death— a  somewhat  unnecessary 
inversion  of  ordinary  language.  ^y^ 


1  i  u 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


mon  parlance  meap?  Tliat  to  which  no  exception  has 
l)een  or  can  be  discovered.  The  last  part — the  words 
"  can  he "  are  as  important  as  the  first.     But  what 

must  "  invariable  "  mean  to  Mill  ?     That  to  wliich  no 


exception  Ms  been  discovered.  In  other  words  "  in- 
variability" is  exactly  measured  by  the  amount  ofex- 
perience  under^^^one.  It  is  a  parallel  use  to  tlie  word 
*^  inconceivability,"  "  Inconceivability,"  for  Mill,  is 
strictly  relative  to  experience:  so  too  is  invariability. 
It  can  have  no  otlier  meanini*-. 

Tlie  misfortune  is  that  Mill  is  supposed  to  be  in 
advance  of  Hume,  because  he  is  more  scientific.  Which 
is  the  more  logical  here  ?  Hume  said  that  Experience 
r»f  antecedents  and  consequents  led  to  the  formation  of 
a  custom  of  expecting  the  consequent  when  we  found 
the  antecedent.  Mill  sa\'s  that  the  Cause  is  the  ante- 
cedent,  invariable  so  far  as  our  experience  has  gone. 
The  difference  between  the  custom  (founded  on  past 
experiences)  of  finding  a  consequent,  when  we  come 
across  an  antecedent,  and  Mill's  assertion  that  Cause 
is  the  antecedent,  invariable,  so  far  as  our  experience 
lias  gone,  is  certainly  not  very  great.  If  there  is 
anv  difierence,  it  is  that  Hume  confines  himself 
wiihin  what  Lis  spte.  allows  him,  while  Mill,  in 
using  the  word  invariable,  does  not  always  explain 
that  he  only  means  ^'unvaried."  As  to  any  real 
objective  validity  in  Causality,  it  must  be  denied  by 
0„  J,,..  „  „ucU  „  b,  .ho  .,!,„.      H....  opoulj 


CAL^SATION,  AND  UNIFORMITY  OF  NATUEE.    Ill 


denies  it.  Mill  does  so  quite  as  much  when  lie  makes 
the  relation  depend  upon  a  number  of  experiences, 
which  are  of  course  subjective.  If  it  expresses  more 
than  this,  if  it  is  an  objective  relation  between  objective 
fiicts,  we  at  once  want  to  know,  how  Mill's  account  of 
externality,  limiting  it  to  Permanent  Possibilities  of 
Sensation,  can  admit  either  of  such  an  objective  relation, 
or  of  such  objective  facts,  between  which  the  relation 
is  to  hold.  -^' 

Let  us  turn  to  Mill's  second  adjective,  the  word 
*'  unconditional."  I  supi)0se  that  there  is  no  student 
of  Mill  who  has  not  felt  some  difficulty  in  understand- 
ing how  this  attribute  of  ''  unconditionality  "  is  meant 
t£j^lJ^PPlJ'^^-^^^  used.  We  are  told  that  the  cause  is 
the  sum  of  *'  the  conditions,"  antecedent  to  an  event :  * 
imd  yet  we  are  told  that  the  cause  is  "  unconditional."  t 
We  are  told  that  an  cfiect  only  follows  a  cause  in  the 
absence  of  counteracting  phenomena :  and  yet  that  if 
the  cause  is  real,  the  eftect  follows  ^^  under  any  ima- 
ginable supposition  with  regard  to  other  things."  X 
]\Iiirs  instance  of  the  relation  of  Night  and  Day  does 
not  throw  much  light  on  our  confusion.  Day  is  not 
the  cause  of  night,  says  Mill,  because  Niglit  following 
on  Day  depends  on  another  condition— viz.,  the  rota- 
tion of  the  earth.  But  inasmuch  as  it  would  appear 
tliat  the  precedence  of  day  is  one  of  the  conditions  (for 
it  is  irai)lied  in  the  rotation  of  the  earth),  the  theory 

*  "  Logic;-  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  3.        f  Ibid.,  s.  6.        %  Ibii.,  s.  G,  par.  2. 


11.2 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MILL. 


which  makes  a  Cause  the  sum  of  conditions,  must 
include  tliat  precedence,  in  the  cause  of  night.  And 
indeed  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  why  tlie  analysis  which 
resolves  Causation  into  ohserved  sequence,  should  refuse 
to  find  in  Day  the  cause  of  Night.  The  spirit,  at 
all  events,  of  Hume's  discussion  seems  to  find  it  quite 
a  satisfoctory  enough  instance  to  give  of  the  relation 
of  Causation.* 

Thewor.l  "unconditional,"  in  reality,  rests  on  a  view 
of  the  relation  of  mind  to  nature,  quite  diftereiit  from 
that  whicli  Mill  unfolds  in  his  Psychological  theories. 
Starting  from  a  purely  subjective  basis  of  feeling,  it  is 
hard,  indeed,  to  understand  its  meaning:  but  if  we 
start  from  any  realistic  theory,  it  becomes,  of  course, 

intelligible  enough.     IVomJ^mi^  at  all  events,  weare 

entitled  to  demand  this  much :  that  either  he  shQuld 
refuse  to  speak  of  Cause  as  the  sum  of  conditions,  or 
else  refuse  to  define  Cause,  as  the  unconditional  ante- 
^^^M.  He  must  either  draw  a  clear  distinction  be- 
twoen  Cause  and  Condition  (which  he  does  not  do)  or 
else  abandon  his  adjective  "  unconditional." 

We  see,  perhaps,  the  difficulty  more  clearly,  when  we 
observe  how  Mill  has  to  limit  his  "  unconditionality.'' 
"Unconditional"  just  like  "invariable"  means  only 
"so  far  as  experience  has  gone."  Therefore,  although 
"  unconditional  "  is  defined  as  "  under  any  imaginalile 
supposition  with  regard  to  other  things,"  we  find  that 

*  "  Inqniry/'  s.  4,  p.  1. 


CAUSATION,  AND  UXIFOEMITY  OF  NATURE.    li:i 

the  latter  words  only  mean  under  any  supposition  with 
regard  to  the  things,  which  have  come  under  our  \ 
experience.  Thus  in  distant  parts  of  the  stellar  re- 
gions, events  may  well  be  imagined  to  follow  without 
a  cause,  just  as  in  that  nebulous  region  2  +  2  may=i5.* 
That  is  to  say  that  intelligence  coming  across  new  plie^:"^ 
nomena  may  have  to  alter  its  laws.  No  clearer  proof 
is  needed  to  show  how  little  the  words  "  invariable  " 
and  "  unconditional "  mean.  We  surely  ought  to  mean 
by  them  that  they  hold  good  for  all  intelligence  :  that 
even  if  we  do  arrive  at  the  study  of  phenomena  in 
distant  stellar  regions,  there  too  we  shall  apply  our 
category  of  Causation  just  as  much  as  we  do  in  regions 
that  have  come  already  under  our  study.  Then  "  in- 
variable "  means  what  it  implies.  But  with  Mill,  it 
only  means  "  unvaried  within  the  limits  of  our  expe- 
rience," not  absolutely  invariable. 

The  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us  that  these  words, 
"  invariable "    and   "  unconditional,"   by  which   Mill 
"  developes  "  his  predecessor's  doctrine,  are  but  the 
darkening  of  the  clear  counsels  of  Hume.     Hume  we"^ 
could  understand :  but  then  Hume  invalidated  Science.     / 
Mill,  to  save  Science,  adds  fresh  words.     The  relation  of 
Cause  and  Efiect  is  still  merely  a  subjective  association,    ,' 
based  on  past  sensations,  past  experience  :  yet  the  rela- 
tion must  be  conceived  as  "  invariable  "  and  "  uncondi- 
tional."    Hence,  complexity  and  confusion  of  spirit.     ^^ 

*  "  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  sxi,  s.  4,  last  par. 


I 


114 


THE   METxlPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


One  word,  finally,  as  to  the  qElBi^B)  combated  by 
Mill,  botli  in  the  "  Logic,"  Bk.  iii.  c.  v.  and  the  chapter 
on  Sir  W.  Hamilton— the  opinion,  viz.,  that  Volition  is 
the  source  and  type  of  all  our  ideas  of  Power,  and 

tf    Ml  I iiiiiiiiiiiii I --- » " " ""■ * 

tiierefoi^'SFCau^  Mill  asks,  Wliat  Idea  of  Power 

do  we  find  in  ourselves  ?  (much  the  same  question  as 
Hume  asked).  Is  it  Power  to  act,  or  Power  to  will? 
If  the  former,  there  are  so  many  steps  between  the 
originating  impulse  and  the  consequent  action — so 
much  intermediate  action  of  muscles,  &c.,  of  which  we 
are  iofuorant, — that  no  idea  of  Power  can  thence  be 
derived. 

This  does  not  appear  a  wholly  satisfactory  criticism. 
A  despot,  I  imagine,  feels  a  real  power  in  giving  his 
orders,  though  he  may  be  ignorant  of  the  various 
officials  through  whom  his  orders  get  executed,  if  he 
is  sure  that  they  will  be  executed  somehow.  Some 
such  assurance  certainly  is  possessed  by  the  Will. 

The  second  alternative— that  what  we  feel  is  a  Power 
of  Self  over  the  Volitions,  or  a  Power  to  Will,  Mill 
disposes  of  without  argument.  Mill,  "in  common 
with  one-half  the  psychological  world,"  is  wholly  un- 
conscious of  having  any  such  power.  It  does  not 
necessarily  follow  that  the  other  half  of  the  psycholo- 
gical world  is  equally  unconscious.  The  argument, 
if  argument  it  be,  is  capable  of  too  easy  a  retort 

But  in  reality,  the  opinion  itself,  that  finds  in  Self 
mnd  in  Volition  the  type  of  Power  in  Causation,  is 


CAUSATION,  AND  UNIFOEMITY  OF  NATURE.    115 


found,  I  need  scarcely  say,  in  JMansel  and  others  and 
not  in  Kant.  Mansel  says  *  (following  in  the  steps  of 
Cousin,  to  whom  he  is  largely  indebted),  that  the  soul 
is  a  power  conscious  of  itself.  To  Kant,  any  such 
assertion  would  hardly  commend  itself.  To  say  this  of 
the  Soul,  is  to  rise  above  Categories,  is  to  treat  the 
Soul  as  a  Noumenon,  and  not,  as  Ave  can  only  know  it, 
to  treat  it  as  exhibiting  Phenomena.  In  one  sense,  of 
course,  the  mere  fact  of  ct  priori  mental  Categories 
assumes  a  certain  power  in  the  "  pure  Ego  "  to  impose 
them ;  the  mere  fact  of  its  bringing  a  Category  of 
Causation  to  bear  in  the  construction  of  an  Intelligible 
World,  implies  a  certain  mental  activity.  But  Kant 
denied  the  Power  of  the  individual  Self  over  Volition 
and  Actions,  and  in  that  sense  denied  Free  AVill  to  the 
Ego.  On  the  other  hand,  Free  Will,  as  shown  in 
Morality,  is  brought  back  again.  But  we  are  only 
concerned  with  the  Logical  aspect  of  tliis  question, 
and  from  that  point  of  view,  such  a  notion  of  Power  in 
the  Self,  is  alien  to  the  critical  methods  of  Kant. 


♦  i 


'  Prolegomena  Logica,"  p.  139. 


I  2 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


117 


YIII 

MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS   AND   NECESSARY  TRUTHS. 

We  proceed  to  the  foundations  of  Geometry  and 
Arithmetic,  or  iu  other  words  to  Mill's  treatment  of 
Necessary  Truths. 

A  passage  in  Mill's  Autobiography  which  has  been 
recently  quoted,*  shows  that  with  regard  to  these 
Necessary  Truths,  Mill  purposely  chose  for  his  con- 
sideration Mathematical  Axioms,  because  thus  he 
thought  he  should  carry  the  war  into  the  very  citadel 
of  the  enemy.  If  the  Axioms  of  Geometry  were  shown 
to  be  inductions  from  experience,  much  more  would 
other  so-called  necessary  truths,  cease  to  be  considered 
"  a  priori  J* 

To  this  attempt,  then— to  make  Mathematical  Axioms 
the  result  of  Experience,— Mill  devotes  himself  in 
**  Logic,"  Bk.  II.  c.  V.  and  vi. 

These  chapters  may  be  divided  into  three  separate 
questions. 

*  By  Professor  JcYons,  in  Contemporary  Review  for  December, 
1877. 


(i.)  What  is  the  meaning  of  Necessary  Truth  ? 

(ii.)  In  what  sense  and  to  what  extent  are  Mathe- 
matical Truths  necessary  ?  or  in  other  words — what  is 
the  meaning  of  Mill's  "Hypothetical  Mathematics?" 

(iii.)  Are  Axioms  Experimental  Truths  ? 

(i.)  Necessary  truth  as  ordinarily  defined,  is  supposed 
to  be  that  which  is  independent  of  any  and  every  ex- 
perience.    It  is  a  priori  truth.   . 

Such  is,  however,  not  the  sense  of  Necessary  Truth 
o  Mill.  Necessity  to  him  is  necessity  and  certainty 
of  Inference—not  certainty  or  necessity  of  truth.  In 
other  words  the  term  is  applicable  to  the  process  of 
reasoning,  not  to  the  a  priori  conditions  of  reasoning. 
("  The  certainty  ascribed  is  nothing  whatever  but 
certainty  of  inference.")  But  inference  from  what? 
Inference  from  assumptions,  which,  by  the  conditions 
of  the  enquiry  are  not  to  be  questioned.  This  then 
is  Mill's  definition  of  Necessary  Truth,  "Necessary 
Truth  is  sucli  as  necessarily  follows  from  assumptions 
which  cannot  be  questioned."  Why  these  assumptions 
are  not  to  be  questioned,  is  a  query  to  which  we  shall 

return  later. 

fii.)  "  The  character  of  necessity,  ascribed  to  the 
truths  of  Mathematics,*  and  even  the  peculiar  certainty 
(sometimes)  attributed  to  them  is  an  illusion,"  says 
]\Iill.  ^Vhy  ?  Because  they  relate  to  purely  imaginary 
objects.     "  There  does  not  exist  either  in  nature,  or 

♦  Mill's  «  Logic,"  Bk.  ii.  c.  5,  sec.  1. 


118 


■THE   METxlPnYSICS   OF   MILL. 


in  the  Imman  mincl  any  objects  exactly  corresponding 
to  the  definitions  of  Geometry."  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  a  "  point  witlioiit  magnitude  "  or  a  "  straight 
line, — length  without  breadth,"  or  a  perfect  circle. 
Therefore  the  assumption  implied  in  the  definitions 
of  Geometry  "  that  there  exist  real  things  conformable 
to  the  definitions  "  is  false.* 

Now  the  conclusions  of  Geometry  follow  from  the 
definitions,  and  the  definitions  themselves  are  built 
upon  the  hypothesis  that  there  exist  real  things  con- 
formable thereto.  Therefore  Geometry  rests  upon  a 
liypothesis — or  in  other  words  it  is  concerned  not  with 
such  points,  circles,  straight  lines,  as  are  seen  in 
nature  ;  but  witli  ideal  points,  ideal  circlesj  Xc. 

The  same  thing  holds  good  also  of  the  science  of 
number,  t  "  In  all  propositions  concerning  numbers,  a 
condition  is  implied  witliout  which  none  of  them  would 
be  true,  and  that  condition  is  an  assumption  which  may 
be  false.  The  condition  is  that  1  =  1,  that  all  the  numbers 
are  numbers  of  the  same  or  of  equal  units.  Let  this  be 
doubtful,  and  not  one  of  the  propositions  of  Arith- 
metic will  hold  true.*'  Arithmetic  then,  and  the  Science 
of Numbers  as well as, .Geometry,  rest  on  a  hypothe- 
sis, an  assumption. 

What  is  the  conclusion  ?    It  is  stated  very  clearly 

by  Mill  I    'Mathematics,  of  course,  is  the  type  of  a 

V 

*  "  Not  strictly  true,"  ninth  edition. 

t  "  Logic,"  bk.  ii.  c.  vi.,  sec.  3.  $  Ibid.,  sec.  I. 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


119 


L 


Deductive  Science,  and  its  method  rests  on  hypotheses. 
The  result  is  in  JVIill's  language  "  that  the  Method  of 
all  Deductive  Sciences  is  hypothetical."  ^^ They  proceed 
by  tracing  the  consequences  of  certain  assumptions, 
leaving  for  separate  consideration  whether  the  as- 
sumptions are  true  or  not,  and  if  not  exactly  true, 
whether  they  are  a  sufficiently  near  approximation  to 
the  truth." 

While  elaborating  his  own  view,  Mill  takes  occasion 
to  adduce  arguments  against  another  view  of  Mathe- 
matical Necessity,  viz.,  that  of  the  Nominalists,  who 
would  resolve  all  such  necessary  Truths  into  merely 
analytical  propositions.*    According  to  them  (and  we 
may  remember  that  Hobbes  and  Leibnitz  are  among 
them)  the  Definitions  and  Theorems  of  the  Science  of 
Number  are  merely  verbal.     We  are  analysing  what  we 
mean  by  particular  terms,  straight  lines  or  units,  &c., 
and  we  affirm  no  more  in  the  predicate  when  we  say  that 
two  and  one  are  three,  than  what  we  have  already  im- 
plicitly affirmed  in  the  subject.     The  view  is  supported 
by  the  argument  that  we  do  not  carry  ideas  of  any 
particular  thing  along  with  us,  when  we  manipulate 
algebraical  or  arithmetical  symbols,  as  a  and  x.     In 
answer  to  this.  Mill  asserts  that  we  are  throughout 
dealing  with  tilings  and  not  with  symbols.    "  Ten  must 
mean  ten  bodies,  or  ten  sounds,  or  ten  beatings  of  the 
pulse."     The  Symbols  are  things,  and  our  operations 

*  "  Logic,"  chap.  vi.  sec.  2. 


f  ttn 


X .  1 1  1  i     JjlLx^  XxxX  J-L  J.  OXv^'O      \J£       JixLLX^Xj* 


upon  tliem  express  facts.  As  to  the  other  argument  of 
the  K'ominalists  tliatthe  Propositionsof  Number,  when 
considered  as  Propositions  relating  to  things,  all  seem 
to  be  identical  propositions,  Mill  replies  that  though 
the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  numerical  proposition 
may  have  the  same  denotation  (denoting  the  same 
objects)  yet  they  may  have  a  different  connotation  (as 
implying  different  states  of  those  same  olyects).  In 
"  two  and  one  =  three,"  for  instance,  the  subject  says 


££ 


CD  d) 


and  CD,"  the  predicate  this  " 


j> 


(iii.)  IVe  come  now  to  the  third  point — that  Axioms 
are  experimental  truths.*  "  What  is  the  ground  for 
our  belief  in  axioms — what  is  the  evidence  on  which 
they  rest  ?  They  are  experimental  truths  :  generaliza- 
tions from  observation."  The  evidence  upon  which  we 
believe  them  is  of  the  same  kind  as  tlie  evidence  upon 
which  we  believe  any  other  fact  of  external  nature — 
our  experience  of  their  truth.  They  are  the  simplest 
and  easiest  cases  of  generalization  from  experience. 

In  order  to  support  this  view.  Mill  has  to  undertake 
two  tasks. 

L  He  has  to  show  that  the  evidence  derived  from 
experience  is  sufficient  to  prove  axioms. 

This  he  does  by  pointing  out  how  experience  con- 
firms them  every  moment  in  our  lives.  Experimental 
proofs  crowd  upon  us  in  profusion  without  any  instance 


•   a 


Logic,"  chap.  v.  sec.  4. 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


121 


of  a  possible  exception.  If  then  experience  is  sufficient 
to  convince  us  of  their  truth,  why  should  we  be  at 
the  pains  of  sujiposing  other  ''a  priori'''  evidence 
necessary  ? 

ii.  In  the  next  place,  he  has  to  defend  his  theory 
against  attacks. 

(a.)  "  Axioms  are  seen  to  be  true  by  merely  tJdnJdng 
of  them,  not  by  actual  experiment  of  seeing  and  feel- 
ing." But,  says  IMill,  Imagination  can  so  reproduce 
sensations  of  form  that  our  mental  pictures  of  lines, 
circles,  &c.,  are  as  fit  subjects  for  experimentation, 
as  the  realities. 

{ft.)  "  The  axioms  contain  an  assertion  of  invaria- 
bility and  universality,  e.g.^  one  axiom  says,  two 
straight  lines  cannot  meet  if  prolonged  to  infinity. 
How  is  this  to  be  explained  by  an  experience  which 
can  never  talk  of  an  infinite  distance?"  ]\Iill  answers  : 
that  we  know  that,  if  the  two  straight  lines  would 
meet,  tliey  would  meet  at  a  finite  distance,  and  we  can 
in  imagination  transport  ourselves  to  that  point,  and 
there  in  imagination  discover  that  the  two  convergent 
lines  are  not  straight  lines,  but  crooked  ones.  Imagi- 
nation, and  its  power  to  reproduce  sensations  of  form, 
help  us  over  this  difficulty. 

(y.)  ''  But  the  contradictory  of  these  axiomatic  truths 
is  inconceivable,''  Mill  replies,  that  what  is  inconceiv- 
able is  neither  necessarily,  nor  always  false.  For 
inconceivability  is  altogether  an  accidental  thing,  or  as 


122 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


^ill  pots  it,  "  Botli  what  persons  can  and  wliat  tliey 
cannot  conceive  is  veiy  much  an  affiiir  of  accident,  and 
dei»ends  altogether  on  their  experience  and  their  habits 
of  thoiio:ht."  If  we  have  in  i)ast  experience  frequently 
and  constantly  found  a  Proposition  true,  we  believe  its 
contradictory  to  be  inconceivable.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
we  have  ever  found  it  false,  or  if  tliere  exist  analogies 
which  suggest  tlie  possibility  of  its  ever  being  false, 
then  its  contradictory  becomes  conceivable. 

Moreover,  we  have  several  examples  of  Propositions 
once  regarded  as  inconceivable,  now  recognised  not 
merely  as  conceivable  but  as  being  the  only  true 
accoiuits.*  E.g.,  to  Newton,  that  a  body  should  act 
where  it  is  not,  was  inconceivable ;  now  it  is  recognised, 
says  Mill,  in  the  theory  of  Gravitation  and  Magnetism. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  instances  of  truths 
really  arrived  at  by  long  exi)erience  and  investigation, 
which  have  become  so  familiar,  that  some  scientific 
men  hold  them  to  be  necessary  truths,  ^.y.,  tlie  first 
law  of  motion  (which  by  some  is  held  to  be  a  neces- 
sary  truth),  and  the  laws  of  chemical  composition. 

So  the  test  of  inconceivableness  proves  nothing, 
except  that  "  two  ideas  are  so  firmly  associated  in 
our  minds  that  we  find  it  impossible  to  disconnect 
them." 

Hence  the  general  result  follows — that  axioms  are 
experimental  truths. 


•   u 


Logic,"  bk.  ii,  c.  v,  sec.  6, 


MATHEMATICiiL  AXIOMS. 


123 


In  examining  Mill's  doctrines  on  the  subject  of 
Mathematics  and  Necessary  Truths,  there  are  two  parts 
of  the  subject  which  we  had  better  keep  distinct.  The 
first  is  expressed  in  the  question  : 

(1.)  How  far  is   Mill's   own  account  of  Mathe- 
matics   and    Geometry    satisfactory    and 
consistent  with  itself? 
The  second  will  run  thus  : 

(2.)  Can  we  believe  that  Necessity  and  Univer- 
sality are  to  be  gained  by  the  Association  of 
Ideas,  or,  to  put  it  differently,  does  Mill 
satisfactorily  dispose  of  the  test  of  In- 
conceivability of  the  opposite  ? 
I.  Let  us  first  clearly  see  the  difference  between 
Mill  and  Hume  in  respect  of  Mathematical  truths. 

With  Hume,*  all  lines,  angles,  triangles,  and  figures 
with  which  the  Geometrician  is  conversant,  were 
nothing  other  than  those  which  we  have  come  across 
in  our  experience.  Consequently  Hume  can  only  allow 
the  mathematician  an  indefinite  approach  to  exactness. 
It  is  all  very  well  for  the  mathematician  to  pronounce 
all  right  angles  equal,  but  any  perfect  equality — an 
equality  "  beyond  what  we  have  instruments  and  art 
to  ascertain," — Hume  says  is  ''  a  mere  fiction  of  the 
mind,  useless  as  well  as  incomprehensible."  From 
the  progressive  correction  of  our  actual  measurements 
we  have  a  tendency/  to  feign  perfect  exactness,  perfect 
♦  Hume's  "  Treatise,"  part  ii.  sec.  4. 


124 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MttL. 


equality  in  tliese  cases,  but  it  is  notliing  else  tlian  a 
fiction.  In  perfect  consistency  with  this  we  find 
Hume  denying  the  infinite  divisibility  of  extension. 
And  throughout  IIume*s  s|>irit  is  tlie  same,  as  indeed 
it  must  be  for  any  philosopher,  wlio  makes  all  truths 
(and  therefore  all  Mathematical  trutlis)  rest  on 
experience. 

But  just  as  Hume's  doctrine  of  Cause  was  supposed 
to  invalidate  tlie  possibility  or  truth  of  Natural  Science, 
so  too  Hume's  doctrine  of  Mathematical  truth  evidently 
supposes  "  an  exactness  "  very  dilierent  from  what  the 
mathematician  himself  assumes.  And  just  as  Mill 
made  some  additions  to  Hume's  doctrine  of  Causation 
to  save  Pliysics,  so  too  he  adds  to  liis  predecessor's 
doctrine  of  Geometry  to  save  Mathematical  Science. 
The  addition  is  this  :  that  mathematical  deductions 
depend  on  a  hypothesis.  We  suppose,  according  to 
Mill,  figm-es  exactly  corresponding  to  our  definitions, 
though  such  do  not  really  exist.  The  definitions,  in 
fact,  represent  ideas,  though  not  ideas  to  w^liich  real 
objects  can  be  found  exactly  answering.  The  lines, 
angles,  and  figures  are  ideal  lines,  angles,  and  figures. 
Witli  Hume,  on  tlie  contrary,  all  ideas  were  merely 
copies  of  impressions,  and  therefore  our  idea  of  a  line 
could  only  be  a  copy  of  our  impression  of  a  line. 

This  hypothetical  character  of  Mathematics  Mill 
derived  from  Dugald  Stewart,  and  it  is  a  refinement  on 
Hume.     Is  this  refinement  an  improvement  ? 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


125 


It  is  and  it  is  not.  We  welcome  with  satisfaction 
the  admission  that  there  can  be  in  the  mind  ideas, 
which  are  not  copies  of  sensible  things — ideas  to  which 
no  external  counterpart  can  exactly  be  found.  We  are 
glad  to  learn  that  the  mind  can  manipulate  ideal  figures, 
and  reason  about  them,  and  draw  deductions  from  them 
— quite  apart  from  tlie  external  (so-called)  realities, 
with  which  we  are  conversant  in  experience. 

But  then,  what  becomes  of  the  assertion  in  the 
"Logic,"  that  the  theory  "  that  knowledge  consists  in 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  is  tlie  nio.st 
fatal  mistake  that  ever  retarded  a  scientific  observer  "  ? 
Knowledge  deals  witli  things,  not  with  our  ideas  of 
things,  says  Mdl.  But  Mathematical  Knowledge,  at 
all  events,  seems  to  deal  with  our  ideas  of  things^  and 
hot  with  things, — with  our  ideas  of  straight  lines,  and 
not  with  straight  lines,  such  as  we  meet  with  in  expe- 
rience. It  is  perhaps  a  little  superfluous  of  Mill  to 
say  that  ten  means  ten  things,  ten  beats  of  the  pulse, 
ten  counters,  &c.,  after  this  admission. 

And  further,  what  have  we  heard  of  the  mind 
hitherto,  in  Mill's  system,  which  will  account  for  this 
idealising  power?  The  mind  is  only  the  permanent 
possibility  of  undergoing  sensations.  Sensations,  and 
associations  of  sensations  and  ideas,  give  us  the  sum 
total  of  our  mental  furniture  on  the  intellectual  side. 
How  then  can  the  mind  give  us  ideal  lines,  such  as  do 
not  correspond  with  what  Mill  calls  external  realities  ? 


1911 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


127 


How  can  it  liave  ideas  to  wliich  no  external  objects 
can  be  found  answering  ?  Of  course  Mill  treats  the 
idealising  power  as  an  illusion.  But  just  as  Hume 
might  be  called  upon  to  account  for  his  *Hendency  to 
feign,"  of  which  he  makes  such  conspicuous  use,  so 
Mill  may  be  called  upon  to  account  for  tliis  idealising 
power,  this  power  of  framing  hypothetical  straight 
lines,  which  he  uses  in  accounting  tor  mathematical 


^  The  real  difficulty  emerges  later.  The  difficulty  is 
to  bring  into  harmony  this  hyijothetical  character  of 
definitions,  and  the  other  doctrine  that  axioms  are 
nothing  but  experimental  truths.  For  if  "  two  straight 
lines  cannot  enclose  a  space"  be  a  truth  known  only  by 
experience,  when  we  talk  about  straight  lines  we  can 
only  mean  such  straiglit  lines  as  are  known  in  expe- 
rience. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  straight  lines  we 
talk  about,  are  not  straight  lines  known  in  experience, 
but  ideal  straight  lines,  the  axiom  in  question  cannot 
be  learnt  from  experience,  because  exi)erience  never 
testifies  to  it,  ne¥er  presenting  us  with  lines  really 

straight. 

Either,  then,  the  ideal  straight  line  must  be  an  exact 

copy  of  a  real  straight  line,  or  else  axioms  are  not 

founded  on  Experience.  Which  is  Mill's  opinion  ?  It 
I  is  impossible  to  say.  Is  our  mental  image  an  exact 
"^opy  of  a  reality,  or  is  it  not  ?    In  the  first  section  of 

chapter  y.  he  says,  "  There  exist  no  points  without 


magnitude;  no  lines  without  breadth,  nor  perfectly 
straiglit ;  no  circles  with  all  their  radii  exactly  equal, 
nor  squares  with  all  their  angles  perfectly  right. 
Their  existence,  so  far  as  we  can  form  any  judgment, 
would  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  physical  con- 
stitution of  our  planet  at  least,  if  not  of  the  universe." 
In  the  fifth  section  he  says,  "  The  imaginary  lines 
exactly  resemble  real  ones,"  and  again,  "  We  can 
frame  a  mental  image,  which  we  may  rely  on  as  being 
precisely  similar  to  the  reality."* 

11.  We  proceed  to  Mill's  treatment  of  the  test  of 
Inconceivability. 

The  question  now  is  this:  Are  the  recognised  tests  "\ 
of  such  Truths  as  the  first  truths  of  Mathematics  (and 
indeed  all  truths  of  tlie  same  stringency) — viz.,  Neces-      I 
sity  and  Universality,  sufiiciently  accounted  for  by  the  J 
laws  of  Association  ?     The  easiest  mode  of  approaching 
this   question  is   to  look   at  that  test  which   is  the 
negative  form  of  terms  like  "  Necessity  "  and  ^*  Uni- 

*  I  need  not  enlarge  on  this  point,  as  it  was  strenuously  insisted 
on  by  I'rofessor  Stanley  Jevons  in  Liis  article  in  the  (hntr/ii/Mtrarf/ 
Ileckw  fur  December,  1877.  His  summing  up  of  Mill's  position  is 
clear,  and  is  adequately  supported  by  his  references. 

1.  Perfectly  straight  lines  do  not  really  exist. 

2.  We  experiment  ui»on  imaginary  straight  lines. 

3.  These  imaginary  straight  lines  exactly  resemble  the  real  ones. 

4.  If  these  imaginary  straight  lines  are  not  perfectly  straight, 

they  will  not  enable  us  to  prove  the  truths  of  Geometry. 

5.  If  they  are  perfectly  straight,  then  tlie  real  ones  which  exactly 

resemble  them  must  be  perfectly  straight,  ergo,  perfectly 
straight  lines  do  exist. 


12S 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


versality*'-— viz.,  '*  tlie  Inconceivability  of  the  Opposite 
Assumption."  Tlic  first  tratlis  of  Matliematics  are 
Accessary  and  Universal,  because  the  opposite  assump- 
tion is  inconceivable,  because  we  cannot  even  conceive 
the  possibility  of  straight  lines  ever  enclosing  a  space. 
Mill  says  that  Inconceivability  is  an  accidental 
thing,  depending  on  experience,  and  association  of 
ideas.*  Inconceivability  is  of  course  an  ambiguous 
term,  and  before  we  can  assent  to  this,  we  have  to  see 
in  what  senses  it  is  capable  of  being  used.  Fortunately 
Mill  himself  helps  us  here.  In  his  chapter  on  "The 
Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned"  in  "  The  Examination 
of  Hamilton"   he   distinguishes  three  senses  of  the 

word. 

Inconceivable  means — 
(a)  that  of  which  the  mind  can  form  no  repre- 
sentation,  either  because  no  attributes  are 
given  out  of  which  a  representation  could 
"be  framed,  or  because  the  attributes  given 
are  incompatible. 
(P)  that  of  which,  though  the  mind  can  form  a 
representation,  it  cannot  conceive  a  reali- 
^     sation.     In  this  sense  the  mind  is,  by  the 
law  of  association,  temporarily   debarred 
from  believing  it. 
(y)  that,  which  the  mind  cannot  construe  to  itself, 
through  a  higher  notion,  or  conceive  as  the 

•  **  Logic,"  bk.  iii.  c.  v.  s.  9. 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


129 


consequent  of  a  certain  reason.     This  is  a 

Hamilton ian   sense    of    the  word,    which 

would  render  all  first  truths  inconceivable, 

and  must  therefore  be  rejected.* 

If  a  thing,  continues  Mill,  is  inconceivable  in  the 

third   sense,  it  can,  obviously,  be   believed  with  full 

understanding.     If  it  is  inconceivable  in  the  second 

sense,  it  can  yet  be  believed,  because  we  can  represent 

it  to  ourselves,  and  "  the  inability  to  conceive  "  only 

rests  upon  a  limited  experience.     If  it  is  inconceivable 

in  the  first  sense, 

(a)  if  we  can  attach  any  meaning  to  it,  it  may  be 

believed,  but  without  understanding,  i.e., 
it  may  be  believed,  because  if  false  it  would 
contradict  something  which  is  otherwise 
known  to  be  true,  or  it  may  be  taken  on 
Authority;  but 

(b)  if  we  cannot  attach  any  meaning  to  it  at  all, 

belief  is  imix)ssible. 
Now,  in  which  of  these  senses,  is  it  inconceivable 
that  two  straight  lines  should  enclose  a  space  ?  Evi- 
dently in  the  first  sense,  the  attributes  given  are 
incompatible — straightness  does  not  accord  with  the 
enclosure  of  space.  In  the  second  sense  of  the  term, 
the  Antipodes  were  inconceivable  to  our  forefathers. 
They  could  indeed  form  a  picture  of  them,  but  they 
were  debarred  from  believing  in  them  because  all  ex- 

*  "  Examination,"  pp.  83-89. 

If 

K 


130 


THE   METxiPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


perience  hitherto  had  pointed  in  m  opposite  direction. 
Here  possibly  the  association  of  Ideas  generated  by 
experience  is   quite  adequate   to  explain  the  incon- 
ceivability.    Is  it  sufficient  to  explain  inconceivability 
in  the  first  sense,  where  inconceivable=unpictiir<abIe  ; 
or  where,  in  other  words,  it  seems  to  go  clean  against 
the  forms  of  the  thinking  mind  itself?     Mill  says  it 
is.*     "We   cannot    conceive    two    straight    lines    as 
enclosing  a  space,  because    enclosing  a  space  means 
approaching  and  meeting  a  second    time;    and    the 
mental  image  of  two  straight  lines  which  have  once 
met,  is  inseparably  associated  with  the  representation 
of  them  as  diverging."      And  again,  t   "  AVe  should 
probably  have  no  difficulty  in  putting  together  the  two 
ideas  supposed  to  be  incompatible,  if  our  experience 
bad  not  first  inseparably  associated  one  of  them  with 
the  contradictory  of  the  other." 

This  is,  of  course,  simply  an  assertion,  not  even 
adequately  supported  by  instances,  for  the  instances 
come  mainly  from  the  second  sense  of  the  term  incon- 
ceivable. It  is  therefore  certainly  incumbent  upon  us 
to  examine  it  somewhat  further. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  noticed,  that  not  only 
is  the  common  consciousness  of  mankind  opposed  to 
such  a  travesty  of  the  terms  "necessity,"  "universality," 
«  inconceivabihty  of  the  opposite,"  but  also  philo- 
soBhers.    Leibnitz  and  Hobbes,  for  instance,  despairing 

♦  «  Examiimtioii,"  p.  85.  f  Ibid.  p.  85. 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


131 


of  getting  "necessity"  and  "universality"  out  of  a 
synthesis  of  experiences,  attempt  to  get  them  out  of 
an  analysis  of  consciousness.  According  to  this  theory, 
the  axioms  (and  all  Necessary  Truth),  are  merely  Ana- 
lytic judgments,  we  are  merely  analysing  what  we 
mean  by  the  name.  But  Mill  expressly  rejects  this 
view.  With  him.  Axioms  are  synthetic,  i.e.,  more  is 
expressed  in  the  predicate  than  is  stated  in  the  sub- 
ject, and  yet,  propositions  which  add  to  our  knowledge 
(synthetic)  attain  to  universality  and  necessity  by 
adding  experience  to  experience. 

Kant  simply  falls  back  on  these  tests,  as  all  suffi- 
cient ;  where  we  have  synthetic  judgments,  as  these 
axioms  are,  and  yet  judgments  which  are  necessary  and 
universal,  there  we  may  be  sure,  according  to  Kant,  of 
"  a  priori "  action  of  the  mind. 

Even  Herbert  Spencer*  opposes  Mill  on  this  point. 
With  him,  the  inconceivability  of  the  contradictory  is 
the  ultimate  basis  of  all  beliefs.  It  is  the  universal 
postulate.  "  Whenever  the  contradictory  of  a  Propo- 
sition is  inconceivable,  that  Proposition  must  be  accepted 
as  true."  Being  then  the  final  ground  of  all  our  be- 
liefs, intuitive  as  well  as  inferential,  it  must  be  that 
of  axioms  among  the  rest. 

Let  us  approach  this  question  from  another  side. 


*  H.  Spencer's  "  PsyclioL^gj,"'  vol.  ii.,p.  400  and  following.  So 
too  G.  H.  Lewes,  "  History  of  I'hilosophy,"  Introduciiou  "  The  Test 
of  Truth." 


132 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


According  to  Mill,  the  necessity  and  universality  of 
axioms  are  due  to  an  inseparable  association  of  ideas  in 
experience.     Evidently,  unless  the  Association  is  inse- 
parable. Experience  cannot  generate  universality  and 
necessit}-.     Now,  does  experience  testify  to  the  truth  of 
these  axioms  so  constantly  as  to  be  able  to  produce 
inseparable  associations  ?     Why  they  are  contradicted, 
80  far  as  experience  goes,  constantly,  and  as  a  frequent 
matter  of  observation.     "  Every  child  who  looks  down 
a  long  street,  sees  two  parallel  right  lines  converging. 
Every  one  who  puts  a  straight  rule  into  water,  may 
observe  that  a  crooked  line  is  the  shortest  way  between 
two  points  (its  extremities)."*    What  is  the  mental 
process  in  such  cases  ?     We  believe  in  our  axioms  even 
when  experience  contradicts  them,— as  against  and  in 
the  teeth  of  experience.     Mill's   own  illustration   of 
railway  lines  wliich  seem  to  meet  is  an  instance  in 

point. 

It  may  be  said,  that  in  these  cases,  we  correct  one 
experience  by  another,  but  that  throughout  we  never 
leave  the  field  of  experience.  But  the  question  is, 
how  inseparable  associations  are  formed,  and  Mill  tells 
lis  that  unless  experience  is  invariable,  no  inseparable 
association  can  be  formed.  "  Uniformities  of  sequence 
in  which  the  phenomena  succeed  one  another  only  at  a 
certain  interval,  do  not  give  rise  to  inseparable  asso- 
ciations."   And  again,  "  Had  but  experience  afforded 

*  Cf.  MahafEy's  *»  Fischer  oe  Kant"    Introduction,  p.  xxvii 


MATHEMATICAL  AXIOMS. 


133 


an  illusion,  the  counter-association  formed  might  have 
been  sufficient  to  render  the  reverse  supposition  pos- 
sible." But  here,  experience  does  afford  illusions, 
therefore  inseparable  associations  cannot  be  formed. 
Therefore  experience  cannot  lead  up  to  Necessity 
and  Universality  and  Inconceivability  of  the  Opposite. 
The  fact  is,  as  it  seems  to  me,  that  whether  we 
compare  these  rigid  tests  with  the  associations  which 
experience  generates,  or  whether  taking  experience, 
we  see  whether  it  is  invariable  enough  to  produce 
inseparable  association  —  from  both  points  of  view, 
Necessary  Truth  remains  as  an  unique  testimony  to  a 
priori  mental  action,  depending  on  mental  forms,  in- 
dependent of  all  experience,  and  therefore  never  itself 
to  be  developed  out  of  experience. 


CHAPTER    IX. 


GENERAL  IDEAS. 


We  come  now  to  a  subject  whicli  brings  us  to  the 
borderland  of  Logic— that  of  the  formation  of  General 


''CIS. 


Mill's  view  on  this  question  is  to  be  gathered  from 
(1.)  Examination    of   Hamilton,    c.   xvii.    "On 

General  Concepts." 
(2.)  Logic.    Bk.  iv.,  c.  ii.,  "On  Abstraction,  or 
the  Formation  of  Conceptions." 
Tlie  last  chapter  may  be  dismissed  after  a  very  few 
words.     It  is  concerned  only  with  abstraction,  as  a 
Logical  process,  as  a  process  subsidary  to  Induction. 

One  pertinent  criticism  of  Whewell  may  be  noticed. 
Whewell  had  maintained  that  the  conception,  first 
formed  in  the  mind,  was  superinduced  upon  pheno- 
mena. Mill  asserts  that  it  is  only  gained  from 
phenomena.  General  concepts  are  always  gained  by 
abstraction  from  individual  objects,  whether  those 
individual  objects  be  the  very  things  we  are  examining, 
or  whether  they  be  things  whose  resemblances  we 


GENEEAL  IDEAS. 


135 


remember  to  have  noted  on  former  occasions,  which 
we  bring  in  to  help  out  our  present  investigation. 

The  metaphysical  question,  how  concepts  are  formed 
at  all,  or  whether  we  ought  to  speak  of  General  Ideas, 
or  only  of  General  Names,  Mill  does  not  discuss  in 
the  Logic.  To  discover  this  we  have  to  turn  to  the 
chapter  in  "  tlie  Examination." 

As  however  this  question  of  General  Ideas  has  a 
history — we  had  better  trace  its  origin  farther  back, 
and  let  Mill's  opinion,  as  divulged  in  this  chapter,  fall 
into  its  proper  historical  position,  as  that  of  a  modern 
Nominalist. 

To  the  Greeks,  the  possibility  of  knowledge  rested 
in  large  measure   on  the  existence  of  Universals  or 
General  Ideas.     This  was  the  direct  outcome  of,  and 
reaction  against,  the  Sceptical  tendencies  of  Sophistic 
thought,  with  the  stress  it  laid  on  individualism — indi- 
vidualism in  Logic,  Ethics,  and  Life.     To  Socrates  the 
only  safeguard  for  knowledge  was  the  recognition  of 
universal  concepts,  true  for  all  intelligence  and  not 
varying  with  the  variability  of  individuals.     And  so  it 
is  Socrates'  praise  in  the  mouth  of  Aristotle,  that  he 
insisted  on  tlie  importance,  not  only  of  eiraKTiKoi  koyoi 
but  also  of  TO  optCeaeai  Ka^oAou,— that  he  invented  a 
philosophy  of  Conceptualism.     After  him  the  artistic 
Hellenic  feeling  that  for  every  mental  idea  there  must 
be  found  an  external  counterpart,  gained  free  play.     If 
there  are  General  Ideas  in  the  mind  there  must  be 


1S6 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


general  things  or  Substantive  Ideas  in  the  Universe.  If 
tliere  are  siil»ji'ctive  tocat,  arrived  at  by  a  process  of 
comparison  and  division,  by  ^waycayr}  and  8tatp€o-tj, 
there  are  also  objective  ISe'at,  existing  for  Plato  in 
the  only  real  sense  of  "  existence," — in  an  intelligible 
world.  Illustrated  and  exi»lained  in  every  variety  of 
dialectical  exegesis  througliout  all  the  Platonic  dia- 
logues, nowhere  do  the  i5cat  stand  out  in  such  complete 
objective  presentation  as  in  the  Republic.  But  not 
only  are  these  universals  objective  and  real,  but  they 
are  the  only  reality:  single,  particular,  individual 
objects  fade  into  all  the  transitoriness  and  nothingness 
of  the  (l)aw6iJL€mp,  Tliis  was  the  extreme  expression  of 
what  was  known  afterwards  as  Realism,  or  the  doctrine 
of  "  Universalia  ante  rem  or  extra  rem." 

The  poetry  of  such  a  conception  survived  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  although  the  practical  exigencies  of 
Logic  demanded  its  demolition  at  the  hands  of 
Aristotle.  But  Aristotle  was  too  much  of  a  Platonist 
to  destroy  it  utterly.  In  his  controversial  moods  he 
says,  sternly  enough,  that  such  Universals  were  a  need- 
less reduplication  of  sensible  things,  were  practically 
useless,  and  untrue ;  and  then,  in  his  meditative  moods, 
he  tells  us,  as  in  the  Posterior  Analytics,  that  though 
the  individual  object  be  the  only  thing  perceived,  yet 
the  object  of  tlie  perception  is  not  the  individual  Callias, 
but  the  universal  roan.  The  only  reality  is  affirmed  to 
be  the  Hoc  Aliiiuid,  the  particular  sensible  thing,  and 


GENEEAL  IDEAS. 


137 


the  Universal  only  the  predicate  of  the  robe  tl  :  and 
yet  all  the  apxal  on  which  imarrifxr],  or  Science,  depends 
are  Generals  and  Universals,  Summa  Genera,  attainable 
only  by  vovs.  The  solution  of  the  antithesis  is  per- 
haps to  be  found  in  the  sentence  h  rotj  eiSeo-t  toIs 
aladyjTois  hi(TTi  irm  ra  ror^ra.  Kovs  is  implicit  in,  may 
be  developed  from  aludrjats.*  And  so  of  Aristotle's 
doctrine,  on  this  sulyect,  the  sum  is  that  he  supposed 
Universalia,  not  "  extra  rem  "as  Plato  did,  but  "in 


re. 


j» 


It  was  natural,  perhaps,  that  Media3valism,  with  its 
poetry,  its  constructive  imagination,  its  scientific  im- 
potence, should  remember  the  "Universalia,"  and  forget 
the  ''  in  re."  The  doctrines  of  Realism,t  at  all  events, 
flourished  in  the  Schools,  and  Scholasticism,  hand  in 
hand  with  Theology,  affirmed  by  the  mouths  of  Anselm, 
Aquinas,  and  Duns  Scotus,  the  existence  of  Universals 
in  nature,  as  realities,  apart  from  and  greater  than 
individual  realities. 

The  reaction  came  in  the  rise  of  Nominalism.  These 
Universalia  were  not  *'  ante  rem,"  or  "  in  re,"  but  mere 
"nomina,"  "names"  applied  for  our  convenience,  hold- 
ing together  a  mass  of  particulars  solely  by  the  strength 
of  the  common  name  applied.     They  are  voceSy  said 


*  Arist.,  De  An.  iii. 

t  I  need  scarcely  say  tliat  "  Realism  "  in  this  sense  is  different  from 
the  sense  in  which  I  have  used  it  as  applicable  to  the  doctrines  of 
"  Common  Sense.'' 


138 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


Roscellin.  Tliej^  are  .^^enmneSj  said  Abelard.  Tliey  are 
only  "  in  meiite,"  said  William  of  Ockliam.  "  Eiitia 
1100  miiltiplicanda  sunt  pnBter  necessitatem."  Logic, 
Science,  the  Modern  Spirit  were  all  on  tlie  side  of  tlie 
Nominalists,  and  Realism  fell. 

It  left  not  itself  without  witness,  liowever,  in  the 
modern  world,   in    the    doctrines  of    so-cjilled   Con- 
cept ualism.     But,  though  the  inlieritor  of  Realism,  the 
whole  point  of  view  is  changed.     For  "  Universal ia" 
in  Nature  being  denied   and  discredited,  the  modern 
question    became,    not    whether    there    are    or    are 
not   in   Nature   essences    and    quiddities,  but  ratlier 
what  is  the  process  of  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  ? 
Are  these  General  Ideas  in  tlie  Mind  abstracted  from 
particulars  of  Sense-perception?     Or  is  it  truer  to  say 
that,  after  observation  of  plienomena,  we  choose  to 
apply  not  General  Ideas,  but  merely  General  Names  ? 
If  ft.  b.  c.  be  observed  singly  and  separately,  is  the  ahc 
with  which  we  sum  up  the  result,  a  general  idea  formed 
in  tlie  mind,  or  a  general  name  formed,  as  convenience 
suggests,   by  dropping    out   individual   peculiarities? 
Thus  the  modern  contest  of  Conceptualism  and  Nomi- 
nalism is  waged    round   the  origin  and    process   of 
Knowledge,  while  the  anciest  contest  of  Realism  and 
Nominalism  was  waged  round  the  constitution  of  the 
external  world.      Descartes    and    the  Cartesians  are 
Conceptualists ;  Hobbes  is  a  Nominalist ;  Locke  is  a 
Nominalist  in  tendency  and  a  Conceptualist  in  expres- 


GENEBAL  IDEAS. 


139 


sion  ("  words  become  general  by  being  made  the  signs 
of  general  ideas.")*  Berkeley  and  Hume  are  both 
claimed  as  Nominalists,  Reid  and  Hamilton  are,  for 
all  practical  purposes,  Conceptualists. 

We  come  now,  historically  to  the  position  of  Mill. 
The  chapter  on  "  Concepts  "  is  a  criticism  on  Hamil- 
ton's position  in  this  question.  Hamilton,  somewhat 
infelicitonsly,  attempted  to  coml)iiie  the  doctrines  of 
Conceptualism  and  Nominalism.  He  is,  in  reality, 
says  Mill,  a  Conceptualist,  yet  lie  quotes  with  appro- 
bation Berkeley's  words  in  the  "  Principles,"  in  which 
that  philosopher  confesses  that  if  others  have  "  this 
wonderful  power  of  abstracting  their  ideas,"  they  best 
can  tell,  but  for  himself  he  has  no  such  power. 

There  are  two  arguments  by  which  Hamilton  defends 
the  possibility  of  General  Concepts. 

(i.)  General  Concepts  are  objects  of  the  Thinking 
Faculty  (Begriff),  not  objects  of  the  Imagining 
Faculty  (Anschauung).  If  we  had  only  the  Imagin- 
ing Faculty  we  should  never  get  beyond  a  series  of 
individuals  and  particulars ;  by  the  aid  of  the  Think- 
ing Faculty  we  gain  General  Concepts.  Thus  though 
Imagination  cannot  figure  to  itself  anything  general 
or  universal,  Tliought  Proper,  or  the  Comparative 
Faculty,  or  the  Understanding,  can. 

This  Mill  denies.  The  distinction  is  one,  he  thinks, 
which  would  not  be  admitted  by  Berkeley,  or  any  of 

♦  "  Essay,"  bk.  iii.  c.  iii. 


140 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


GENERAL  IDEAS. 


141 


ftjt>^ 


the  great  Nominalist  thinkers,  any  more  than  it  would 
be  by  himself. 

(ii.)  The  second  argument  is  that  a  Concept  is  really 
a  mental  relation  between  individual  things.  Thougli 
things  be  indi¥idual,  the  relation  can  be  general  or 
nniversal.  Mill  replies  tliat  a  relation  must  mean  a 
gelation  between  things :  and  if  the  things  are  in- 
dividual, so  is  the  relation.  It  follows,  too,  that  a 
relation  cannot  be  thought  witliout  thinking  the  re- 
lated objects,  and  the  related  ol>jects  being  thought  as 
individual,  the  relation  itself  is  thought  as  individual. 

After  these  criticisms  on  Hamilton,  Mill  states  his 
own  position,  the  usual  Nominalist  doctrine.  It  is 
this  *  "  The  formation  of  a  Concept  does  not  consist 
in  separating  the  attributes  which  are  said  to  compose 
it,  from  all  other  attributes  of  the  same  object,  and 
enabling  us  to  conceive  those  attributes,  disjoined  from 
any  others.  We  neither  conceive  them  nor  think 
them,  or  cognise  them  in  any  way  as  a  thing  apart, 
but  solely  as  forming  the  idea  of  an  individual  object." 
General  Concepts,  therefore,  we  have,  properly,  none ; 
we  have  only  complex  ideas  of  objects  in  the  concrete ; 
we  are  only  thinking  of  individual  objects,  but  we  can 
attend  exclusively  to  some  part  of  the  concrete  idea. 
And  what  enables  us  to  do  this  is  the  employment  of 
Signs  and  especially  of  Names. 

There  are  one  or  two  criticisms  which  might  be 

•  **  ExamiEatioE,"  p.  377. 


made  on  the  way  in  which  Mill  treats  Hamilton.     In 
the  first  place,  Mill  quotes  from  Berkeley's  "  Intro- 
duction  to   Principles    of   Human   Knowledge,"    the 
section  10  which  is  generally  quoted — so  far  as  it  goes 
a  very  clear  enunciation  of  a  Nominalist  position.     But 
another  section  (section  15)  introduces  a  point  of  view 
not  strictly  in  harmony  with  a  consistent  Nominalism. 
"A  word  becomes  general,"  Berkeley  thinks,  ''  by  in- 
volving a  symbolical  relation  to  other  things."     *'  Uni- 
versality does  not  consist  in    the    absolute  positive 
nature  of  anything  but  in  the  relation  it  bears  to  the 
particulars  signified  or  represented  by  it:   by  virtue 
whereof  things  particular  are  rendered  universal."     It 
is  clear  then  that  to  Berkeley  ^^  ideas  "  in  themselves 
particular  are  universalised  by  their  relations^ — the 
apprehension  of  relations  being  the  essence  of  general 
knowledge.     If  such  is  Berkeley's  position,  it  is  obvious 
that  he  is  not  a  Nominalist  in  the  sense  in  which  Mill 
takes  him  to  be.     Such  a  position  as  is  disclosed  in 
the  sentences  given  above  explains,  in  reality,  what 
Hamilton  was  aiming  at,  in  describing  General  Ideas 
as  relations. 

Mill's  criticism  on  the  doctrine,  which  resolves 
General  Ideas  intorelations,  shows  clearly  how  little  he 
attempted  to  realise  what  Hamilton  (and  Berkeley 
before  him)  had  meant  by  the  word  "  relation."  If  "re- 
lation" only  means  a  link  connecting  two  things,  it  is 
possible  that  if  the  things  are  particular  and  individual, 


142 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OP   M,ILL. 


GENERAL  IDEAS. 


143 


the  link  may  be  particular  and  individual  also.  But 
*'  relation  "  does  not  only  mean  "  link  of  connection :  '* 
it  means  "aspects,"  "ways"  of  regarding  things. 
"  Relations  established  between  things,"  means  the 
things  grasped  and  held  togetlier  l»y  a  conception  or 
conceptions.  Relation  is  only  another  way  of  speak- 
ing of  "  mental  forms."  If  this  is  the  meaning  which 
Hamilton  gave  (or  intended  to  give)  to  tlie  word,  the 
criticism  of  Mill  does  not  hit  the  point  at  all.  How- 
ever particular  and  individual  the  things  may  be,  the 
view,  the  aspect  in  w^hich  they  are  regarded  is  not 
individual  and  particular.  The  mental  form,  the 
mould,  as  it  were,  in  which  the  things  are  run,  is  on 
the  contrary  necessarily  general  and  universal.  01>jects, 
as  Berkeley  seems  to  have  thouglit,  in  themselves  par- 
ticular, are  universalised  by  their  relations. 

This  too  explains  what  Hamilton  meant  by  that 
"potential  generality"  or  "universality"  of  certain 
things,  of  which  Mill  is  so  incredulous.  It  is  exactly 
what  Berkeley  said  when  he  spoke  of  things  involving 
a  symbolical  relation  to  other  things.  All  that  is  meant 
is  that  a  triangle  may  be  taken  to  stand  for  any  and 
every  triangle ;  we  may  reason  about  it,  draw  deduc- 
tions from  it,  applicable  to  all  triangles,  with  perfect 
truth.  Why?  Because  the  triangle  is  potentially, 
though  not  actually,  universal.  Because  the  particular 
triangle  "doth  equally  stand  for  and  represent  all  recti- 
lineal triangles  whatever." 


/ 


And  finally  we  see  now  Hamilton's  distinction  be- 
tween Imagination  and  Thought — between  "  Anschau- 
ung"  and  "  Begriff  "  in  reference  to  this  question,  though, 
by  a  verbal  slip,  he,  as  Mill  points  out,  afterwards  con- 
founds the  two.     A  particular  individual  triangle  is  a 
matter  for  the  Imaginative  faculty,  the  Anschauung  to 
present.    It  must  be  a  triangle  of  some  one  kind,  either 
scalene,  or  isosceles,  or  equiangular.      The  potential 
universality  of  that   triangle,  its    symbolical  relation 
to   all  other  triangles,   cannot  be  presented  by  the 
Imaginative  faculty.     It  is  a  matter  for  thouglit,  for 
Begriff.     Or  in  other  words,  that  concej)tion  of  rela- 
tions, which  is  the  essence  of  knowledge,  is  the  work 
of  something  higher  than  Sense  or  Imagination  or  any 
purely  Presentative  faculty ;  it  is  the  work  of  Mind  or 
Thought,  imposing  its  own  forms  on  the  chaotic  mate- 
rials of  Sense. 

Tlie  real  elucidation  of  the  question  of  Conceptualism 
or  Nominalism  is  not  reached,  until  w^e  answer  the  pre- 
liminary question,  What  is  the  course  or  progress  of 
acquiring  Knotvledge?  Does  Knowledge  proceed  from 
the  Abstract  to  the  Concrete,  or  from  the  Concrete  to 
the  Abstract  ? 

Locke,  Hume,  Mill  and  all  Nominalists  assume  that 
the  last  is  the  true  answer.  First  individual,  concrete, 
objects,  then  abstractions  from  these,  in  so  called 
ideas.  From  this  point  of  view,  of  course,  the  ideas, 
being  mere  copies  of  things,  cannot  contain  more  than 


144 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


tlie  tilings  from  whicli  tliey  are  derived.  There  cannot, 
for  instance,  be  ideas  really  general  or  universal,  because 
tbis  would  be  to  add  something,  not  accounted  for  by 
tlie  particular,  individual  things  of  which  they  are  the 
copies.  Hence  tbe  Nominalist  doctrine  that  whatever 
generality  or  uuiversality  we  have  or  seem  to  have  in 
our  ideas,  is  a  mere  generality  or  universality  of  Name. 
Knowled*?e  is  from  Concrete  to  Abstract,  and  concrete 
things  being  individual,  the  abstract  ideas  are  in  reality 
merely  individual  also. 

Take  tlie  other  assumption  and  the  question  must  be 
differently  answered.  For  now^  the  assumption  is  that 
the  course  of  knowledge  is  from  Abstract  to  Concrete ; 
that  in  the  first  stages  we  have  vague  generalities, 
indefinite  and  undefined  relations,  and  that  the  develop- 
ment of  knowledge,  by  Comparison,  by  the  exercise  of  the 
Comparative  or  Rational  faculty,  leads  to  the  increas- 
in*'  definiteness  of  these  early  aud  vague  specifications 
until  is  reached  the  Concrete  Individual  Thing.  For 
an  Individual  Thing,  a  Concrete  thing,  is,  in  reality, 
very  complex  and  by  no  means  simple,  or  immediately 
cognised.  A  Concrete  Individual  Tiling  has  a  mass  of 
relations  with  other  things,  which  keep  it  in  its  Indi- 
viduality, relating  it  to,  differentiating  it  from,  all 
other  things.  It  cannot  therefore  be  an  early  product 
of  knowledge.  First  there  is  the  chaos  of  Sense- 
impressions  into  which  the  Mind  brings  order,  by 
imposing  forms  and  relations  and  categories.     Then 


*■% 


GENEEAL  IDEAS. 


145 


from  the  action  and  re-action  of  Sense-impressions 
and  Thought-relation,  arises  the  definite  Individual 
Thin"-.    The  course  of  knowledge  is  from  Abstract  to 

Concrete. 

Let  us  apply  this  to  the  case  before  us.  Let  us 
take  any  general  Proposition.  Every  triangle  has  its 
three  interior  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles.  This 
general  proposition  is  based,  we  say,  on  the  general  idea 
of  a  triangle.  How  has  this  general  proposition 
arisen?  It  has  arisen  from  a  certain  *' analysis  in 
reflection "  *  of  our  general  idea  of  a  triangle.  Our 
idea  of  a  triangle  is  due  to  "  the  unconscious  synthesis 
of  Perception."  The  Perception  of  a  triangle  is  the 
result  of  certain  relations  being  imposed  on  sense- 
impressions.  These  relations  are  imposed  almost  un- 
consciously, the  normal  process  in  perception  being 
in  all  cases  alike.  The  general  proposition  then  is 
the  result  of  an  analysis  in  reflection  of  that  synthesis, 
or  imposing  of  relations,  which  goes  on  unconsciously 
in  perception. 

First  knowledge  is  abstract,  then  it  is  concrete ;  first 
it  is  an  undigested  mass  of  general  relations,  then  it  is 
definite  individualisation.  First  there  is  the  general 
abstract  idea  of  a  triangle ;  then  (and  only  in  the 
second  place)  there  is  the  special  individual  triangle 
whether  scalene  or  isosceles  or  equiangular.  When  after 
all  this  process  is  concluded  (almost  unconsciously)  we 

♦  Cf.  Professor  Green's  "  Introduction  to  Hume,"  p.  183. 


146 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MILL. 


make  a  general  proposition  and  enquire  on  what  it  rests, 
and  what  account  we  arc  to  give  of  it,  we  answer  that 
it  is  due  to  reflective  analysis — reflection  analysing  the 
general  relations  imposed  when  knowledge  was  in  its 
abstract  stage. 

To  ask  then,  are  General  Ideas  possible  ?  is  a  need- 
less question.  For  general  ideas  are  of  course  abstract 
ideas :  and  knowledge  is  abstract  before  it  becomes 
individual  and  concrete.  To  make  General  Ideas 
merely  individual  ideas,  with  some  specific  properties 
dropped  out,  is  to  confuse  the  later  stages  of  know- 
ledge with  the  earlier :  to  make  the  course  of  knowledge 
proceed  from  the  Concrete  to  the  Abstract,  instead  of 
(as  it  really  does)  from  the  Abstract  to  the  Concrete. 

If  all  this  be  so,  we  can  see  how  it  acts  upon  the 
Theory  of  Syllogistic  reasoning.  For  the  Theory  of 
the  Syllogism  is  really  an  answer  to  the  question, 
what  is  the  place  of  General  Ideas  in  reasoning  ?  Mill, 
consistently  with  his  views  of  General  Ideas,  has  to 
deny  to  the  Major  Premiss  any  logical  merit  as  that 
from  which  the  conclusion  is  proved.  The  conclusion 
does  not  follow  from  the  Major  Premiss,  according  to 
Mill.  The  Major  Premiss  is  but  a  register,  a  memo- 
randum of  that,  to  which  experience  has  testified 
hitherto.  When  we  say,  "  All  men  are  mortal,  Socrates 
is  a  man,  therefore  Socrates  is  mortal,"  the  conclusion 
does  not  follow  from  the  assertion  that  all  men  are 
mortal,  but  that  assertion  is  proved  concurrently  with 


GENEEAL  IDEAS. 


147 


the  conclusion,  by  the  course  of  experience.  Mill  could 
not  say  otherwise.  As  there  are  no  General  Ideas, 
knowledge  must  of  course  be  a  course  of  inference  from 
Particular  to  Particular.  But  if  there  are,  after  all. 
General  Ideas,  as  the  Conceptualist  imagines,  it  is  a 
different  thing.  Then  the  Major  Premiss  becomes 
something  more  than  a  mere  register,  a  memorandum. 
To  it  in  a  very  real  sense  is  due  the  conclusion.  The 
"  mortality  "  which  we  now  formally  predicate  of  man  is 
the  recognition  by  reflective  analysis  of  those  early 
relations,  by  which  we  made  real  and  intelligible  to 
ourselves  our  conceptions  of  humankind. 


EPILOGUE. 


149 


^iigiir  II Jill  iJlii«JLJfcwi*JLi     imBw'  JLmJJLiV  ■■'fci  li*  * 

EPILOGUE. 

With  tlie  questions  of  "Necessary  Truth,"  and 
"  General  Concepts,"  an  inquiry  into  the  metaphysical 
foundations  of  MilPs  Philosophy  necessarily  ends.  The 
special  logical  doctrines  of  Mill's  "  System  of  Logic  "  I 
have  not  the  power  or  the  wish  to  criticise.  It  is,  in 
fact,  part  of  the  contention  of  the  foregoing  pages,  tliat 
the  logical  doctrines  stand  on  a  different  basis,  as 
compared  with  the  psychological  doctrines  revealed 
whether  in  criticisms  of  Hamilton,  or  expositions  of 
James  Mill.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  me  to  discuss  that 
gravest  of  metaphysical  questions,  which  forms  the 
subject  of  Mill's  posthumous  volume  on  Nature  and 
Keligion.  Two  remarks  may  be  ventured  on.  In  the 
irst  place,  it  is  not  hard  to  discover  in  Mill's  views  as  to 
God  the  result  of  those  radical  defects  of  Sensationalism, 
which  are  to  be  found  in  other  parts  of  his  philosophical 
scheme.  It  would  be  difficult,  indeed,  for  Sensationalism, 
with  its  two  dogmas  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Individual, 
and  the  supremacy  of  Sensation,  to  arrive  at  any  such 


conceptions  of  the  Absolute,  and  the  Infinite,  and  the 
Super-sensual,  as  are  implied  in  the  philosophical  (and 
popular)  belief  in  the  great  First  Cause.     The  attempt 
has  twice  been  made  by  English  Sensationalists,  and 
the  result  has  not  been  encouraging.    In  Locke,*  the  in- 
consistency of  a  quasi-materialism  on  the  one  side,  and 
a  proof  of  God,  which  rests  on  the  existence  of  Spirit, 
on   the    other,    is    too  obvious    and   apparent:    and 
Berkeley's  proof  of  God,t  makes  the  conception  rest  on 
just  those  "  presuppositions  of  Faith,"  on  which,  in 
reality,  is  based  his  doctrine  of  Mind  or  Spirit.  Hume, 
with  his  clear-headed  logic,  and  directness  of  vision, 
knew  too  well  the  limits  of  the  sensationalistic  system. 
The  other  remark  is,  that  Mill's  view  of  Nature— 
in  which  the  absence  of  all  feeling  of  the  beauty  of  the 
Natural  World  is  so  significant  a  feature— is  perhaps 
explained  by  the  deficiency  of  any  systematic  treat- 
ment of  the  Emotions,  which  is  a  peculiar  charac- 
teristic of  nearly  all  the  so-called  English  Psychological 
School,  with  the  exception  of  Bain.  In  Mill's  own  case, 
the  complete  subjection  of  his  own  mind  in  its  earlier 
stages  to  that  of  his  Mher  (from  which  it  comes  that 
MiU  has  no  Psychology  of  his  own  at  all,  but  only  an 
adapted  version  of  the  ''  Analysis  "  of  James  Mill),  and 
the  peculiar  suppression  of  emotional  culture,  which  his 
education  exhibited,  go  far  to  explain  these  and  other 

•  «  Essay, "  b.  4,  c.  3,  para.  6.  Cf.  b.  1,  c.  4,  para  8,  and  b.  4  c.  10. 
+  Cf.  "  Siris,"  ajid  "  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,    sec.  Jb. 


I'dO 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


EPILOGUE. 


151 


points,  as  well  in  his  Philosophy,  as  in  his  Life. 
*•  The  Autohiography  "  should  he  read  side  hy  side  with 
the  **  Three  Essays  on  Religion."* 

To  speak  of  systems  of  Philosophy  as  "  transitional," 
is  the  easy  and  possibly  the  historical  method,  when 
they  include  some  curious  inconsistencies.     If  such  a 
method  may  he  employed  here,  Mill's  system  may  justly 
be  termed  "  transitional."     Sensationalism  is  the  early 
phase  of  English  philosophy,  Scientific  Empiricism  is 
the  later.     The  difference  is  exactly  measured  by  the 
rise  and  study  of  Biology.     Sensationalism  is  empiri- 
cism minm  Biology ;  scientific  empiricism  is  empiri- 
cism pirn  Biology.      Hume  forms  the  apex,   as  it 
were,  of  the  early  phase ;  the  later  phase  reaches  its 
culmination  in  works  like  G.  H.  Lewes'  "  Problems  of 
Life  and  Mind,"  and  the  "  Physical  Basis  of  Mind." 
Mill  stands  between  the  earlier  and  the  later,  he  is 
not  a  pure  Sensationalist,   and  he  is  not  a  scientific 
Empiricist.     And  so,  if  we  judge  him  by  an  absolute 
standard,  he  is  doubly  wrong,— wrong  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  earlier  philosophers,  and  wron;?  from  the 
point   of  view  of  the  later.    But  if  we  view  him 
historically,  according  to  a  relative  standard,  he  becomes 
a  true  and  valuable  link  of  connection  showing  how 
sensationalism  merges  itself  into  a  scientific  empiricism. 
His  work  is,  in  fact,  "  transitional" 

*  Cl  Autobiography,  p,  148.  •*  I  wanted  a  culture  of  the  emotions." 
Cf.  however,  p.  147. 


1 


Many  indications  may  be  found  in  his  philosophy, 
which  yield  this  result,  besides  some  of  those  we  have 
been  in  past  pages   considering.     The  characteristic 
principle  of  Sensationalism  is  the  passivity  of  Sense, 
the  passivity  of  Mind,  and  thence  comes  all  the  difii- 
culty  of  understanding  how  a  purely  receptive  and  pas- 
sive mind  can  "relate"  one  feeling  to  another,  can 
differentiate  and  discriminate  different  sensations,  can 
associate   one   with  another.      Biology  has   radically 
altered  the  problem.     For  now,  instead  of  "  a  passive 
receptivity  of  sense,"  we  hear  of  "  a  nervous  organisa- 
tion," which  is  active ;  we  hear  of  an  organic  classifica- 
tion of  relations,  whereby  the  perceptions  of  difference 
and  similarity  are  the  first  constituents  of  conscious- 
ness.    '^  To  rest  with  the  unqualified  assertion,"  says 
Herbert  Spencer,  "  that  antecedent  to  experience,  the 
mind  is  a  blank,  is  to  ignore  the  questions— Whence 
comes  the  power  of  organising  experiences  ?— If  at 
birth  there  exists  nothing  but  a  passive  receptivity  of 
impressions,  why  is  not  a  horse  as  educable  as  a  man  ? 
Understood  in  its  current  form,  the  experience-hypo- 
thesis  implies  that  the  presence  of  a  definitely-organised 
nervous  system  is  a  circumstance  of  no  moment — a 
fiict,  not  needing  to  be  taken  into  account !   Yet  it  is  the 
all-important  fact— the  fact  to  which,  in  one  sense,  the 
criticisms  of  Leibnitz   and  others  pointed— the  fact, 
without  which  such  an  assimilation  of  experiences  is 


\ 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF    MILL. 


EPILOGUE. 


153 


inexplicable."  *  And  Lewes,  too,  is  equally  clear  on 
this  point  He  discriminates  between  "sensation 
properly  so-called,"  and  what  he  terms  "  ideation  "  (or 
the  faculty  of  having  ideas),  and  he  pertinently  asks 
« If  the  mind  is  '  a  tabula  rasa '  as  to  knowledge,  and 
is  not  even  pre-existent  as  a  faculty  (according  to  the 
metaphysicians)  or  as  organism  (according  to  the 
biologists),  if,  in  a  word,  sensations  and  combinations 
of  sensations  create  both  knowledge  and  the  knowing 
faculties,  how  can  we  explain  the  phenomena  of 
idiocy  ?  "  f  Compared  with  this  empirical  development, 
Mill's  psychological  criticisms  of  Hamilton  are  some- 
what antiquated.  Hear  him  in  a  later  work,  standing 
before  Mr.  Bain's  psychological  labours  and  comment- 
ing on  what  to  him  is  a  new  revelation.  *' Those 
who  have  studied  the  writings  of  the  Association 
Psychologists,  must  have  often  been  unfavourably 
impressed  by  the  almost  total  absence,  in  their 
analytical  expositions,  of  the  recognition  of  any  active 
element,  as  spontaneity,  in  the  mind  itself"  J 

Besides  the  direct  contribution  of  Biology  to  Psy- 
chology in  the  shape  of  a  "definitely-constituted 
nervous  organism,"  there  is  also  the  indirect  result  of 
the  study  of  Heredity.  "  Hereditary  transmission," 
with  all  that  it  entails,  is  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous 

•  H.  Spencer's  *'  Psychology,*'  vol.  i.,  pp.  467,  468. 

t  Lewes,  on  "  Condillac, '  "  History  of  I'hilosophy,"  vol.  ii. 

t  Mill's  *'  Dissertations  and  Discussions,"  toI.  iii.,  art.  on  *'  Bain." 


II 


principle  of  modern  scientific  empiricism.     It  is  this 
which  explains,  or  is  believed  to  explain,  the  long- 
debated  question  of  "  Mental  Forms,"  and  reconciles, 
as  3Ir.  Herbert  Spencer  says  in  ''  First  Principles," 
the  school  of  Kant  with  the  school  of  Locke,  and  allows 
the  long-arrested  development  of  Psychology  to  begin 
anew.     For  the  "  priority  "  of  Forms  is  shown  to  be  a 
mere  logical  priority, — the  explanation  being  that  they 
have  been  developed  by  a  long  course  of  experiences  in 
the  race.     In  other    words,    in    these    and   kindred 
problems  the  great  conception  of  Historical  Evolution 
plays  an  important  part.     But  Mill,  as  we  have  before 
noticed,  is  strangely  uninfluenced  by  the  importance  of 
Evolution  in  Psychology.     In  this  matter,  he  is  still  a 
Sensationalist,  still  clings  to  the  individual  experience 
of  Locke  and  Berkeley  and  Hume,   instead  of  the 
universal    Race-experience  of   Herbert  Spencer  and 
Lewes.     Very  noteworthy,  from  this  point  of  view,  is 
his  admiration  of  Comte's  historical  law  of  Progress ; 
his  surprise  at  the  daring  generalisation  of  an  evolution 
of  Thought.*     In   the  matter  of  later  research  into 
*^  nervous  organisations "  and  so  forth,  he  is  full  of 
surprise  and  admiration  at  Bain ;  in  the  conception  of 
Development,  he  is  full  of  surprise  and  admiration  at 
Comte.     These  are  exactly  the  characteristics  of  a  man 
who  forms  a  link  between  two  phases  of  a  philosophical 
sj^stem,  who   connects  together  Sensationalism    and 

*  In  "  Comte  and  Positivism." 


IM. 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MILL. 


EPILOGUE. 


155 


Scientific  Empiricism.  A  follower  of  Hume,  lie  yet 
sees  the  imperfections  of  Sensationalism  (as  e.r/.  in  the 
doctrine  of  "  Causation "  ) :  a  pioneer  of  Herbert 
Spencer  and  Lewes,  lie  admires  from  a  distance  bio- 
logical analysis,  and  historical  evolution. 

For,  to  those  who  are  conversant  with  later  specu- 
lations, it  is  clear  that  the  relation  between  Idealism 
and  Sensationalism  is  a  somewhat  different  matter  to 
the  attitude  which  the  metaphysician  must  adopt 
before  the  scientific  empiricism  and  biology  of  the 
later  school.  In  this  particular  instance  of  hereditary 
transmission  of  "  Forms,"  it  is  of  course,  open  to  an 
objector  to  mj  that  it  only  puts  the  difficulty  a  stage 
further  liack, — and  that  we  nm  want  to  know  how  the 
first  man  who  opened  bis  eyes  on  the  natural  world 
proceeded  to  systematise  liis  experience,  whereas  we 
took  before,  a  man  of  the  present  time,  to  serve  as 
subject  for  psychological  analysis.  But  it  is  clear  that 
such  an  answer  will  not  be  in  any  way  satisfactory  to 
the  biologist,  nor  does  it  show  much  comprehension 
of  the  bearings  of  Evolution.  Foi:  the  reply  that  will 
be  made  will  be  that  Intelligence  is  itself  based,  by 
Evolution,  on  Instinct,  and  Instinct  on  still  lower 
automatic  functions,  and  that  consequently  "  Mental 
forms"  were,  possibly,  in  process  of  construction  in 
much  lower  organisms  than  Man.  That  the  meta- 
physician has  his  own  unanswerable  analysis  of  Con- 
sciousness, and  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  is,  of  course. 


undoubted ;  if  it  were  proved,  perfectly  incontestably, 
that  man  is  developed  from  apes,  or  skin-bags,  it  is 
none  the  less  true  that  the  consciousness  which  makes 
us  men,  is  independent  of  time  and  development :  but 
that  the  methods  of  Empiricism  in  the  hands  of  a 
Lewes,  are  not  the  same  as  those  in  the  hands  of  a 
Mill,  is  a  point  which,  though  clear  enough  (especially 
after  a  perusal  of  the  imitators  of  Spencer),  seems  to 
have  been  hardly  sufficiently  considered.  Just  in  the 
same  way.  Scientific  Materialism  has  its  own  special 
views  in  Ethical  theory,*  which  are  by  no  means  the 
same  as  the  Ethics  of  Mill, — a  point  which  is  equally 
forgotten  by  those,  who  think  that  in  answering 
utilitarianism,  they  are  answering  the  moral  problems 
of  physiologists.  Evolution  and  "  a  nervous  organisa- 
tion" play  as  much  part  in  Ethics,  as  they  do  in 
problems  of  knowledge. 

It  is  this  transitional  character  of  Mill's  philo- 
sophical system  which  makes  it,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
so  imperfect  an  instrument  of  education.  For  the 
belief  is  common  that  Mill  is  the  modern  experi- 
mental philosopher  />ar  excellence,  that  in  his  various 
works  we  may  find  the  most  recent  and  best  accredited 
utterances  of  the  experimental  school.  For  this, 
however,  we  ought  raihrr-to  ii^v  to  Herbert  Spencer 
and  G.  H.  Lewes.     -Milfs^  '•  Logic "  is,  of  course. 


,  t ,    11     1 1  >  • 


♦  Cf.for  instance,  MaudsUij';  Kp:/' JCGnscicnce- spol  Orgamsation," 
in  "Body  and  Mind."       •..•■•;:  ■     :' 


156 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OP   MILL. 


to  a  large  extent,  exempted  from  such  criticism,  but 
only  because,  to  a  large  extent,  it  disavows  the 
metaphysical  foundation  of  the  "  Examination.'*  Yet 
even  here,  in  those  Logical  questions  which  depend 
upon  metaphysical  considerations, — as  the  question  of 
General  Ideas,  and  Abstraction,  and  possibly,  too,  the 
theory  of  Real  Kinds  in  Nature,— the  instability  of  the 
foimdation  will  make  itself  felt.  And,  at  all  events, 
the  student  of  Mill's  "  Logic  "  cannot  well  be  debarred 
from  the  study  of  Mill's  deeper,  fundamental  in- 
quiries. For,  as  3Iill  says,  with  a  prophetic  insight, 
of  which  possibly  he  did  not  see  the  full  application, 
"  the  difficulties  of  Metaphysics  lie  at  the  root  of  all 
Science." 


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The  Devil— Crime— Drunkenness- 
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The  Sabbath.  Third  Edition.  Crown 
8vo.     Cloth,  price  6s. 

Speech  in  Season.  Fourth 
Edition.     Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price 

Thoughts   for  the  Times. 

Tenth  Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  ^s.  6d. 


HAWEIS  (Rev.  H.  R.y-continued. 
Unsectarian        Family 

Prayers,  for  Morning  and  Evening 
for  a  Week,  with  short  selected 
passages  from  the  Bible.  Second 
Edition.  Square  crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  3i.  6d. 

Arrows  in  the  Air.     Crown 

8vo.     Cioth,  price  6^. 

HAYMAN  (H.),  D.D., late  Head 
Master  of  Rugby  School. 
Rugby    School    Sermons. 

With  an  Introductory  Essay  on  the 
Indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  js.  6d. 

HELLWALD  (Baron  F.  von). 

The   Russians  in    Central 

Asia.  A  Critical  Examination, 
down  to  the  present  time,  of  the 
Geography  and  History  of  Central 
Asia.  Translated  by  Lieut.-Col. 
Theodore  Wirgman,  LL.B.  Large 
post  8vo.  With  Map.  Cloth, 
price  125. 
HELVIG  (Major  H.). 
The  operations  of  the  Ba- 
varian Army  Corps.  Translated 
by  Captain  G.  S.  Schwabe.  With 
Five  large  Maps.  In  2  vols.  Demy 
8vo.     Cloth,  price  24J. 

Tactical  Examples :  Vol.  I. 
The  Battalion,  price  1 5 J.  Vol .  1 1.  The 
Regiment  and  Brigade,  price  loj.  6d. 
Translated  from  the  German  by  Col. 
Sir  Lumley  Graham.  With  numerous 
Diagrams.  Demy  8vo.  Cloth. 
HERFORD  (Brooke). 
The  Story  of  Religion  in 
England.  A  Book  for  Young  Folk. 
Crown  8vo.    Cloth,  price  5^. 

HEWLETT  (Henry  G.). 

A   Sheaf  of  Verse.     Fcap. 

8vo.     Cloth,  price  is.  6d. 
HINTON  (James).  „,.     , 

Life  and  Letters  of.     Edited 

by  Ellice  Hopkins,  with  an  Introduc- 
tion by  Sir  W.  W.  Gull,  Bart.,  and 
Portrait  engraved  on  Steel  by  C.  H. 
Jeens.  Second  Edition.  Crown  8vo. 
Cloth,  8^.  6d. 

The  Place  of  the  Physician. 

To  which  is  added  Essays  on  the 
Law  of  Human  Life,  and  on  the 
Relation  between  Organic  and 
Inorganic  Worlds.  Second  Edi- 
tion. Crown  8vo.   Cloth,  pru;e  3*.  6rf. 


14 


A  List  of 


HI N TO N  0 9cmt%y-^mtmmd. 
Physiology    for    Practical 
Ute.     By  various  Writers.     With 

Jo  lllustmtions.     a    vols.      Second 
idition.    Crown  8vo.    Cloth,  price 

An  Atlas  of  Diseases  of  the 
llembrana  Tvmpani.  With  De- 
icriptiwTexl.  PostSva  Pnce/66*. 

The    Questions   of   Aural 

Surf  cry.  With  Illustrations.,  a  vols. 
Post  8vo.   Cloth,  price  xis.  fid. 

H.  J.  C. 
The  Art  of  Furnishing. 
A  Popular  Treatite  on  the  Principles 
of  Furnishing,  based  on  the  Laws  of 
Ctominon.  Sense,  Requirement,  and 
Picturesque  Effect.  Small  crown 
8vo.    Cloth,  price  31.  M. 

HOCKLEY  (W.   B.\ 
Tales  of  the  Zenana ;  or, 

A  Nuwab's  Leisure  Hours.  Bv  the 
Author  of  "  Pandurang  Hari."  With 
a  Preface  by  Lord  Stanley  of  Alder- 
ley.  3  vols.  Crown.  8vo.  Cloth, 
pnce  2U. 

Pandurang  Hari;  or,  Me- 
moirs of  »  Hindoo.     A  Tale   of 

Malinita  Life  mxtf  years  ago.  With 
a,  .flliM«'  bf  Sir  H.  Bartlc  E. 
Fi«i%  aCS.  I.,  &.C.  New  and 
'CiMapcr  Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  6f . 
HOFFBAUER  (Capt.). 
The  German  ArtiUefy  in 
the  Battles  near  Met*.  Based 
on  the  official  reports  of  the  German 
Artillerf.  Translated  by  Capt  E. 
O.  Hoffiit.  With  Map  and  Plans. 
Demy  Svo.    Cloih,  price  ai*. 

HOLMES  (B.  O.  A.). 
Poems.    Fcap.  8yo.    Cloth, 

■price  51. 
HOLROYO  (Miuor  W.  R.  M). 
Tas-hil    ul     KHam ;     or, 

Hindustani  made  Easy.  Crown  8va 
Cloth,  price  5 J. 

HOOPER  (Mary). 

Little  Dinners:  How  to 
Serve  them  with  Elegance  and 
Economy.  Thirteenth  Edition. 
Crown  8va    Cloth,  price  51. 


HOOPER  {Ui^xy).— continued. 
Cookery  for  Invalids,  Per- 
sons of  Delicate  Digestion,  and 
Children.   Crown  8 vo.   Cloth,  price 
3^ .  fid. 

Every- Day  Meals.  Being 
Economical  and  Wholesome  Recipes 
for  Breakfast,  Luncheon,  and  Sup- 
per. Second  Edition.  Crown  8vo. 
Cloth,  price  5J. 

HOOPER  (Mrs.  G.). 
The  House  of  Raby.    With 
a  Frontispiece.     Crown  8vo.    Cloth, 
price  yt.  w. 

HOPKINS  (Ellice). 
Life  and  Letters  of  James 
Hinton,  with  an  Introduction  by  Sir 
W.  W.  Gull,  Ban.,  and  Portrait  en- 

f raved  on   Steel   by  C.    H.   Jeens. 
econd  Edition,   down  8vo.   Cloth, 
price  8j.  6d. 
HOPKINS  (M.). 
The    Port  of  Refuge;    or, 

Counsel  and  Aid  to  SUpmasters  in 
Difficulty,  Doubt,  or  Distres.s.  CroMm 
8vo.    Second  and  Revised  Edition. 
Cloth,  price  6s. 
HORNE  (William),  M.A. 
Reason    and    Revelation: 

an  Examination  into  the  Nature  and 
Contents  of  Scripture  Revelation,  as 
compared  with  other  Forms  of  Trutli. 
Demy  8vo.    Cloth,  price  la*. 

HORNER  (The  Misses). 
Walks  in  Florence.   A  New 

and  thoroughly  Revised  Edition.  1 
vols,  crown  8vo.  Cloth  limp.  With 
Illu&trations. 

Vol.  I.— Churches,  Streets,  and 
Palaces.  lojr.  6//.  Vol.  II.— Public 
Galleries  and  Museums.    5*. 

HOWARD  (Mary  M.). 
Beatrice  Aylmer,  and  other 

Tales.   Crown  8vo.   Cloth,  price  6t. 

HOWARD  (Rev.  O.  B.). 
An    Old    Legend    of    St. 
Paul's.     Fcap.  8vo.     Cloth,  prim 
45.  6d. 

HOWELL  (James). 
A   Tale   of  the   Sea,  Son- 
nets, and  other  Poems.     Fcap. 
8vo.     Cloth,  price  5s. 

HUGHES  (Allison). 
Penelope  and  other  Poems. 

Fcap.  8vo.    Cloth,  price  41  6d. 


C,  Kegan  Paul  &*  Co,*s  Puhlications. 


15 


HULL  (Edmund  C.  P.). 
The  European  in  India. 
With  a  Medical  Guide  for  Anglo- 
Indians.  By  R.  R.  S.  Mair,  M.D., 
F.R.C.  S.E.  Third  Edition,  Revised 
and  Corrected.  Post  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  ds. 

HUMPHREY  (Rev.  W.). 
Mr.  Fitzjames  Stephen  and 
Cardinal  Bellarmine.    DemySvo. 
Sewed,  price  i^. 

HUTCHISON  (Lieut.  Col.  F.  J.), 
and  Capt.G.  H.  M  ACGREGOR. 
Military  Sketching  and  Re- 
connaissance. With  Fifteen  Plates. 
Small  8vo.  Cloth,  price  6j.-.  ISeiiig 
the  first  Volume  of  Military  H.ind- 
books  for  Regimental  Officers.  Edited 
by  Lieut.-Col.C.  15.  Ukackekiu'kv, 
R.  A.,  A.  A.  G. 

IGNOTUS. 
Culmshire  Folk.    A  Novel. 

New  and  Cheaper  Edition.     Crown 
8vo.     Cloth,  ptice  6x. 
INCHBOLD(J.  W.). 
Annus    Amoris.       Sonnets. 

Foolscap  8vo.     Cloth,  price  i,s.  6d. 
INGELOW  (Jean). 
The   Little    Wonder-horn. 

A  Second  Series  of  "  Stories  Told  to 
a  Child."  With  Fifteen  Illustrations. 
Small  8vo.     Cloth,  price  2s.  6d. 

Indian    Bishoprics.       By  an 

Indian  Churchman.   DemySvo.  6d. 

International    Scientific 

Series  (The).  I 

I  Forms  of  Water  :  A  Fami- 
liar Exposition  of  the  Origin  and 
Phenomena  of  Glaciers.  By  J. 
Tyndall.  LL.D.,  F.R.S.  _  With  25 
Illustrations.  Seventh  Edition. Crown 
8vo.     Cloth,  price  5^. 

II  Physics  and  Politics  ;  or, 
Thoughts  on  the  Application  of  the 
Principles  of  "  Natural  Selection  " 
and  "Inhent.ance"  to  Political  So- 
ciety. By  Walter  Bagehot.  Fourth 
Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth,  price  4^. 

III.  Foods.  By  Edward  Smith, 
M.D.,  LL.B.,  F.R.S.  With  nu- 
merous Illustrations.  Fiftli  Edition. 
Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  5-v. 

IV.  Mind  and  Body:  The  Theo- 
ries of  their  Relation.  By  Alexander 
Bain,  LL.D.  With  Four  Illustra- 
tions. Sixth  Edition.  Crown  8vo. 
Cloth,  price  4 J. 


International  Scientific 
Series  (The) — continued, 

V.  The    Study    of    Sociology. 

ByHerbert  Spencer.  .Seventh Edition. 
Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  55. 

VI.  On  the  Conservation  of 
Energy.  By  Balfour  Stewart,  M.A., 
LL.D.,  F.R.S.  With  14  Illustrations. 
Fifth  Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  ^s. 

VII.  Animal  Locomotion ;  or. 
Walking,  Swimming,  and  Flying. 
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etc.  With  130  Illustrations.  Second 
Edition.   Crown  8vo.   Cloth,  price  5jr. 

VIII.  Responsibility  in  Mental 
Disease.  By  Henry  Maudsley, 
IVt.l).  Third  Edition.  Crown  8vo. 
Cloth,  price  5.?. 

IX.  The  New  Chemistry.     By 
Professor  J.  P.  Cooke,  of  the  Har- 
vard University.     With  31  lUustra 
i.i'>ns.     Fourth  Edition.     Crown  8vo. 
Cloth,  price  5.^. 

X.  The    Science  of  Law.      By 

Professor  Sheldon  Amos.  Third 
Edition.   Crown  8vo.   Cloth,  price  5 j. 

XI.  Animal  Mechanism.  A 
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Locomotion.  By  Professor  E.  J. 
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Second  Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  s-T- 

XII.  The  Doctrine  of  Descent 
and  Darwinism.  By  Professor  Os- 
car Schmidt  (Strasburg  University). 
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tion.    Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  5J. 

XIII.  The  History  of  the  Con- 
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ence. l!y  J.  W.  Draper,  M.D., 
LL.D.  Eleventh  Edition.  Crown 
8vo.     Cloth,  price  5.V. 

XIV.  Fungi  ;  their  Nature,  In- 
fluences, Uses,  &c.  By  M.  C. 
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the  Rev.  M.  J.  Berkeley,  M.A., 
F.  L.  S.  With  numerous  Illustrations. 
Second  Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
price  5^-. 

XV.  The  Chemical  Effects  of 
Light  and  Photography.  By  Dr. 
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demy of  Berlin).  With  100  Illustra- 
tions. Third  and  Revised  Edition. 
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1 6 


A  Usi  of 


International  Scientific 
Series  (The) — continued, 

JCVI.  The  Life  and  Growth  of 

ItfWIguace.      By  William  Dwight 

Whitney,  _ Professor  of  Sanskrit  and 
Comparative  Philology  in  Yale^  Col- 
lege, New  Haven.  Second  Edition. 
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XVn.  Money  and  the  Mecha- 
nism of  Exchange.  By  W.  Stan- 
ley^ Je.vons,  M.A..,  F.R.S.  Fourth 
Edi.tioii.  Crown  8va  Cloth,  price  51. 

Xyill.  The  Nature  of  Light : 

With  a  General  Account  of  Physical 
Optics,  By  Dr.  Eugene  Lommel, 
Professor  of  Physics  in  the  Univer- 
iity  of  Erlangen.  With  188  Illustra- 
tions and  a  table  of  Spectra  in  Chn> 
mo-lithography.  Second  Edition. 
Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  51. 

XIX.  Animal  Parasites  and 
Messmates.  By  Monsieur  Van 
Beneden,  Professor  of  the  Universitf 
of  Lou  vain,    Correspondent    of   the 

Institute  of  France.  With  83  Illus- 
trations. Second  Edition.  'Crown 
%<m.    Cloth,  price  51. 

XX.  Fermentation.    By  Professor 

•Schfitienlwrger,  Director  of  the 
Chemical  Laboratory  at  the  Sor- 
bonne.  With  28  Illustrations.  Second 
Edition.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth,  price  5*. 

XXL  The  Five  Senses  of  Man, 

By  Professor  IJentstein,  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Halle.  With  91  Illustra- 
tions. Second  Edition.  Crown  Svo. 
Cloth,  price  5^. 

XXII.  The  Theory  of  Sound  in 
its  Relation  to  Music.     By  Pro 

fessor  Pielro  Blaserna,  of  the  Royal 
University  of  Rome.  With  numerous 
Illustrations.  Second  Edition.  Crown 
Svo.     Cloth,  price  jj. 

XXIIL     Studies    in    Spectrum 

Analysis.  _  liy  J.  Norman  LcKkyer. 
F.R.S.  With  six  photographic  II- 
Imtrations  of  Spectra,  and  numerous 
engravings  on  wood.  Crown  8vo. 
Second  Edition.  Cloth,  price  6*.  M* 

forthcoming  Volumes, 

Prof.  W.  KiNGDOK  Clifford,  M.A. 
The  First  Principles  of  the  Exact 
Sciences  explained  to  the  Non-ma- 
thematicai 


International  Scientific 
Series  (The). 

Forthcomi«sVols.-<ontinu.'d. 

W.  B.  Cari'enter,  LL.D.,  F.R.S. 
The  Physical  (jeography  of  the  Sea. 

Sir  John  Luhbock,  Bart.,  F.R.S. 

On  Ants  and  Bees. 

Prof  W.  T.  TmsKi.TON  Dver.  B  A., 
B.  Sc.    Form  and  Habit  in  Flowering 

Plants. 

Prof.  MicnvKf.  Fdster,  M.D.  Pro- 
topbsm  and  the  Cell  I'heory. 

H.  Charlton  _Bastian,  M.D., 
F.R.S.    The  Brain  as  au  Organ  of 

Mind. 

Prof  A.  C.  Ramsay,  LL.D.,  F.R.S. 
Earth    Sculpture:     Hills,    Valleys, 

Mountains,  Plains,  Rivers,  I^kes; 
how  they  were  Produced,  ami  how 
they  have  been  Destroj-ed. 

P.  Bert  (Professor  of  Physiology, 
Paris).  Forms  of  Life  and  other 
Cosmical  Conditions. 

Prof.  T,  H.  Hi'XLKv.  The  Crayfish  : 
an    Introduction    to   the    Study  of 

Zoology. 

The  Rev.  A  Sixcui,  D.J.,  late 
Director  of  ihe  Observatory  at  Rome. 

.1  lie  otars. 

Prof  J.  RosHNTHAt.,  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Krlangcn.  ( IciRial  Physiology 

of  Muscles  and  Nerves. 

Prof  A.  DK  QuATREFACRs,  Membre 
derinstitut.     The  Human  Race. 

Prof.  Thuk^ton-.  The  Steam  En- 
gine.    With  numerous  Engravings. 

F 1*  A  NCI  s  G  A  LTO  N ,  F.  R .  S,    Psycho- 

metry. 

J.  W.  JiTJi>.  F.R.S.  The  Laws  of 
Volcanic  Action. 

Prof  Y.  N.  BALFofK.  The  Em- 
Ijryonic  Phases  of  Animal  Life. 

J.  Livs,  Physician  to  the  Hospice 
del  a  .Sill  pc  t  r  i  e  r  e .  Tl  1  e  Brai  n  and  i  ts 
Functions.     With  Illustrations. 

Dr.^  Carl  Si-mim-k.  Animals  and 
their  Conditions  of  Existence. 

Prof.  WiiRTZ.  Atoms  and  the 
Atomic  Theory. 

George  J.  Rom  a  x  e s,  F.  L.  S.  Ani- 
mal Intelligence. 

Alfred  W.  Bennett.  A  Hand- 
book of  Cryptogamic  Botany. 


C  Kegan  Paul  &*  Coh  Puhlications. 


17 


JACKSON  (T.  G.). 
Modern   Gothic    Architec- 
ture.   Crown  8vo.     Cloth,  price  5J. 

JACOB  (Maj.-Gen.  Sir  G.  Le 
Grand),  K.C.S.I.,  C.B. 
Western  India  Before  and 
duringr  the  Mutinies.  Pictures 
drawn  from  life.  Second  Edition. 
Crown  Svo.     Cloth,  price  ts.  6d. 

JENKINS  (E.)  and  RAYMOND 
(J.),  Esqs. 

A  Legal  Handbook  for 
Architects,  Builders,  and  Build- 
ing Owners.  Second  Edition  Re- 
vised. Crown  Svo.  Cloth,  price  6s. 
JENKINS  (Rev.  R.  C),  M.A. 
The  Privilege  of  Peter  and 

the  Claims  of  tlie  Roman  Church 
confronted  with  the  Scriptures,  the 
Councils,  and  the  Testimony  of  the 
Popes  themselves.  Fcap.Bvo.  Cloth, 
price  3.T.  6^/. 

JENNINGS  (Mrs.  Vaughan). 
Rahel  :  Her  Life  and  Let- 
ters.     With   a   Portrait    from    the 
Painting  l)y  Daffinger.     Square  post 
Svo.     Cloth,  price  7^.  dd. 

JEVONS   (W.    Stanley),    M.A., 
F.R.S. 

Money  and  the  Mechanism 
of  Exchange.  Fourth  Edition. 
Crown  Svo.     Cloth,  price  5^. 

VolumeXVl  I.  of  The  International 
Scientific  Series. 

JONES  (Lucy). 
Puddings  and  Sweets.  Being 

Three     Hundred     and     Sixty- Five 
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Crown  8vo..  price  2^.  M. 
KAUFMANN  (Rev.  M.),  B.A. 

Socialism  :     Its    Nature,   its 
Dangers,    and    its    Remedies    con- 
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KER  (David). 
The  Boy  Slave  in  Bokhara. 

A  Tale  of  Central  Asia.  With  Illus- 
trations. Crown  Svo.  Cloth,  price  55. 

The    Wild    Horseman    of 

the  Pampas.     Illustrated.     Crown 
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KERNER  (Dr.  A),  Professor  of 
Botany    in    the    University    of 
Innsbruck. 
Flowers  andtheirUnbidden 

Guests.  Translation  edited  by  W. 
OtiLE.  MA.,  M.D.,  and  a  prefatory 
letter  by  C.  Darwin,  F.  R.  S.  With  11- 
lustrations.    Sq.  Svo.    Cloth,  price  9.?. 


KIDD  (Joseph),  M.D. 
The  Laws  of  Therapeutics, 

or,  the  Science  and  Art  of  Medicine. 
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cuts, and  a  Map  of  Ireland,  geologi- 
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KING  (Alice). 
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Svo.     Cloth,  price  ts.  6d. 
KING  (Mrs.  Hamilton). 

The    Disciples.      A   roem. 

Third   Edition,   with    some    Notes. 
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Aspromonte,      and      other 
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Letters   and   Memories  of 

his  Life.  Edited  by  his  Wife. 
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Life :    Conferences   delivered 

at  TouIou.se.  A  New  .and  Cheaper 
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Lady  of  Lipari  (The). 

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Love's  Rebellion :  a  Poem. 

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1 8 


A  Ust  of 


LAURIE  (J.  S). 
Educational      Course      of 
Secular  School  Books  for  India: 
The       First       Hindustani 

Reader.  Stiff  linen  wr  apper,  price  6.if. 

The    Second     Hindustani 

Reader.  Stiff  linen  wrap])er,price6(/. 

The     Oriental      (English) 

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price  7j</.  ;  HI.,  price  qd.;  IV., 
price  I  jr. 

Geography  of  India  ;    wiili 

Maps  and  Historical  Appendix. 
traciiiR  the  ("trimth  of  t!ie  British 
Empire  in  Hindustan.  Fcap.  8vo. 
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LAYMANN  (Capt.). 

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20 


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